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 ABSTRACT 
TEMPERANCE IN THE AGE OF FEELING: SENSIBILITY, PEDAGOGY, AND 
POETRY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
BY 
SARAH HATTIE MAITLAND 
British Romanticism has traditionally been understood as participating in a 
narrative of progressive secularism. Temperance in the Age of Feeling seeks to 
challenge this narrative by examining the influence of temperance on Romantic 
conceptualizations of the relationship between sensation, thought, and feeling. I begin 
my argument by investigating Romantic notions of temperance as influenced by Book 
II of Spenser’s The Faerie Queene. I claim that Romantic temperance differs from 
classical temperance because Romantic temperance is concerned with balancing 
mental faculties while classical temperance is concerned with moderating passions. 
Next I consider how temperance influenced Romantic theories of the relationship 
between the senses and the mind. Drawing on the study of neuro-Romanticism, I argue 
that Romantic medicine and Romantic poetry—most particularly Wordsworth’s 
poetry—shared a concern with the possible negative repercussions of sensory 
overstimulation. In my final chapter I engage with the overlap between temperance in 
Romantic theories of education, religious sermons from the period, and Wordsworth’s 
poetry. By looking at education theory with religious sermons and poetry I show the 
ways religious thought on temperance influenced many of the educational ideas and 
aesthetic ideals that continue to govern modern pedagogy. The three chapters are 
united by their preoccupation with the ways that typically religious ideals of 
 temperance are woven into the ideas that shaped education, poetry, and mental health 
at the moment they were first becoming recognizably “modern.”  
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PREFACE TO 
TEMPERANCE IN THE AGE OF FEELING 
 Romanticists with ties to a variety of critical movements in the field have been 
united in the alacrity with which they have eluded the issue of Romantic religiosity. 
For example, in his introduction to Romanticism: An Anthology (2012), Duncan Wu 
writes of the Romantics:  
It is not just their capacity for optimism that distinguishes them, but the 
kind of belief to which they clung. Where earlier generations looked to 
an afterlife, the Romantics tended to reject formalized religion . . . 
Instead they thought they could create through their writing, a promised 
land in which property was of no consequence and people would live in 
harmony. Wordsworth is famous for having said he had no need of a 
redeemer, when he wrote “Tintern Abbey” he had little need of God, at 
least in the generally accepted sense. For him mankind is capable of 
redemption through an act of self-realization. (xxxix) 
In the section above, Wu defines Romanticism against religious belief with little 
attention given to defending the assertion. It is, Wu argues, a defining feature of 
Romanticism that the Romantics believed not in religion but in literature. In his 
introduction to Romanticism, Wu carefully considers the influence of the French 
Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, the rise of the media, the state of the Monarchy, 
and sexual politics on the Romantic period. Given his careful resistance to master 
narratives of the period, such a quick dismissal of the influence of religion is 
surprising. I do not point out his dismissal to undercut the contribution Wu makes to 
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the field. His anthology beautifully complicates accepted interpretations of the period 
by arguing for a greater diversity of authors and more attention to the ways the 
concept of Romanticism itself resists definition. I point out the way Wu bypasses 
religion in his introduction because it is largely indicative of attitudes in the field. 
Whether it is Paul de Man’s notion of demystification or M.H. Abrams’ theory of 
assimilation, one of the few points on which most Romanticists have historically 
agreed is that the Romantic period participates in a movement away from a religious 
understanding of the world toward a secularity more commensurate with modernity. 
This view of Romanticism as playing a crucial role in our march toward 
secular modernity often obscures that Romanticism was a minority movement. Many 
authors of the period such as Hannah Moore and Maria Edgeworth did not participate 
in the radical politics or the radical poetics we now think of as indicative of the 
Romantic period. Narrativizing the Romantic period from the present magnifies the 
risk of normalizing those elements of Romanticism that more closely align with 
modern sensibilities.  
 Recently, however, there has been a movement in Romantic studies to 
complicate the narrative of secular modernity by more thoroughly historicizing the 
role of religion in the Romantic period. It is from one such project that I take my 
departure. Colin Jager’s book, The Book of God: Secularization and Design in the 
Romantic Era (2007) offers a way to re-think progressivist narratives that posit a 
“religious” past against a “secular” modernity. Jager uses the presence and importance 
of the argument from design in Romantic literature as a means through which to 
critique the role the Romantic period is often cast as playing in narratives of secular 
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modernity. But The Book of God does not simply provide a history of the changing 
concept or value of “intelligent design” during the Romantic period; Jager’s book 
illustrates how that concept has come to be woven into modernity. Jager examines 
“how religion finds ways to creatively appropriate the institutional transformations 
that characterize modernity” (39). Published just two years after Tammy Kitzmiller, et 
al. v. Dover Area School District1 (2005), Jager’s critique is significant in a way he 
could not foresee when he began his research. Jager’s work re-frames arguments for 
adding “intelligent design” to public school science curricula by showing how the 
argument from design was never really subverted.  
In the final chapter, “Religion Three Ways,” Colin Jager offers three 
definitions of religion to nuance our understanding of religion’s potential role in 
modernity. Jager’s first definition, “religion as belief” (202), situates religion 
internally as a set of beliefs on whose acceptance salvation hangs. Jager problematizes 
this definition by showing that it divides religion (a set of beliefs) from piety (devotion 
to belief) and facilitates the evaluation of religious precepts on the basis of truth-value. 
The division of belief from devotion to belief is advantageous for scholars as it allows 
for an objective study of an internal phenomenon but it also positions religion against 
reason. Religion becomes the object of study and reason. Jager follows the 
ramifications of this divide through linguistic derivation. Drawing from John Montag, 
Jager shows that the division between revelation and reason is rooted in the changing 
                                                
1 Tammy Kitzmiller, et al. v. Dover Area School District was the first challenge 
brought before the courts against a school system on the topic of intelligent design. 
The case was brought by a group of parents who objected to Dover Area School 
District’s addition of intelligent design to their science curriculum. Although the court 
ruled against the teaching of intelligent design on the grounds that it is not science the 
debate has continued in school systems across the United States.  
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conceptualization of the words.2 Montag argues that Aquinas understood “revelation” 
as a process; he contrasts this meaning with the modern understanding of “revelation” 
as a disclosure of hidden meaning or truth. Montag claims the division between these 
two understandings of revelation is between “having” and “being” (204). Aquinas’ 
revelation is a process of being while modern understandings of revelation “conceive 
of it as having content” (204). 
 Jager’s second definition, “religion as ideology” (206), positions religion 
inside the narrative of modern secular progressivism. Jager argues that once one 
accepts religion as belief it becomes possible to critique it as a “false consciousness” 
(206). If religion is false consciousness, as Marx contends, then the job of modernity 
is to liberate those that labor under its yoke. Jager complicates the conceptualization of 
religion as false consciousness by showing how dependent it is on the assumption that 
one is looking at it from the perspective of an objective, non-historically contingent 
“true” consciousness.  
 Jager’s third definition, “religion as discipline” (210), posits religion as 
engagement in a practice. To elucidate this definition, Jager draws on two analogic 
sources: Wordsworth’s “Nuns fret not at their Convent’s narrow room” (re-printed 
below) and a section from Saba Mahmood’s “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the 
                                                
2 Jager gets to revelation by way of Montag’s analysis of the changing understanding 
of “natural” and “supernatural.” Montag contrasts contemporary understandings of 
“natural” and “supernatural” with their Thomistic meanings. Whereas “natural” in 
contemporary usage refers to physical matter and “supernatural” refers to that which 
violates natural laws, for Aquinas “natural” refers to “the kind of thing a thing is” 
(204). “Supernatural” events, for Aquinas, are events that expand our understanding of 
nature by showing us that “natural things are open to a realm outside themselves” 
(204). Revelation, for Aquinas, is about perspective.  
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Docile Agent: Some Reflections on the Egyptian Islamic Revival” (211, 214). 
Wordsworth’s poem, Jager argues, utilizes analogy to forge connections between the 
work of a nun, hermit, a student, a weaver, a bee, and a poet.  
Nuns fret not at their Convent’s narrow room; 
And Hermits are contented with their Cells; 
And Students with their pensive Citadels: 
Maids at the Wheel, the Weaver at his Loom, 
Sit blithe and happy; Bees that soar for bloom, 
High as the highest Peak of Furness Fells, 
Will murmur by the hour in Foxglove bells: 
In truth, the prison, unto which we doom  
Ourselves, no prison is: and hence to me, 
In sundry moods, ‘twas pastime to be bound  
Within the Sonnet’s scanty plot of ground: 
Pleas’d if some Souls (for such there needs must be) 
Who have felt the weight of too much liberty, 
Should find short solace there, as I have found. (Wordsworth: The 
Major Works 286) 
Jager challenges the simplistic reading of this poem as shaping an understanding of 
freedom “realized through constraint rather than over against it” (211) by explicating 
the analogy. In Jager’s reading the analogy buckles under the pressure of 
dissimilitude. While the poetic voice takes temporary solace in the constraint of the 
sonnet, Jager argues, the nun experiences her vocation as an imperative that brings 
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with it permanent constraint. In the absence of an organic analogy the poem relies on 
the subtle logic of substitution to participate in a narrative of secular modernism. In 
this narrative, Jager claims, religious discipline transforms into the optional pastime of 
sonnet writing. Jager’s assertion is not groundbreaking; Wordsworth’s poetry has long 
been read as participating in a narrative of secular modernism. However, Jager follows 
his reading by inverting the implications of his conclusion: 
In the case of Wordsworth’s poem, the very act of transforming 
discipline into a modern form aligns the rules of the sonnet with 
instinct, disposition, and confinement, thereby sketching a meeting 
ground between writer and reader that is neither idea nor belief but an 
affective and bodily posture. On this reading, life devoted to God is 
little different, in its form, from a life of learning or spinning or 
weaving—in short, an activity or vocation demanding certain skills and 
certain dispositions. (214) 
Instead of delegitimizing religious discipline by transforming it into sonnet writing, 
Jager concludes, “Nun’s fret” highlights the characteristics sonnets share with 
discipline. For Jager “Nun’s fret” is a site of convergence between different kinds of 
work—the work of faith, study, production, writing, and reading. This convergence of 
types of work replaces the narrative of succession from the simplistic reading with 
which he began. My interest in Jager’s reading is twofold. First, Jager’s argument 
complicates our understanding of the Romantic Period as participating in a narrative 
of secular modernity; and, second, Jager’s reading of “Nun’s fret” argues for a 
conceptual convergence between a life of religious devotion, writing and reading on 
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the ground of a “model of subjectivity produced through discipline and training” 
(215).  
 Jager’s second analogic example further clarifies his meaning. Jager draws this 
example from Saba Mahmood’s “Feminist Theory, Embodiment, and the Docile 
Agent.” Jager paraphrases Mahmood:  
A virtuoso pianist . . . can achieve excellence only by submitting 
herself to a rigorous program of drills, lessons, and exercises; the 
freedom of expertise, accordingly, is not the freedom of an autonomous 
will but rather the freedom of mastery—the mastery of a certain set of 
habits, skills, dispositions, or bodily postures. (The Book of God 214) 
In this analogy Mahmood navigates the difference between two perceptions of 
freedom: the freedom of autonomous will and the freedom of mastery. The freedom of 
mastery, Mamood suggests, comes only through self-discipline. If one desires to play 
the piano with expertise, one must practice—practice being the acquisition of a set of 
habits through repetition. In Mahmood’s analogy those habits are both physical—the 
postures and positions of play—and mental—the purposeful and repeated submission 
of oneself. The two kinds of mastery, mastery over the instrument and mastery over 
the self, have a cyclical relationship. As Mahmood’s pianist submits herself to practice 
her musical skills improve; as her musical skills improve so too does her mastery over 
herself.  
 Jager’s reading of “Nuns fret” and his gloss of Mahmood’s musical analogy 
yoke together practices of religious discipline with practices of art. In his reading both 
kinds of discipline hinge on habit formation through voluntary practices of 
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submission. My dissertation is an attempt to continue the discussion Jager begins in 
his book by examining the ways temperance—the religious virtue concerned with 
habit formation—figures in the poetry and prose of the Romantic period. My goals are 
twofold: to argue that temperance informs Romantic conceptualizations of the 
relationship between sensibility and the self, and, on a larger scale, to provide the 
conditions of possibility to critique contemporary ideas about what the study of the 
Humanities can accomplish.   
I begin my argument by tracing Romantic notions of temperance through the 
influence of Book II of Spenser’s The Faerie Queene. In so doing I complicate current 
understandings of Spenser’s influence on the Romantic period and develop a period-
specific theory of temperance. Next I consider how temperance influenced Romantic 
thought on the interaction between the senses and the mind by examining the budding 
field of Romantic neurology3 and representations of madness in Romantic poetry. In 
my final chapter I continue my study by engaging with temperance in Romantic 
theories of education and sermons from the period. By pairing education theory with 
religious sermons, I show the ways that religious thought on temperance influenced 
many of the educational ideas that continue to govern modern pedagogy. The three 
chapters are united by their preoccupation with the ways that typically religious ideals 
of temperance are woven into the ideas that shaped education, poetry, and mental 
health at the moment they were first becoming recognizably “modern.”  
                                                
3 I say here the “budding field” of Romantic neurology and although accurate I should 
clarify that even as a “budding” field the ideas about the mind I discuss are only 
circulating among a small group of intellectuals during the period.   
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Religion is a particularly slippery term; historically contingent, subjective, 
deeply personal, and yet undeniably political, any definition of “religion” is 
understandably difficult to pin down. Although certainly associated with British 
Anglicanism during the romantic period, when I discuss “religion” within the province 
of this project I refer not to specific doctrine but to a practice. Temperance lends itself 
to understanding religion as a practice. Temperance is not a set of principles, a belief, 
or an ideology; temperance is a practice through which one becomes.  
Although we now associate temperance with abstinence from alcohol, until the 
1830’s it meant no such thing. In fact, temperance was not associated with teetotalism 
until 1832 when Joseph Livesey and six other men signed a pledge of total abstinence 
from alcohol in Preston, England. Prior to that pledge, temperance was associated with 
moderation in reference to self-control or command, including the physical appetites 
and emotional and mental faculties.4   
My interest in the term is in this sense: moderation, balance, and self-control. 
Classical in origin, temperance was the word chosen to translate classical concepts of 
sound-mindedness, self-control, and moderation from Plato and Aristotle during the 
Medieval period. Temperance is one of the four cardinal virtues identified by Plato in 
The Republic and one of the seven virtues adopted by the Catholic Church. For 
Thomas Aquinas it was the virtue from which all others flowed. Because temperance 
                                                
4 Annemarie McAllister, a cultural historian at the University of Lancashire, has 
published widely on the temperance movement in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. She has observed that the British and American temperance movements 
developed simultaneously but that the focus in Britain was more on “moral suasion” 
and less on legislation. The difference may be owing to the history of temperance in 
Britain. Although my argument will not take part in a discussion of teetotalism, I will 
argue that Wordsworth’s poetic theory emphasizes temperance as a moral faculty 
essential to self-formation in the Romantic period.  
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is the virtue through which self-discipline is learned and maintained, for Aquinas, all 
other virtues that require moderation such as chastity and meekness are part of 
temperance. Aquinas also believed that temperance allowed for a deeper and more 
sustained enjoyment of wholesome pleasures because it preserved the relationship 
between sensual experience and reason. 
  By way of Tyndale and Wycliffe, temperance was added to the English 
translations of the Old and New Testaments to replace the Latin modestia in previous 
versions. Modestia and temperantia differ in their connotations. Modestia can refer to 
propriety while temperantia refers to balance, moderation, and self-restraint 
(Fairbank). When temperantia replaces modestia in 2 Peter, “And beside this, giving 
all diligence, add to your faith virtue; and to virtue knowledge; And to knowledge 
temperance; and to temperance patience; and to patience godliness” (King James 
Bible, 2 Peter 1.5-6) the substitution prioritizes self-discipline over adherence to a 
specific social order. This change is especially important for how it figures in the 
listing of attributes. The attributes are layered as they build upon each other. Situated 
between knowledge and patience, temperance is positioned between thought, feeling, 
and sensation (where patience is understood as endurance of feeling and sensations). 
 Religious conceptualizations of temperance during the Romantic period pick 
up on the connection between temperance and feeling. Poet and Sermonist Richard 
Graves claims that the intemperate man is “under the tyranny of his sensual appetites; 
which he has so far indulged as to have lost all relish for every other enjoyment . . . his 
understanding is clouded, and his imagination extinguished. . . he has lost all taste for 
the common enjoyments and innocent amusements, of life” (“Sermons on the 
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Following Subjects” 117-118). Graves’ concern here is in the relationship between 
sensual enjoyment and sensibility. Sensibility decreases in inverse correlation to 
sensual enjoyment—or at least certain kinds of sensual enjoyment.  
Graves’ concern for the affects of sensual enjoyment on the vitality of the 
imagination might seems odd but during the Romantic period the imagination was of 
paramount importance. Coleridge defines the imagination in his “Biographia 
Literaria” (1815-1817) as the capacity of the human mind to create; Coleridge writes, 
“the primary imagination I hold to be the living power and prime agent of all human 
perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the 
infinite I AM . . . the secondary I consider as . . . differing only in degree, and in its 
mode of operation an echo of the former . . . it dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order 
to re-create . . . it struggles to idealize and to unify” (313). This definition carefully 
marks out the role and the import of the imagination. The imagination, for Coleridge, 
is the operative faculty through which man understand the world. As the “repetition” 
of the act of creation inside the mind of man the imagination is also the faculty that 
connects mankind to the creative power of divinity. By connecting the imagination to 
the divine act of creation, Coleridge claims for the human imagination the power not 
only to understand the world but also to change the world.  The secondary 
imagination, although less powerful than the primary, is still capable of 
transformation. The secondary imagination goes beyond the role Coleridge claims for 
fancy; the secondary imagination transforms and re-creates. Protecting and even 
increasing imaginative capacity, then, is a moral concern and anything that 
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“extinguishes” (“Sermons on the Following Subjects” 117-118) it—in Graves’ 
words—would be a danger to humanity. 
 Wordsworth expresses a concern similar to Graves’ in the 1802 “Preface” to 
Lyrical Ballads. Wordsworth is concerned that “a multitude of causes, unknown to 
former times, are now acting with a combined force to blunt the discriminating powers 
of the mind, and unfitting it for all voluntary exertion to reduce it to a state of torpor” 
(Wordsworth: The Major Works 599). Wordsworth is referring to what he sees as an 
increasingly voracious appetite for sensational entertainment. Like Graves, 
Wordsworth believes that feeding this appetite with more and more intense sensation 
lessens one’s ability to feel. By the same logic temperance expands one’s ability to 
feel by increasing sensitivity to subtle stimuli.  
This work of increasing sensibility is intrinsic to the Romantic project. 
Wordsworth’s poetry is especially pedagogic in the sense that it seeks to engage 
readers in the development of habits of mind that increase sensitivity to common, 
everyday pleasures. Wordsworth 1799 Prelude begins with a reflection on the role of 
the river Derwent that illustrates my point. 
 For this, didst thou, 
O Derwent, travelling over the green plains 
Near my ‘sweet birthplace’, didst thou, beauteous stream,  
Make ceaseless music through the night and day, 
Which with its steady cadence tempering 
Our human waywardness, composed my thoughts 
To more than infant softness, giving me 
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Among the fretful dwellings of mankind 
A knowledge, a dim earnest, of the calm 
Which nature breathes among the fields and groves? (1-15) 
In this passage the Derwent both shapes thought and serves as a model for the way 
that poetry can shape thought. The Derwent shapes the Poet’s thought by imbuing it 
with an echo of the river’s own steadiness. Through its “ceaseless music” and “steady 
cadence” the river curbs human tendencies toward waywardness. The steadiness of the 
river shapes the poet to such a degree that tumult of later life cannot undo its lessons. 
In fact, the Poet’s very thoughts were “composed” by the river’s cadence. 
“Composed” has double meaning in this passage. In addition to meaning that the river 
forms the Poet’s patterns of thought while still in infancy, it also means that those 
thoughts are composed, or tranquil. “Composed” is also a play on the composition of 
the poetry. The River, then, is responsible not only for imbuing the poet with a calm 
that continues with him throughout life but also for forming him into one who can 
compose. Far from limiting the Poet’s passionate engagement in feeling, the calm of 
the river makes him sensitive even in less favorable circumstances to subtle stimuli 
like the “breath” of nature. 
 Wordsworth ends the 1850 Prelude with a statement of pedagogic intent. He 
writes, “What we have loved / Others will love, and we will teach them how” 
(XIV.448-49). For Wordsworth poetry was both an expression of feeling and a lesson 
in how to feel. The poetry and prose I examine in this dissertation takes up this issue 
of how to feel. Often the answers to that question are seemingly contradictory because 
they suggest that feeling more means needing less to instigate feeling. Instead of an 
 xx 
ever-increasing pursuit of stimuli to inspire feeling the Romantic poetry I study seeks 
to re-form the associations of the mind so that every river, every breeze, and every 
person one encounters elicit feeling.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
TOWARD A DEFINITION OF ROMANTIC TEMPERANCE: IMAGINATION, 
MEMORY, AND MEDIATION 
Critics have characteristically understood British Romanticism as a reaction to 
and rejection of the Enlightenment’s prioritization of reason as the ultimate 
humanizing mental faculty. One feature of this reaction is the Romantic period’s 
renewed interest in the power of the imagination and its conviction that this power 
could produce real social and political change. For this reason temperance—a virtue 
typically associated with the suppression or restraint of feeling— is not a concept 
commonly associated with the Romantic period. However, in this chapter I will argue 
that it is because of this preoccupation with the power of the imagination that a 
uniquely Romantic form of temperance becomes important during the late-eighteenth 
and early-nineteenth century. Heavily influenced by Spenser’s depiction of 
temperance in Book II of The Faerie Queene, Romantic temperance concerns the 
balance of the mind between imagination and memory. 
ROMANTIC TEMPERANCE 
Mentions of temperance abound in Romantic poetry and prose. The words 
temperance or temperate appear twenty-four times in Wordsworth’s collected letters, 
at least fifteen times in The Prelude, and even more often in The Excursion.1 Only two 
uses of the word in his letters are inconsistent with temperance as balance. 
Wordsworth uses the word once in reference to alcohol, in his 1820 letter to Lord 
Lonsdale, and in that letter Wordsworth specifies his meaning by saying “temperate in 
                                                
1 There are fewer examples in Coleridge’s writing but still a significant number. I 
found thirteen separate instances in his poetry and prose.  
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respect to drinking.” And once he uses “temperate” to describe the pleasing weather. 
In all other cases the word denotes a state of mind.2 
The most compelling instance of the word “temperance” in Wordsworth’s 
letters is in his March 1804 letter to Thomas De Quincy. In the letter he counseled, 
I am anxious to hear . . . that you have not been seduced into unworthy 
pleasures or pursuits . . .. I need not say to you that there is no true 
dignity but in virtue and temperance . . . and that the best safeguard of 
all these is the cultivation of pure pleasures, namely, those of the 
intellect and affections . . .. I speak in simplicity and tender 
apprehension3 as one lover of Nature and Virtue speaking to another . . 
. love Nature and Books; seek these and you will be happy; for virtuous 
friendship, and love, and knowledge of mankind, must inevitably 
accompany these. (The Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth 
1878–1805 454) 
In the above quotation Wordsworth connects several concepts that are integral to an 
understanding of Romantic temperance. He draws a bridge between intellect, 
affection, temperance, nature, and books. Wordsworth counsels De Quincy to cultivate 
the pleasures of intellect and affection in order to safeguard virtue and temperance. 
                                                
2 I have omitted the uses of the word in The Prelude and The Excursion from my count 
when it has a different meaning.  
3 Earlier in this letter Wordsworth alludes to a letter De Quincy sent him in praise of 
Lyrical Ballads, his own reticence in responding due to various circumstances, and—
most importantly—De Quincy’s recent matriculation at Oxford. Wordsworth’s 
concern for De Quincy is closely tied to his own university experience at Cambridge 
where he said men’s manners were “frantic and dissolute.” Since it is unlikely 
Wordsworth intended to indicate mental illness by his use of “frantic,” it is most likely 
meant to indicate an intense level of excitement, specified as “ungovernable” by the 
OED.  
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His assertion that the best way to develop temperance is to cultivate pleasure is at odds 
with a conventional understanding of temperance as a suppression of passion or 
feeling (Oxford English Dictionary “Temperance”). We might ask: what do the 
pleasures of intellect and affection have to do with temperance?  In addition, for those 
familiar with classical temperance the juxtaposition of nature and books might seem 
curious. Nowhere in the Nicomachean Ethics does Aristotle (384–322 BC) discuss the 
importance of nature or books to temperance, although he does discuss the importance 
of temperance to happiness. In fact, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle separates the 
moral virtues from the intellectual virtues and identifies moral virtue not as a capacity 
but as a state of character (29). In this letter Wordsworth conflates intellectual and 
moral virtues and suggests that they have a cyclical relationship of practice and 
production.4   
I point out this discrepancy between classical temperance and Wordsworth’s 
use of the word in his letter to De Quincy to help establish the terms of my project. 
Although temperance is integral to the Romantic period, the temperance of the 
Romantic period is different from classical temperance. Aristotle’s temperance is the 
mean point between two extremes. For example, in his discussion of the proper 
management of anger and meekness—two feelings he identifies as opposites—
Aristotle calls the desired emotional balance or temperate state the “mean state” (The 
Nicomachean Ethics 145). Both extremes that influence the mean state—anger and 
meekness—have the potential to be vices. Virtue exists only in the middle point 
                                                
4 Wordsworth tells De Quincy to “love Nature and Books; seek these and you will be 
happy; for virtuous friendship, and love, and knowledge of mankind, must inevitably 
accompany these.” To seek is to take action, but it is cyclical as well because that 
action produces and is produced by love. 
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between anger and meekness. The cultivation of pleasure does not factor into 
Aristotle’s definition of temperance. Classical temperance is this balance between and 
regulation of emotions, impulses, and desires regardless of their intensity.   
My aim in this chapter is not to align Romanticism with emotional moderation 
and argue for an as-of-yet unexplored moralistically conservative Romanticism or to 
prove that the Romantics were not invested in idealism or preoccupied with the power 
of the imagination. On the contrary, my goal is to explore the ways that temperance 
works in Romantic prose and poetry. In so doing I argue that for the Romantics the 
term “temperance” meant something quite different from Classical temperance, 
something far more in keeping with what we have come to understand as the 
Romantic imagination.  
Although, like classical temperance, Romantic temperance is concerned with 
balance and regulation, instead of mediating between opposing emotions or desires 
Romantic temperance mediates between faculties of mind. In the letter I quoted 
previously, Wordsworth tells De Quincy that the best way to “safeguard” temperance 
is “the cultivation of pure pleasures, namely, those of the intellect and affections” (The 
Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth 1878–1805 454). He goes on to write, 
“love Nature and Books; seek these and you will be happy; for virtuous friendship, 
and love, and knowledge of mankind, must inevitably accompany these” (The Letters 
of William and Dorothy Wordsworth 1878–1805 454). Wordsworth makes two claims 
in these lines. First, that pleasures of the intellect and affection encourage temperance 
and, second, that a love of nature and books will inevitably lead to the development of 
these pleasures. In his first claim he poses the pleasures of intellect and affection as 
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two different kinds of pleasure. Wordsworth does not define either kind of pleasure for 
De Quincy but in his 1802 “Preface to Lyrical Ballads” he writes that his poetic aim is 
to explore the mind under the influence of pleasures of affection. Among these 
pleasures he includes those that tie self to society such as maternal passion and the 
mind at the moment of death “cleaving in solitude to life and society” (Wordsworth: 
The Major Works 598–99). The meaning of “intellectual pleasures” is more obscure. 
“Intellectual pleasures” encompass the pleasures of thought that Wordsworth values 
equally with feeling. In the “Preface” he stresses the importance of “habits of 
meditation” and contemplation. These habits of thought are positioned cyclically with 
the pleasures of feeling so that they produce and are produced by them (598). It is 
between these two kinds of pleasure—intellect and affection, or thought and feeling—
that I situate Romantic temperance.  
 TEMPERANCE AND ROMANTIC SPENSERIANISM  
Temperance as positioned between thought and feeling derives from Book II of 
Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, in which Spenser portrays temperance as a mental 
space existing between memory and imagination, fed by both and responsible for 
negotiating between them. Because Spenser is so important to an understanding of 
Romantic temperance I begin with a discussion of the influence of Spenser on the 
Romantic period, drawing heavily from Greg Kucich the foremost critic on Romantic 
Spenserianism. From there I move to a critical history of temperance in Book II of 
Spenser’s The Faerie Queene in preparation to define Romantic temperance as a 
unique concept. I then conclude by examining the way it operates in Romantic poetry.  
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In Keats, Shelley, and Romantic Spenserianism (1991), Greg Kucich attributes 
the Romantic popularity of Spenser to three causes: first, a fascination with 
Renaissance texts arising from the perceived relationship between the Renaissance and 
Romantic poetry; second, a desire to avoid a comparison between Romantic poetry 
and Milton’s epic; and, third, a particular connection to Spenser inspired by the themes 
of The Fareie Queene that speak more directly to Romantic concerns than Paradise 
Lost.5 Kucich first claim is a commonplace in the field; Romantic poets felt a kinship 
to the Renaissance through which they attempted to circumnavigate more complicated 
and, often, frustrated feelings about Enlightenment philosophy. Kucich, like many 
other critics, defines the Romantic period by its emphasis on imagination against the 
Enlightenment’s prioritization of reason. He argues that the Romantics were especially 
interested in Spenser because Enlightenment critiques of The Faerie Queene attacked 
Spenser for lacking the very quality that the Romantics found undesirable in 
Enlightenment literature: an abundance of judgment. 
In his second point Kucich argues that Milton was considered the preeminent 
poet,6 so much so that feelings of inadequacy threatened to inhibit Romantic poets and 
                                                
5 Although Kucich’s second and third point may seem similar, in his second point he 
argues that Romantic poets feared their work would be inferior when compared to 
Paradise Lost while in his third point he argues that The Faerie Queene is 
thematically Romantic.  
6 Although Kucich accounts for Blake’s critique of Milton, saying somewhat 
fancifully that Blake “imagined Milton wandering in eternity waiting for someone to 
redeem the errors of his epic” he does not discuss Wordsworth’s critique of Milton 
(68). Although many of Wordsworth’s books are housed at the Dove Cottage Library, 
so few contain notes that a study of them is not advantageous or necessary. 
Wordsworth’s copy of Paradise Lost is a notable exception. The poet wrote in and 
marked his copy of Paradise Lost. The extent of Wordsworth’s commentary is out of 
character even when compared to other books he annotated. Bishop C. Hunt published 
a transcript of Wordsworth’s annotations in the 1969 Bulletin of the New York Public 
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stop them from composing epic poetry.7 Since epic poetry was considered the height 
of poetic accomplishment the Romantics needed a way to engage with its past without 
bringing to bear comparison with Milton’s great accomplishment. Kucich claims that 
Spenser presented an appealing alternative because although he also wrote epic, his 
epic was “incomplete and problematic” (13). Kucich argues that because The Faerie 
                                                
Library. Wordsworth wrote commentary on thirteen passages, as Hunt has observed 
the distribution of his commentary was as follows: Wordsworth commented on two 
passages in Book III, one in Book VI, two in Book VII, one in IX, one in X, five in 
XI, and one in XII. The majority of the written commentary is corrective and 
addresses both plot and style. Of these corrective comments several identify 
inconsistencies in plot or narrative logic—Hunt argues this is indicative of 
Wordsworth’s close reading of Milton. Wordsworth’s corrective commentary and 
those sections he marked reveal a significant difference in his reading of Paradise Lost 
when compared to Blake’s or Shelley’s. Certainly Wordsworth did not seem to be 
preoccupied by the Miltonic Satan and he certainly did not seem to be consumed by 
the same awe Keats felt of Milton himself. Keats wrote, “the thousand melancholies 
and magnificences of this Page—leaves no room for anything to be said thereon, but, 
‘so it is’” (84). The tone of Keats’s marginalia differs drastically from Wordsworth’s. 
Although influenced by Milton’s epic, Wordsworth’s comments on Milton’s work do 
not portray a mind in awe of genius. Where Keats expresses reverence, Wordsworth 
critiques Milton as one would a contemporary. Wordsworth’s comments illustrate his 
love of Paradise Lost through his capacity for close, critical reading. His marginalia 
also show the distinct differences between his own style and Milton’s. Wordsworth’s 
critique is unsurprising given his own poetic pursuits but it is revealing of his poetic 
theory. In most of the corrective comments Wordsworth advocates for the addition of 
simple picturesque images where Milton has utilizes sublime imagery.  
7 Romanticism has traditionally understood the relationship between Milton and his 
Romantic inheritors as one of failure because the epics the Romantics intended to 
write were never fully realized. In The Romantic Legacy of Paradise Lost Jonathan 
Shears claims that this is true of Wordsworth (“The Recluse”), Coleridge 
(“Wanderings of Cain”), Keats (the incomplete “Hyperion” poems), Shelley 
(“Triumph of Life”), and Byron (“Don Juan”). I would add that although true in all 
cases the comparison between Wordsworth’s work and Milton’s is perhaps most often 
employed because of the strong influence of Paradise Lost on The Prelude, a work 
that was only ever meant to be a predecessor to his real (unfinished) epic “The 
Recluse.” The comparison is not a particularly productive one as the basis for an 
analysis of Romantic poetry because it tends toward an evaluative reading instead of a 
critical reading. Readings of Romantic poetry that take negative comparison with 
Paradise Lost as their central focus run the risk of occluding analysis of Romantic 
contributions to poetics. Comparative readings are, however, very useful in an analysis 
of influences on Romantic poetry—the task Shears and Kucich undertake.  
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Queene was brilliant and yet still flawed it freed Romantics from the burden of the 
past while simultaneously offering them a rich poetic tradition from which to draw 
inspiration and on which to improve.  
In his third claim Kucich argues that Romantic-era readers consider Spenser a 
poet of thought and theory as well as imagination—a significant change from 
Enlightenment readers.8 What Enlightenment readers—and we will later see some 
contemporary Spenserians—read as inconsistencies in Spenser’s allegory, Romantic 
readers read as an exploration of the inevitable conflict of duality. Kucich claims that 
Romantic readers recognized the “dramatic center of Spenser’s allegorical world: the 
mind’s particular division between real and ideal experience” (96). By this Kucich 
does not mean a Platonic ideal; instead he refers to the power of the imagination 
versus lived experience.  
That the Romantics struggled with the relationship between imagination and 
reality is not a new supposition; new historicists have long grappled with the 
relationship between the Romantic imagination and the social and political realities of 
the period.9 Unlike new historicists, however, Kucich argues that the Romantic poets 
                                                
8 Although Kucich claims that Enlightenment readers also saw Spenser as less 
intimidating than Mitlon, he also argues that they found flaw in his moralism, 
didacticism, and the fanciful nature of his allegory (14-15). 
9 In Wordsworth’s Great period Poems Marjorie Levinson argues that Wordsworth’s 
poetry in particular uses the power of the imagination to mask the absence of the 
historical moment that the poetry attempts to conceal. She is interested not in how the 
poem is a product of its historical moment but in how the poem engages in erasure of 
that moment in order to offer a more cohesive and comforting narrative—one of an 
autonomy and power of the mind. Instead of the disunity and psychic damage of the 
historical moment the poet offers a narrative of the growth of his own mind—
replacing disturbing external events with internal growth and cohesion. This narrative 
of the mind focuses on the powers of cognition and imagination that the poet can 
control instead of the violence and uncertainty of events that he cannot control. In this 
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were aware of the tension between the imagination and reality so much so that it 
became the central theme in their admiration of Spenser as well as their own poetic 
endeavors. Romantic awareness of the dual pull of imagination and reality radically 
divides Kucich’s work from that of the New Historicists by shifting the focus of study 
from the mind of the poet to the theorization of mind in Romantic poetry.  
Kucich elaborates on the theorization of mind in Romantic poetry in what is 
perhaps his boldest claim—that Spenserian duality “condition[ed] Romanticism’s 
overall poetics of self-analysis” (102). Kucich’s claim diverges from the history of 
criticism on Romantic Spenserianism. Prior claims for Spenser’s influence on the 
Romantic period focused either on Spenser’s morality or the richness of his 
imagination and poetics. Kucich agrees that Spenser was valued for his moral poetry 
and his poetics; he argues, however, that the feature of Spenser’s poetry that was most 
influential was his psychological complexity and not his moral didacticism (102). For 
                                                
way, Levinson undertakes to read Wordsworth with a kind of psychoanalytic 
historicism. Levinson argues that “the extreme disinterest evinced by [the] works 
indicates their resumption of . . . problematic themes at the level of image and 
metaphysics, precisely because they were deadlocked at the practical level” (5). The 
critic must look beyond—or, rather, into—the poem at the level of image in order to 
see the history the poem attempts to elide. This method of looking for the history in 
the absence of it leads to a construction of the historical moment from the poem and 
results, interestingly, in an aggressively allegorical reading. Levinson’s method 
depends upon her ability to identify by absence, to read the allegory “where the 
signified is indicated by an identifiably absent signifier” (9). She contends that this is 
only possible through the kind of historical remove that McGann argues for in The 
Romantic Ideology. By acknowledging ideological difference and distance between 
critic and poet, the critic can then articulate what Wordsworth and his own 
contemporaries could only obfuscate. The relationship between poet and history here 
is a convoluted one. Unlike McGann, Levinson does not blame the critic—wholly—
for the confusion between present ideologies and Romantic ideologies; instead she 
blames the poet who has attempted to construct a misleading narrative of ideological 
cohesion to mask ideological dissolution. The poet is represented as an unreliable 
historian who can only be read properly by reading against the claims of his work. 
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the Romantics, Kucich argues, Spenser’s poetry portrayed the workings of the mind. 
Because Kucich is arguing against a critical tradition, the majority of his argument is 
given over to proving that the Romantics valued and adopted Spenserian duality. He 
does not spend a great deal of time examining duality in Spenser; instead Kucich does 
the important work of tracing Spenser’s influence by looking at reactions to Spenser 
during the Romantic period as well as representations of Spenserian duality in 
Romantic texts. I will focus my argument on duality in one particular passage in 
Spenser’s The Faerie Queene: the Castle of Alma.  
Understanding this passage is essential to understanding both duality in 
Spenser’s epic and the way it influenced Romantic poetics of self-analysis because it 
is the moment in Spenser’s text where the duality of the mind is analogized. Spenser’s 
analogy compares the faculties of mind to rooms; Memory lives in one room and 
Imagination lives in another. Between these two rooms is a third room where the Self 
resides and mediates between Imagination and Memory. In Book II of The Faerie 
Queene this act of mediation between Memory and Imagination is temperance; instead 
of defining temperance as the median between extremes as Aristotle does, Spenser 
defines temperance as the mediation between the dual faculties of memory and 
imagination through which the self is created.   
THE FAERIE QUEEN: BOOK II CRITICAL HISTORY  
Of all the representations of Spenserian duality in The Faerie Queene, the 
Castle of Alma has been the most often overlooked. While it is certainly true that 
Spenser’s The Faerie Queen has a long critical history, Book II is less often addressed 
than Books I and III, and the Castle of Alma is often overlooked even by critics who 
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take up Book II. The most important debates in the critical history of Book II center on 
its relationship to the Nicomachean Ethics or its coherence as a narrative.  
The debate centered around Aristotle’s influence on The Faerie Queene has a 
long critical history. Beginning in 1906 with J.J. Jusserand’s article, “Spenser’s 
Twelve Private Moral Vertues as Aristotle has Devised” in Moral Philology, the 
debate has mostly hinged on an attempt to match Spenser’s knights to corresponding 
virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics. Overall the attempt has met with mixed results. 
The vast number of studies find that the correlation is not exact, but few have found 
anything less than compelling similarities, suggesting some influence. Although 
Spenser does not duplicate Aristotle’s virtues in his allegory, he certainly draws from 
Aristotle’s definitions. At times Spenser collapses two virtues into one knight; at other 
times he separates out aspects of virtues into more than one allegorical figure. Despite 
the loose relationship between Aristotle’s definitions of the virtues and Spenser’s 
definitions, attempts to find more exact matches persevere in Spenserian criticism. 
Perhaps the precise degree and way Spenser’s definitions of the virtues overlaps with 
Aristotle’s has remained an issue for scholars because Spenser claims Aristotle as a 
source in his introductory letter to Sir Walter Raleigh: “I labour to pourtraict in 
Arthure, before he was king, the image of a brave knight, perfected in the twelve 
private morall vertues, as Aristotle hath devised . . . So in the person of Prince Arthure 
I sette forth magnificence in particular, which vertue for that (according to Aristotle 
and the rest) it is the perfection of all the rest . . . But of the xii. other vertues, I make 
xii. other knights the patrones, for the more variety of the history” (15–16). The 
wording of his claim may account for the emphasis most scholars have put on 
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matching Aristotle’s virtues to Spenser’s text. Spenser specifically claims that his 
virtues are derived from Aristotle’s twelve virtues, a difficult feat considering the 
Nicomachean Ethics does not include a list of twelve specific virtues.  
Critics account for this discrepancy in several ways. Lilian Winstanley and 
James Lyndon Shanley argue that Spenser’s Temperance is a combination of 
Aristotelian ideas of temperance and continence,10 while Viola Blackburn Hulbert 
argues instead for the influence of a Christian theory of temperance developed by 
early church fathers. Although arguments for early Christian influence are 
undoubtedly persuasive, the texts from which they draw share Aristotle’s Ethics as a 
common source, significantly undercutting the argument against Aristotelian 
influence. For example, Thomas Aquinas adopted many of Aristotle’s definitions in 
The Summa Theologica. These arguments do raise an important question of 
methodology, however. Attempts to trace an absolute correspondence between the 
Nicomachean Ethics and The Faerie Queene are bound to fail because Spenser’s 
virtues will undoubtedly reflect the Christian influences of his period, regardless of his 
reliance on Aristotle as a source. In addition, this strain of Spenser criticism has 
contributed to a surprisingly common consensus among Spenserians that echoes 
Enlightenment critique of Spenser: that his poem is fragmented, inconsistent, and that 
it lacks the narrative brilliance of Paradise Lost. 
                                                
10 This argument had become so widely accepted that those responsible for it are 
hardly ever cited when referenced.  
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This critique of Spenser’s narrative cohesion is so pervasive that it is its own 
subset of Spenser criticism. The three most important critics of Spenser, Paul Alpers,11 
Northrop Frye, and A.C. Hamilton participate in this debate. In The Poetry of The 
Faerie Queene (1967) Alpers claims that because The Faerie Queene lacks narrative 
cohesion the poetry can only be examined through its relationship to the reader. 
Alpers’ argument is two-fold: first, The Faerie Queene pursues and engages its reader 
on the surface level—the level of reaction12—and, second, in so doing it removes the 
impetus to understand the allegory in favor of responding to it. Alpers claims: 
Spenser’s attention is focused on the reader’s mind and feelings and not 
on what is happening within his fictions. His poetic motive in any 
given stanza is to elicit a response—to evoke, modify, or complicate 
feelings and attitudes. His stanzas, then, are modes of address by the 
poet to the reader. (5) 
Alpers’ argument suggests that the only meaning in the poem is the exchange between 
author and reader it facilitates. Such an assertion is common enough as an 
acknowledgement that meaning can only ever be understood as part of the reading 
                                                
11 Alpers, perhaps best known for What Is Pastoral?, died in May of 2013. The 
Spenser Review dedicated their Fall 2013 issue (44.2) to him. The retrospective 
includes work by Sukanta Chaudhuri, Andrew Escobedo, Paul J. Hecht, James 
Nohrnberg, Syrithe Pugh, and Christopher Warley. Warley’s article in particular is an 
excellent resource. Warley reminds us that Alpers helped pioneer “slow reading” and 
said of pastoral poetry that “there is no way to become a believer short of reading [it],” 
a sentiment that beautifully echoes Romantic feeling (123). Although I disagree with 
his reading of The Faerie Queene I would be remiss if I did not recognize that his 
interest in reader response I discuss above was an academic as well as an ethical 
commitment.  
12 By surface Alpers means an analysis of the allegory as it is presented by stanza 
opposed to a “depth” reading like Frank Kermode’s or Alastair Folwer’s. Kermode 
and Fowler examine iconology and arithmology in The Faerie Queene.  
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experience, but Alpers’ argument is much more aggressive. Alpers argues that 
Spenser’s text is logically incoherent because Spenser sacrifices narrative for the sake 
of instigating reader response.13 He goes on to critique the narrative structure for being 
inconsistent and illogical and to claim that, because the narrative structure is 
immaterial to the meaning of The Faerie Queene, each stanza is isolated and can be 
experienced independently from its relationship to the rest of the poem.  
 Although Northrop Frye14 also prizes the imagination and is interested in the 
response of readers and narrative cohesion, his approach to The Faerie Queene differs 
drastically. Frye argues that The Faerie Queene’s narrative cohesion is tied to the 
moment in which it was written because it relies on “axioms and assumptions” 
Spenser would have shared with his readers (“The Structure of Imagery in The Faerie 
Queene” 56). Frye goes on to analyze the narrative according to the concept of the 
“four levels of existence” he argues would have been recognizable to Spenser’s 
readers (62). Frye’s prioritization of narrative cohesion brought heavy criticism from 
                                                
13 A.C. Hamilton wrote an excellent—if somewhat personally invested—review of 
Alpers book for ELH, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Dec., 1986). In his review he explains in detail 
the ramifications of Alper’s argument, including the way it would drastically limit the 
scope of future Spenser scholarship if scholars heeded its call to abandon narrative.  
14 Northrop Frye is best known in Romantic circles for his groundbreaking work on 
Blake Fearful Symmetry. His Anatomy of Criticism (1957) is better known in wider 
circles and began with his interest in Spenser. In his introduction to Anatomy of 
Criticism he explains, “After completing a study of William Blake (Fearful Symmetry, 
1947), I determined to apply the principles of literary symbolism and Biblical 
typology which I had learned from Blake to another poet, preferably one who had 
taken these principles from the critical theories of his own day, instead of working 
them out by himself as Blake did. I therefore began a study of Spenser's Faerie 
Queene, only to discover that in my beginning was my end. The introduction to 
Spenser became an introduction to the theory of allegory, and that theory obstinately 
adhered to a much larger theoretical structure” (vii). Unlike Alpers who focused on 
Spenser and Milton for much of his career, Frye wrote extensively in several different 
periods.  
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Alpers. Alpers criticized Frye, saying, “It seems to me both a wonder and a warning 
when a man as intelligent as Frye has to describe Spenser’s poem so inaccurately in 
order to persuade himself or his reader that it is aesthetically coherent” (123). For 
Alpers, Frye’s reading of another layer of symbolism in addition to the allegory of The 
Faerie Queene is at best wishful thinking and at worst purposeful delusion driven by 
Frye’s desire to see sense where there is none. But Alpers is not only critiquing Frye, 
he is also critiquing anyone else who insists on cohesion in The Faerie Queene. Just as 
Hamilton will prove to be concerned that Alpers’ resistance to reading narrative will 
destroy the future of Spenserian criticism, Alpers is concerned that the refusal to admit 
that there is no cohesion will destroy its future. 
 Finally, A.C. Hamilton argues that the nature of allegory requires both the 
surface pleasure Alpers champions and the cultivation of critical distance that Frye 
performs. Hamilton goes on to argue against consistency is a valid concern because, 
like Alpers’ pleasure, it is dependent on the perception of readers. If readers follow 
Alpers’ advice and ignore narrative action, Hamilton asserts, they will miss most of 
the resolution the poem offers because the resolution almost exclusively takes place in 
moments of narrative action. Hamilton claims a more important place for allegory than 
either Alpers or Frye allow. Hamilton’s reading of allegory works on the level of 
immediate pleasure and the level of critical reading. Interestingly, although Hamilton 
argues against critical readings on the basis of cohesion his work as the editor of the 
Spenser Encyclopedia15 suggests it is still a concern for him.  
                                                
15 The Spenser Encyclopedia is a large collection of entries on themes, allegorical 
figures, books, historical influences, and allusions. At 858 pages its size alone makes 
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The debate over Aristotelian influence and the debate over narrative coherence 
share an important similarity: Spenserians invested in both debates are thinking about 
faithfulness to a particular model. Those critics involved in the debate over 
Aristotelian influence are concerned with how well or poorly Spenser reflects 
Aristotle’s ethics. Few critics have considered Spenser’s changes to Aristotle’s ethical 
models as transformative; instead critics have considered these changes to be the result 
of Spenser’s faulty or inexact understanding of Aristotle. Similarly, the debate around 
narrative cohesion interrogates Spenser’s faithfulness to allegory. With the notable 
exception of A.C. Hamilton, critics engaged in the debate over narrative cohesion 
consider the narrative as successful or not based on its cohesion. This tendency toward 
evaluative readings is the reason Book II has garnered little critical attention 
comparatively and the reason that attention has focused almost entirely on the ways 
Book II fails as a narrative and as a representation of temperance.  
More than the meaning of the text is at stake in the debate over how to read 
The Faerie Queene—these critics debate the very nature of the text. Of course the text 
is an allegory and allegory comes with its own set of reading requirements,16 but The 
Faerie Queene thwarts many of them. Unlike its allegorical predecessor Piers 
Plowman or its descendent Pilgrim’s Progress, The Faerie Queene thwarts attempts to 
pin down its allegory to one static meaning. Spenserian criticism that prioritizes 
narrative cohesion assumes the success or failure of the poem hinges on its 
                                                
an argument for the desire to pin down The Faerie Queene into some kind of cohesive 
whole. 
16 Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism takes up the problem of allegorical form. I have not 
included a review of it here because few would argue that it bears directly on The 
Faerie Queene for the reasons I discuss above. 
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faithfulness to conventional allegorical structure. In the face of The Faerie Queene’s 
narrative inconsistency, it is no wonder that critics often focus on how to read the text 
instead of constructing readings of the text.  
The dismissal of allegory as too simplistic to deserve much critical attention 
has a long history. Paul de Man examines the dismissal of allegory as it applies to 
Romanticism in “The Rhetoric of Temporality” (1969). In his essay de Man carefully 
considers the motivations behind the movement from allegory to symbol as the 
predominant form of figural language during the Romantic period. De Man attributes 
the predominance of the symbol to the Romantic desire for subject/object unity. He 
says, “the valorization of the symbol at the expense of allegory coincides with the 
growth of an aesthetic that refuses to distinguish between experience and the 
representation of this experience” (“The Rhetoric of Temporality” 188). Symbols 
associate images with that which is beyond the ability of the senses to perceive but 
their effectiveness is dependent on the slippage between the image and the thing it 
represents. When the subject is associated with the symbol, and the symbol with the 
suprasensory, a-temporal object that it represents, the subject and object collapse and 
the subject shares in the characteristics of the object-symbol. Through this slippage, de 
Man argues, the symbol attempts to transcend temporality and collapse the distance 
between subject and object.  
Unlike his contemporaries, de Man argues that the Romantic period is 
characterized not by the transcendence of symbol but by the temporality of allegory. 
In part de Man’s argument is based on a reclassification. He argues that because the 
landscapes so important to Romantic poets were derived from a typology instead of a 
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specific locale, the poems are more like the allegories of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries than they are locodescriptive. More importantly, because the typology 
changes over time with lived experience the poet is reminded of temporality and 
cannot hold on to the unifying power of symbol. In this way de Man complicates 
allegory; instead of a mechanical representation, he understands allegory to reinforce 
an awareness of the difference between the ideal and lived experience. By reinforcing 
an awareness of the difference between ideal and real, allegory creates the conditions 
for an analysis17 of the self over time.18 De Man’s rendering of allegory presents an 
alternative to engaging with temperance in The Faerie Queene as didactic and self-
consuming19 and a more complex way of thinking about the relationship between 
Spenserian temperance and the Romantics.  
The two texts in Spenserian criticism that most nearly escape this critique by 
taking the connections between allegory and temperance seriously are Lauren 
Silberman’s “The Faerie Queene: Book II and the Limitations of Temperance” (1987) 
and Jeff Dolven’s Scenes of Instruction in Renaissance Romance (2007). Although 
both Silberman and Dolven are still concerned with narrative cohesion, they come the 
                                                
17 By highlighting the differences between the ideal and lived experience and 
differences in the self over time allegory creates the conditions—the distance—needed 
for critical reading.  
18 This last point—allegory as creating the conditions for self-analysis—comes 
primarily during his discussion of A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal. De Man writes, “the 
fundamental structure of allegory reappears here in the tendency of the language 
toward narrative, the spreading out along the axis of an imaginary time in order to give 
duration to what is, in fact, simultaneous within the subject” (225).  
19 Here I am referring to Stanley Fish’s 1972 book Self-Consuming Artifacts: The 
Experience of Seventeenth-Century Literature. In his book Fish develops a theory of 
dialectical didacticism in which a text engages a reader in a search for a truth that 
often contradicts the reader’s pre-conceived truths. In so doing the text leads the 
reader through a process of conversion but also robs itself of purpose. Once the text 
has succeeding in converting the reader to its own truth it loses its value.  
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closest to addressing the problem of temperance in The Faerie Queene without 
dismissing it as a narrative flaw. Instead, Silberman and Dolven approach the problem 
of reading in The Faerie Queene as inherent in allegorical form.  
Like Alpers, Frye, and Hamilton, Silberman is concerned about the lack of 
cohesion in The Faerie Queene. Unlike these critics, Silberman sees this lack of 
cohesion as Spenser's attempt to illustrate the inadequacy of temperance as a 
framework for mediating between sensuous experience and the individual. Book II, 
she argues, positions temperance as a kind of critical distance, one that eschews 
engagement for impassivity. Her argument is not far from A.C. Hamilton's assertion 
that allegory requires we step back from the initial pleasure that results from reading 
to consider the meaning behind the narrative, except that Silberman is interested in 
how reading works inside the text. Silberman claims that the narrative instructs 
Guyon—the knight of Temperance—in a lesson that is ultimately impossible to learn 
because the real intent is to discredit temperance as a "moral standard in order to put in 
question the actual relationship between ethical principle and moral action and to 
examine allegory itself as a methodology" (9). To support her claim Silberman isolates 
and analyzes moments in the text when, she argues, the mediating power of 
temperance fails. Although her approach is not unique her conclusions certainly are. 
Silberman reads these failures of temperance as failures of reading.  
Like Hamilton, Silberman adopts the parallel between reading allegory and 
temperance. Like reading allegory, temperance requires a cultivated distance from 
immediate experience. However, Silberman neglects two important ideas in her 
reading. The first is A.C. Hamilton's agreement with Alpers that engagement is 
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essential. In fact, Hamilton asserts that we cannot really have disengagement without 
first having engagement. For Silberman's argument this means that what she sees as 
inevitable failures of temperance can also easily be read as part of a learning curve. 
The lack of critical distance she argues is the failure of temperance is also a 
prerequisite for its success because to learn to create distance Guyon must first 
collapse distance. In fact, in attempts to create critical distance there is an inherent risk 
of collapse. The risk of collapse is as much a marker of success as it is a condition for 
failure. The second thing Silberman neglects is the way Guyon's stay at the Castle of 
Alma takes up reading as its direct subject. She pays close attention to what she calls 
moments of failed reading in the poem—moments in which she claims Guyon fails to 
learn lessons essential to temperance—but she does not comment on Guyon's actual 
reading in the castle and the role it must play in any theory of reading in The Faerie 
Queene.   
Jeff Dolven's reading of Book II also avoids Alma'a castle, instead focusing on 
the ways that allegorical figures serve as examples to each other and to the reader. 
Unlike Silberman, Dolven argues that Guyon can and does read allegory. When 
Guyon fails to read Amavia's allegorical role he puts himself at risk for absorption into 
the drama of her experience. Although he cannot save her, Amavia’s death brings with 
it the critical distance he needs to understand the interaction as the teaching moment it 
is (156). Dolven argues that the instruction functions on two levels—Guyon learns 
critical distance from Amavia's death and the reader learns critical reading from 
Guyon's slip into Amavia's pain. Dolven goes on to argue that what is at stake in The 
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Faerie Queene is "the degree of proper detachment" (156). Dolven concludes of 
Guyon that, 
What he learns in particular—what springs him from the cycle of 
destructive sympathy—is how to recognize examples, how to frame 
and excerpt the world like a text, to recognize the natural boundaries 
around its lessons and treat them with the proper respect. (163)  
For Dolven, Guyon's sympathy is destructive because it consumes him and makes it 
impossible for him to judge or act wisely. Only by learning to distance himself from 
the narrative can Guyon control his role in it. Guyon extracts himself from the 
narrative by learning to read with an eye toward allegory. Silberman claims that 
temperance mediating between sensuous experience and self results in disassociation 
between mind and body; Dolven argues that the mediating power of temperance 
cultivates boundaries between self and experience. Dolven’s argument about allegory 
is similar to de Man’s claims for Romantic allegory in The Rhetoric of Temporality 
but Dolven does not follow them through to the conclusion of Guyon’s training. Like 
de Man, Dolven is interested in the way allegory highlights the difference between 
real and ideal. Dolven’s argument hinges on moments in the text in which Guyon is 
confronted with immediate action and either collapses into the narrative by 
transgressing the boundaries between self and experience or resists collapse by reading 
the world like an allegory. In the Castle, Alma teaches Guyon to apply the same 
principles to his own interiority. 
TRAINING IN TEMPERANCE: IMAGINATION AND MEMORY IN THE 
CASTLE OF ALMA 
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In Alma's castle Guyon learns that true temperance is a mental labor of 
negotiation between faculties of the mind. It requires imagining the future, 
remembering the past, and mediating the present. Guyon learns this through a brief 
interaction with Alma and her three counselors: Phantastes, or imagination; the 
unnamed counselor who mediates the present; and Eumnestes, or memory. The first 
and last counselors combine wisdom of the past with an imagining of the future: “The 
first of them could things to come foresee . . .The third things past could keepe in 
memoree” (II.IX.49.1, 3). The middle counselor balances between imagination and 
memory, drawing from both to mediate the demands of the present. Unlike Red Crosse 
who is tutored at length in the House of Holiness, Guyon receives a tour of the rooms 
each counselor inhabits and then remains in Eumnestes’ room to read his collection of 
books at length. In fact, none of Alma's counselors ever give direct instruction to 
Guyon. This lack of direct instruction sets the Castle of Alma apart in The Faerie 
Queene. Typically when a knight arrives at the allegorical home of his virtue, the 
allegorical figures that reside there intervene in his quest through direct instruction. In 
Book I, for example, the knight of Holiness is instructed by the inhabitants of The 
House of Holiness: Fidelia (faith), Speranza (hope), and Charissa (charity). His 
instruction is part of a lengthy, hands-on process whereby he is cleansed from his sins 
and prepared to defeat the dragon and complete his mission. In contrast, the Castle of 
Alma offers Guyon little by way of didactic instruction. Instead, the instruction he 
receives is in keeping with Spenser’s conceptualization of temperance because it 
teaches that reflection is the center of temperance.  
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The three rooms in the Castle of Alma are representations of what is internal to 
Alma’s counselors. Phantastes, the allegorical figure for imagination, lives in a room 
with painting all over the walls in “sundry colours” of all kinds of fantastic creatures 
as well as the common sights, described as “some daily scenes” which include “fooles, 
louers, children, Dames” (II.IX.50.6, 8). The real is mixed in with images Guyon 
cannot even identify. He describes them as “infinite shapes of things dispersed thin” 
(II.IX.50.2). The images and colors represent the productive powers of the 
imagination. The imagination can conjure both the familiar and the fantastic, and is its 
own faculty separate from memory.  
In addition to the colors and images, the room is also full of flies. One might 
think that flies so abundant that they “encombred all mens eares and eyes” might get 
top billing in a description of the room, but it is the images on the walls that first 
capture Guyon’s attention (II.IX.51.3). By holding back the flies the reader becomes 
aware of his or her own imagination as he or she revises his or her mental picture to 
include such a pervasive detail. Holding back the image of the flies also indicates that 
they are less important than the images on the wall. The meaning of the flies is 
explicitly stated in the following lines: 
All those were idle thoughts and fantasies, 
Deuices, dreames, opinions vnsound, 
Shewes, visions, sooth-sayes, and prophesies; 
And all that fained is, as leasings, tales, and lies. (II.IX.51.6-9) 
Ashley Cross examines the significance of flies in Romantic poetry in the recent 
European Romantic Review article “To ‘buzz lamenting doings in the air’: Romantic 
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Flies, Insect Poets, and Authorial Sensibility” (2014). Cross claims that flies—in the 
tradition of Titus Andronicus—serve as both a measure of sensibility and a reminder 
of authorial craft. When Marcus Andronicus kills a fly at the dinner table Titus 
reprimands him for hurting something so defenseless and inoffensive, using the fly as 
a symbol to represent the powerlessness of Lavinia and himself, but when his brother 
changes the symbolic value of the fly to Aaron—the Moor who facilitated Lavinia’s 
brutal rape—Titus praises Marcus and even stabs the dead fly as well. Titus’ demand 
first that Marcus have compassion on the fly and then for retribution shows a 
sensibility out of control. Titus’ feelings are so raw that he cannot help but associate 
even the treatment of a fly with his own pain. Cross argues that Titus’ shift from 
compassion to retribution reminds the audience of the significance of language and 
context to interpretation and that in so doing the fly becomes a symbol for the author 
as well.  
As a symbol for the author, the fly highlights the power of authorship as well 
as its ephemerality. The author has the power to draw out the emotions of the audience 
by controlling symbolic value. When the fly represents Lavinia the author inspires 
compassion; when the fly represents Aaron the author inspires repugnance. The 
feeling is dependent on the symbolic value of the image. The fly represents the 
ephemerality of authorship, Cross claims, both because of its dependence on an 
engaged audience and the predominance of cheap printing mediums like newspaper 
that literally expire in days. As part of his allegory, Spenser’s flies, like Cross’, are 
heavily symbolic. Although Spenser’s flies pre-date Romantic printing concerns, they 
do address another kind of ephemerality intrinsic to authorship: the creative impulse. 
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The images on the walls of the room representing the imaginative faculty represent 
realized creative visions. They bring together the real and the imagined ideal in a 
profusion of sensory delight. The flies are also allegorical figures for the imagination 
but they are creative impulses that have not been realized. Unlike the images on the 
walls of the room of imagination, the flies are “idle” because they have led to no 
resulting creation. The flies remind the reader that the power of the imagination is 
useless at best and potentially dangerous at worst if one is incapable of distinguishing 
between what is imagined and what is real. It is capable of conjuring scenes of beauty 
and pathos but, if left unchecked, its power can inhibit the senses.20 The room of 
imagination is not only every beautiful thing one could imagine it is also all that is 
ugly and nightmarish.  
For Spenser the imaginative power can both be productive and destructive and 
it requires a balancing force: memory. Like Phantastes, Eumnestes—Memory—has its 
own internal space. The internal space of memory is unsurprisingly old but sturdy. 
Spenser does not describe the room in much detail; the focus is on its purpose. Like 
his room, Eumnestes is old but his mind is still sharp. His mind is full of “liuely 
vigour” and “forse” (II.IX.55.7, 8). He is capable of “infinite remembrance” and is 
responsible for keeping a physical record of all “things foregone” (II.IX.56.1, 2). The 
room of memory is an exhaustive repository of history. Guyon treats Eumnestes with 
reverence because he preserves the lived experience of generations. This lived 
experience is valuable because it provides an opportunity for Guyon to better 
                                                
20 The flies can literately blot out sound and vision. In my second chapter I will 
discuss the way the imagination figured in discussions of insanity in the Romantic 
period; the flies here work similarly. They have the potential to disrupt any other 
imaginative vision if they are allowed to dominate the mind. 
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understand the world. When Guyon sees the books—particularly the history book of 
Faerie Land—he looks at it “greedily” and “burning . . .with feruent fire,” and begs 
leave to read it (II.IX.60.3, 6). Guyon’s reaction seems out of character for temperance 
but his desire has to be fervent to balance the power of the imagination. The Faerie 
Queene’s version of the dual pull of temperance is less about finding a median 
between desires, emotions, or pleasures21 and more about balancing the faculties of the 
mind.  
Balance is represented by an unnamed figure in Book II and is the middle 
room between imagination and memory and the second room Guyon visits after 
Phantastes’. I quote it at length for the purpose of my analysis: 
Thence [Alma] brought them to the second roome, whose wals 
Were painted faire with memorable gestes, 
Of famous Wisards, and with picturals 
Of Magistrates, of courts, of tribunals, 
Of commen wealthes, of states, of pollicy, 
                                                
21 In the Ethics Aristotle discusses temperance mostly in terms of the consumption of 
food and wine. However, his related discussion of the nature of virtue—as I mentioned 
before, most especially continence—and the process of self-mastery is closely tied to 
his understanding of temperance. Aristotle places temperance at the center of virtue, 
calling it the virtue from which all other virtues spring. Aristotle defines virtue as “the 
regulation of feelings and actions” (84). This definition of virtue comprises two key 
parts. First, Aristotle’s definition of virtue does not insist on the absence of 
characteristics or dispositions that are antagonistic to virtue; in fact, this definition of 
virtue insists on the presence of antagonistic tendencies. To regulate—meaning to 
control, order, or normalize—there must be the possibility of indocility, disorder, or 
aberration. Regulation is not the same as eradication; regulation is a working 
between—a negotiation or mediation of conflicting desires, tendencies, or impulses. 
For Aristotle this includes physical appetites like lust and hunger and their extreme 
opposites, as well as emotions like anger and apathy. It does not include imagination 
and memory, which are not really opposites of the same desire or faculty so much as 
individual faculties that balance each other.  
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Of lawes, of iudgements, and of decretals; 
All artes, all science, all Philosophy, 
And all that in the world was aye thought wittily. 
 
Of those that roome was full, and them among 
There sate a man of ripe and perfect age, 
Who did them meditate all his life long, 
That through continuall practise and vsage, 
He now was growne right wise, and wondrous sage. 
Great pleasure had those stranger knights, to see 
His goodly reason, and graue personage, 
That his disciples both desir'd to bee; 
But Alma thence them led to th'hindmost roome of three. (II.IX.53-54) 
Like the spaces inhabited by Phantastes and Eumnestes, mediation is its own internal 
space as well. Unlike the spaces inhabited by Phantastes and Eumnestes, the middle 
room is both beautiful and functional. Like Phantastes’ room there are paintings on the 
wall but these paintings include the magical, political, religious,22 juridical, 
monarchical, aesthetic, scientific, and philosophical. In short, the middle room 
includes all the various systems of judgment, thought, and knowledge. Taken together 
they represent an enormous amount of potential strain on the mind. As with Bahktin’s 
                                                
22 Decretals are official letters from the Pope sent to communicate changes in 
ecclesiastical law.  
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peasant,23 the demands of these diverse systems could create a crisis in the mind of 
any individual responsible to them. The last three things listed, “All artes, all science, 
all Philosophy,” would be especially taxing. The room represents some figures from 
each category but it includes all art, all science, and all philosophy, much of which 
would conflict with each other. The room is full of these representations and the 
unnamed man in the room is responsible for mediating between them.  
There are two conditions that make it possible to mediate between these 
disparate systems: first, “continuall practise and vsage” and, second, the placement of 
mediation between imagination and memory. The first of these is consistent with 
Aristotle’s habit-based temperance. Aristotle claims that temperance is cultivated 
through “separate acts of working” (The Nicomachean Ethics 100), which, together, 
produce habits of the mind. In other words, when a man engages repeatedly in “bad” 
acts—meaning acts that arise from an extreme emotion or desire like anger—he 
produces bad habits and is the cause of his own dissolution. The acts that lead to habit 
are, for Aristotle, a matter of choice; however the habits that these choices form resist 
choice. Once a habit of mind begins to develop through the repetition of separate 
similar acts, the likelihood of additional similar acts increases. In other words, the 
more one feels a particular emotion without attempting to control it the more likely the 
                                                
23 In The Dialogic Imagination, Bakhtin gives the example of a peasant who speaks 
several different languages including the language of prayer, the language of song, the 
language of his family, and the official language, but does not realize that the 
ideologies attached to the languages he speaks are contradictory. When he becomes 
aware of the contradictions the languages enter critical interanimation and he is forced 
to choose where he stands among the languages. The critical interanimation of 
language precedes the struggle to make ideologies fit together; it may be the catalyst 
for the struggle because it reveals that they don’t fit together perfectly and that 
adjustments in meaning and acceptance must be made in order for cohesion to be 
achieved.  
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mind is to default to that emotion under similar circumstances. Similarly, when a man 
engages in “good” acts, positive habits are formed and these habits increase the 
likelihood of future positive acts by creating a kind of mental tendency toward them. 
This tendency toward virtue is most important in moments that preclude specific 
preparation. For example, Aristotle reasons that in moments when danger is 
anticipated one can prepare to act with courage but when danger is unforeseen and 
sudden a calculated response is not possible (The Nicomachean Ethics 112). When 
calculated response is not possible, Aristotle argues that a man will act according to 
whatever habit he has developed through his actions in similar situations in the past. In 
other words, his reflex reaction will be virtuous if he has cultivated virtue by separate 
reflexive prior works. Like Aristotle’s temperate man, the allegorical figure that 
inhabits the space for mediation has developed the habit of temperance through long 
practice in thinking temperately.24 
                                                
24 The “Occasion” episode is clearest example of the creation of emotional habits in 
Book II of The Faerie Queene. In Gyon’s conflict with Occasion, Guyon learns that 
because one cannot control provocation one must prepare to control one’s reaction to 
provocation prior to a conflict. When Guyon sees Furor in the distance dragging a 
Squire behind him and followed by an old hag (Occasion), he hastens to the aid of the 
Squire and throws Occasion to the ground. Guyon is about to kill Furor when the 
Palmer stops him and draws his attention to Occasion, explaining that Furor cannot be 
contained until Occasion is overcome. The Squire explains to Guyon that he was 
tricked by his best friend into believing his fiancée was unfaithful. Believing that he 
has seen his fiancée with a groom, the Squire kills her and when he finds that what he 
actually saw was his fiancée's maid Pyrene and his own friend Philemon he kills 
Philemon and pursues Pyrene with the intent to kill her as well. It is in his pursuit of 
Pyrene that the Squire is overcome by Furor and Occasion and bound by them. In the 
telling of his story the Squire poses an important he question; he asks, "what man can 
shun the hap, / That hidden lyes vnwares him to surpryse" (2.4.17). This question is 
essential to the Occasion episode and is answered by both Guyon and the Palmer. 
Guyon tells the Squire, "sore haue ye beene diseasd; / But all your hurst may soone 
through temperance be easd" (2.4.33). Disease here carries two meanings, because of 
Philomon's manipulation the Squire has been put out of ease, but he is also diseased in 
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The second condition that enables mediation between the disparate systems, 
the room’s position as a middle space between imagination and memory, is a unique 
characteristic of Spenserian temperance. Here Spenser is playing with tempus, the root 
of temperance. Imagination shapes the future, memory chronicles the past, and both 
inform the present. Like the allegorical function of narrative in Paul de Man’s reading 
of “A Slumber did my Spirit Seal,” Spenser’s allegorical figuring of temperance 
insists on a self shaped by temporality. The mental space of the present is between the 
past and the future, but that is not the only relationship they bear to each other. By 
putting mediation between imagination and memory Spenser suggests that any present 
incarnation of self is formed by the imagination and memory. The internal spaces of 
imagination and memory both turn inward toward the present, coming together to 
form a potentially chaotic present state of mind. For Spenser, then, temperance is the 
process of mediating between these two mental faculties and, in so doing, creating a 
self that is formed by both. 
TEMPERANCE AND THE ROMANTIC IMAGINATION 
Like imagination in The Faerie Queene, the Romantic imagination is a 
powerful, productive faculty with its own mental space. Also like imagination in The 
Faerie Queene, Romantic imagination was often characterized as working with and 
                                                
the sense that he has corrupted his character by allowing intemperance in his actions. 
The Palmer echoes this second meaning when he moralizes, most wretched man, / 
That to affections does the bridle lend; / In the beginning they are weake and wan, / 
But soon with suff'rance grow to fearfull end (2.4.34). The Squire locates the source 
of his problem in the moment he was trickedthe first meaning of diseased; the 
Palmer locates the source far earlier citing his tendency to give free rein to 
intemperance. Because the Squire allowed his baser desires to rule his character, 
creating bad habits, he was not prepared to act within the ethical mean in the moment 
of crisis and became a victim to his own passions.  
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defined against reason. Percy Bysshe Shelley most completely theorizes the 
relationship between the power of the imagination and reason in A Defense of Poetry 
(1821)25. Shelley claims, “According to one mode of regarding those two classes of 
mental action which are called Reason and Imagination, the former may be considered 
as the mind contemplating the relations borne by one thought to another, however 
produced, and the latter, as mind acting upon those thoughts so as to colour them with 
its own light, and composing from them as from elements, other thoughts, each 
containing within itself the principle of its own integrity” (674). Reason focuses on 
relationships between thoughts while Imagination has productive power. It takes what 
reason comprehends and adds to it something particular to the individual mind. 
Although imagination uses the same thoughts as Reason in its creative process, the 
product is more than the sum of those thoughts.  
Shelley defines poetry as the “expression of imagination,” generally speaking, 
and poets as capable of seeing the future in the present. Shelley distinguishes this 
ability to see the future in the present from prophecy. Poets prefigure; they do not 
prophesy.26 Prefiguration does not foretell the future. Prefiguration is a pre-imagining 
based in the present where the imagination moves forward from the present 
conceptually. Spivak explains the difference between prefiguration and prediction as 
“negatively, in the intending subject’s apparent lack of precision, in the figure; 
positively, it is the figure’s immense range in time and space” (“Terror: A Speech 
                                                
25 A Defense of Poetry was written in 1821 but first published posthumously in 1840.  
26 The distinction between prefiguration and prophecy is an important one. Many other 
poets have suggested that poets are like prophets, perhaps most notably Sydney, but 
Shelley resists that model. In so doing he moves away from an older model of poet-
prophet that sought to legitimate the work of poetry by lending it a quai-religious 
power.  
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After 9-11” 87). While prophecy is a foretelling that encloses, solidifies, and narrows 
the future, prefiguration multiplies possibilities. To prefigure is to imagine beforehand 
but without any kind of surety. Not to be confused with obscure prophecy or a 
prophecy with unclear meaning, prefiguration’s lack of precision is not in the subject’s 
ability to read the future but in their figuration of the future as non-definitive. 
Prefiguration is also not limited to a specific future time and place as is prophecy. For 
Spivak, prefiguration is an ethical act because imagination precludes knowledge—we 
do not need to imagine that which we already definitively know. In other words, 
prefiguration suspends knowing in favor of imagining. In The Stateman’s Manual 
Coleridge articulates the dangers of prophecy in a way that helps shed light on the 
ethical value of prefiguration. Coleridge blames a number of factors for the French 
Revolution and among them he includes “an assumption of prophetic power” (45). 
Coleridge argues that this assumption of prophetic power allowed men to construct 
governments like “machines, every moment of which might be foreseen” and to do so 
with “remorseless arrogance” (45). He contends that because those constructing the 
government believed they could see every outcome, they carried out their plans 
without consideration for the cost to the rights and lives of men (45). Prefiguration 
refuses the surety of prophecy; while prophecy has a determined end that all action is 
then bent to bring about, prefiguration is an exercise in imagining relationships 
between present and future. 
Spivak argues for training in the Humanities because of the ethical value of 
prefiguration: training the imagination to imagine the other before drawing 
conclusions based on “knowledge.” Because prefiguration necessitates a forward 
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imagining, it is very important to Shelley that poets do not imbue their poetry with 
“[their] own conceptions of right and wrong, which are usually those of [their] place 
and time” (682). Prefiguration is a productive power; Shelley’s imagination has the 
power to produce without being tied to only that which is already real or true.  
Because the Romantics saw the productive power of the imagination as 
extremely influential, the Romantics were also concerned with its possible detrimental 
effects. In fact, the imagination was considered so powerful that there was a lot of 
concern over how it was formed and stimulated. Romantic historian John Brewer 
claims that literature was evaluated by its capacity to support mainstream morality, as 
the “intellectual ally and emotional support of the official supernatural” (Brewer 
282).27 This relationship between literature and morality is apparent in the educational 
theories and practices of the period.28 Literature, as Alan Richardson argues in 
Literature, Education, and Romanticism: Reading as Social Practice 1780-1832 
(1994), was employed as a part of an ideology-producing educational strategy. 
Especially when employed to teach the poor, literature was expected to reinforce 
commonly held moral and religious beliefs. The “official supernatural” is, of course, 
Anglicanism but also a less tightly defined but still socially accepted Christianity. As 
such, some (Hannah More, John Hartcliffe, Richard Graves, Maria Edgeworth, et al.) 
viewed poetry that inflamed the senses or ignited the imagination with suspicion. This 
suspicion of sensual poetry runs contrary to much of what we think about the 
Romantic period, the moment when imagination became prioritized as the highest 
                                                
27 By “official supernatural” Brewer indicates that literature was expected to support a 
kind of general Christian spirituality separate from the church. Literature was not 
expected to indoctrinate but it was expected to edify.  
28 I address educational theories in more depth in my third chapter. 
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human faculty (Brewer 283). Brewer does not argue that the imagination was any less 
important in the Romantic period than is widely accepted; he argues that the 
importance of pleasures associated with the imagination gave rise to an effort to 
distinguish between imaginative pleasure that gratified the appetites and imaginative 
pleasure that edified the mind. Part of the distinction between the two kinds of 
pleasure, Brewer claims, was that edifying imaginative pleasure heightened sensibility 
to the real as well as the imagined. For example, imaginative pleasure increased one’s 
sensibility when confronted with actual poverty while pleasure that gratified the 
appetites allowed readers to experience compassion for imagined poverty without any 
lasting changes to their thoughts and feelings.  
Wordsworth’s theory of the imagination addresses the creation of new patterns 
of thought and feeling. In the 1802 “Preface to Lyrical Ballads” he describes the 
purpose of poetry. 
The end of poetry is to produce excitement in a co-existence with an 
over-balance of pleasure. Now, by the supposition, excitement is an 
unusual and irregular state of the mind; ideas and feelings do not in that 
state succeed each other in accustomed order. But, if the words by 
which this excitement is produced are in themselves powerful, or the 
images and feelings have an undue proportion of pain connected with 
them, there is some danger that the excitement may be carried beyond 
its proper bounds. Now the co-presence of something regular, 
something to which the mind has been accustomed in various moods 
and in a less excited state, cannot but have great efficacy in tempering 
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and restraining the passion by an intertexture of ordinary feeling. 
(Wordsworth: The Major Works 609) 
Wordsworth identifies excitement of the mind as the aim of poetry but he considers 
exciting the mind a delicate and potentially dangerous process. For poetry to be 
successful it has to incite new patterns of thought and feeling while simultaneously 
producing more than an ordinary amount of pleasure. If poetry can produce this 
pleasure it can create the conditions for new patterns of thought and feeling to develop 
into habits of mind. However, if the excitation comes without the over abundance of 
pleasure it is potentially dangerous. Excitement disrupts the regular order of feeling 
and thought but if the disruption is associated with something painful it can cause 
damage by taking the disruption beyond “proper bounds.” Wordsworth suggests the 
inclusion of something “regular” to ensure that the disruption is pleasurable instead of 
painful. By “regular” Wordsworth means the regularity of meter, which provides 
order. He uses the word co-presence, suggesting that the two things must exist 
alongside each other simultaneously. Words that might inspire painful associations are 
set to meter, affecting the reader simultaneously with disruption and regularity. It is 
this combination of disruption and regularity that “temper[s]” passions. Passion is 
distinctly different from pleasure. Good poetry produces an “over-balance” of pleasure 
but it tempers passion. Pleasure is a sensual response to sense stimulus while passion 
is an active desire. While for poetry to be successful it must create an “overbalance” of 
pleasure, it also needs to regulate the passions so as not to disturb the mind into a state 
of pain. This is accomplished by an “intertexture” of “ordinary feeling” with the 
excitement. By combining the ordinary and the extraordinary, the mind is balanced 
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between: the ordinary allows the reader to connect ideas with the extraordinary 
feelings the poetry incites.  
 Wordsworth’s poetic theory is deeply concerned with balancing between past 
and present, order and chaos, imagination and reality. Often Wordsworth’s description 
of poetry as “the spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling” eclipses his more 
reflective theory of how poetry is produced. Wordsworth describes the mental process 
of writing poetry in the following excerpt from the 1802 Preface. 
Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: it takes its 
origin from emotion recollected in tranquillity: the emotion is 
contemplated till by a species of reaction the tranquillity gradually 
disappears, and an emotion, similar to that which was before the subject 
of contemplation, is gradually produced, and does itself actually exist 
in the mind. In this mood successful composition generally begins, and 
in a mood similar to this it is carried on. (611) 
Wordsworth’s description is full of the contrasting of balancing faculties. Poetry may 
be the “spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling” but it does not arise from the 
moment of spontaneity. Its root is an exchange between imagination and memory—
the heart of Romantic temperance. Poetry is the result of recollecting feeling when the 
mind is tranquil and imagining it into a current moment. The process Wordsworth 
describes here is an ongoing act of practicing Romantic temperance. Like in the Castle 
of Alma, creative work is fed by memory and created by the imagination. Earlier in 
the Preface he explains the end goal of that act:  
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For our continued influxes of feeling are modified and directed by our 
thoughts, which are indeed the representations of all our past feelings . . 
. till at length, if we be originally possessed of much sensibility, such 
habits of mind will be produced, that, by obeying blindly and 
mechanically the impulses of those habits, we shall describe objects, 
and utter sentiments, of such a nature and in such connection with each 
other, that the understanding of the being to whom we address 
ourselves, if he be in a healthful state of association, must necessarily 
be in some degree enlightened, and his affections ameliorated. (598) 
For Wordsworth, feeling is controlled by thought but thought is a product of past 
feeling. Although our thoughts are capable of controlling our feelings, the thought that 
would accomplish this is the product of past feeling. This means that if feeling is 
allowed to become corrupt it will produce thought incapable of regulating future 
feelings. Likewise, if feelings are not regulated they will not produce future thoughts 
capable of directing future feeling. The relationship between thought and past feeling 
is symbiotic but the only way to attain this relationship is through this practice that 
produces “habits of mind.” Like Spenser’s middle room these two faculties come 
together to temper each other and create imaginative work—in this case poetry. The 
more often this practice is disregarded the less capable the mind becomes to engage in 
it, similar to the way that the will is compromised by the development of bad habits, or 
vices. When the mind engages in contemplation of thought and feeling, particularly a 
kind of self-analysis where thoughts and feelings are compared in their relation to each 
other to reveal priorities and desires, the mind is actually trained to associate feeling 
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with thought, preparing the self to react in specific ways in moments of intense 
emotion. Wordsworth asserts that one can develop not only habits of action but also 
habits of feeling.  
Wordsworth’s “Lines Written a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey” and 
Coleridge’s “This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison” are two examples of the balancing of 
memory and imagination. In both poems the poetic voice is positioned to remember a 
past experience closely tied to the environment in which he finds himself and, in that 
moment of remembrance, exercises his imagination.  
Again, Romantic temperance is characterized by the mediation of feeling or 
imagination by the rational faculty. In the case of Wordsworth’s poetic theory, 
feelings felt in any one moment are shaped by thoughts that have in turn been shaped 
by past feelings: they continuously temper each other, keeping the mind in balance. 
Thought is generated by the remembrance of feeling, and remembrance becomes not a 
reliving of a past moment—because remembering generates an emotion “similar” to 
the emotion being remembered, not the exact emotion—but a present moment of self-
creation (1802 Preface 611).  
This mediation between memory and imagination is enacted in “Lines Written 
a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey” as the poetic voice shuttles between his 
imagination and his memory. The poem is positioned right away between past and 
present when the poetic voice begins by explaining that he had been to the setting of 
the poem five years before. In the twenty-three lines of the first stanza Wordsworth 
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uses the word “again” four times.29 The entirety of the first stanza is given over to 
memory as the poetic voice remembers this previous visit and, through remembering a 
previous time, contemplates a prior self. As is often the case for Wordsworth, in 
Tintern Abbey nature is the repository of memory. It is by and through looking at the 
changes around him that Wordsworth remembers the changes he has undergone.  
From there, instead of moving from past to the present moment, Wordsworth 
turns from remembering his past to a memory of remembering and imagining.  
Though absent long,  
These forms of beauty have not been to me,  
As is a landscape to a blind man’s eye:  
But oft, in lonely rooms, and mid the din  
Of towns and cities, I have owed to them,  
In hours of weariness, sensations sweet,  
Felt in the blood, and felt along the heart,  
And passing even into my purer mind  
With tranquil restoration: (24-31) 
In these lines Wordsworth recalls an act of Romantic temperance. When oppressed by 
the reality of everyday life in “lonely rooms” and in “the din / of towns and cities,” 
Wordsworth imagines this beloved scene until it tempers his feelings of oppression 
                                                
29 Wordsworth uses the word “again in lines 1, 4, 9, and 15. Each usage focusing on a 
sense memory: “again I hear / These waters, rolling from their mountain-springs” (1-
2), “Once again / Do I behold these steep and lofty cliffs” (4-5), “The day is come 
when I again repose / Here” (9-10), and “Once again I see / These hedge-rows” (15-
16). First Wordsworth remembers what he heard, then what he saw, what he felt, and 
finally what he saw again. Smell is the only sense entirely omitted from Wordsworth’s 
reminiscence. It is worth noting for the credence it might lend to theories that 
Wordsworth suffered from anosmia.  
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and restores his mind to tranquility. Lines 29-31 trace a pattern through the body as if 
the sensations induced by this remembrance move in the blood through the circulatory 
system to the organs of heart and mind. Like the blood, the sensations restore the 
functions of the organs—the feeling heart (metaphorically) and thinking mind. 
“Tranquil restoration” suggests a restoration of peace that frees the poetic voice from 
those feelings of weariness resulting from the busy loneliness of the city. Through the 
mediation between reality and the imagination Wordsworth even attains to a state of 
“harmony” (49). Although memory is associated with the rational mind in Spenser’s 
temperance, for Wordsworth memory is never exact. Wordsworth “cannot paint what 
then [he] was” when he attempts to recall the feelings he experienced as a younger 
man; the past is lost and can only ever be created in a present moment. When 
Wordsworth remembers—tempering reality with the imagination and the imagination 
with reality—he undergoes a present moment of self-formation (76-77).  
And now, with gleams of half-extinguish'd though[t,]  
With many recognitions dim and faint,  
And somewhat of a sad perplexity,  
The picture of the mind revives again:  
While here I stand, not only with the sense  
Of present pleasure, but with pleasing thoughts  
That in this moment there is life and food  
For future years. And so I dare to hope  
Though changed, no doubt, from what I was, when first 
I came among these hills; (59-68) 
 41 
Although it is impossible to remember with any fidelity exactly what was, in 
attempting to remember the mind is rejuvenated with new thought. This new thought 
is reflexive because it acknowledges the change from the past highlighted by the 
present moment, and it also acknowledges the relationship between the present 
moment and a not yet experienced future. In addition, Wordsworth classifies the 
change he experiences as one of increased thoughtfulness: For I have learned / To look 
on nature, not as in the hour / Of thoughtless youth, but hearing oftentimes / The still, 
sad music of humanity (88-91). Although thoughtless pleasure has been lost, 
“abundant recompense” is found in the development of a more acute sensitivity born 
from a more complete control over the mind. This more complete control will 
function, in Wordsworth's formation of thought, to generate future feelings, ever more 
sensitive to sensation. In this way Wordsworth's poetry illustrates a uniquely Romantic 
temperance, one that tempers imagination and reality, keeping the mind in balance and 
facilitating imaginative production.  
 In “This Lime-Tree Bower My Prison” Coleridge also explores the relationship 
between memory, imagination, and reality. In the poem the poet is confined to the 
garden-bower due to a temporarily disabling accident while his friends walk about the 
countryside. Although at first the poet mourns the loss of the views of the landscape 
and the pleasure of companionship, he quickly finds consolation in the pleasures of his 
imagination.  
The poet mourns the loss of “Beauties and Feelings, such as would have been / 
Most sweet to my remembrance even when age / Had dimmed mine eyes to 
blindness!” (3-5). But as he reflects on the views and pleasures he has lost he begins to 
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live them even in his stationary state. He imagines the places his friends will go and 
what they—especially Charles—will see and feel once there. The poet begins by 
reflecting on how valued his memories of this experience—walking in nature with his 
friends—would have been when he became old and no longer able to see such views. 
In “Tintern Abbey” the poetic voice imagines a past act of temperance, in “This Lime-
Tree Bower” the poetic voice images a future act of temperance when the bleak reality 
of old age will be tempered by imagining the pleasurable experiences of his younger 
years. As the poem progresses, though it becomes apparent that in this moment of 
temporary blindness to the scenes he wishes he could see, the poet also enacts a 
current moment of Romantic temperance because he can imagine them with clarity, as 
if he was there. His memory and imagination temper his less appealing reality, 
alleviating his feelings of distress and replacing them with pleasure. The replacement 
of a present view30 with a remembered view and a present interaction with an 
imagined interaction allows the poet to feel “a delight” in his heart (43). In fact, the 
imagined vistas “soothe” the poet even as he remains aware of his continued 
confinement to the lime-tree bower (47). The poet exclaims “Henceforth I shall know / 
That Nature ne’er deserts the wise and pure; / No plot so narrow, be but Nature there, / 
No waste so vacant, but may well employ / Each faculty of sense, and keep the heart / 
Awake to love and Beauty!” (59-61). The poet recognizes the power of the 
imagination to produce its own beauty. Most importantly, by engaging “each faculty 
to sense” he can improve his state of mind. The realization of the power of the 
                                                
30 Of course because the composition of this poem is likely taking place removed even 
from the moment the poetic voice inhabits there is no “present” view for the poet. 
However, the poem hinges on this removal from the inaccessible view of the moment 
he inhabits and the view he conjures through memory and imagination. 
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imagination leads him to reflect, “and sometimes / ‘Tis well to be bereft of promised 
good, / That we may lift the Soul, and contemplate / With lively joy the joys we 
cannot share” (64-67). Even though at first he mourned the loss of the pleasant day out 
in nature with his friends, he now sees the importance of his realization: even though 
he cannot change the circumstances of reality, he can control his state of mind through 
consciously mediating between his imagination and his reality.  
Both poems exhibit the negotiation between memory and the imagination that 
is the mark of Romantic temperance. Like Spenser’s version of the virtue, Romantic 
temperance in these poems generates imaginative scenes that combine the real and 
imagined without collapsing them. More than a matter of morality, Romantic 
temperance is the process through which poetry is produced. It requires the kind of 
close observation of lived experienced that the Romantics prized, combined with the 
dynamic power of the imagination that marks the period as separate and distinct from 
what came before and what comes after. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SENSIBILITY AND THE SUBLIME: THE COMPOSURE OF THE ROMANTIC 
MIND   
In my first chapter I argue for a definition of Romantic temperance based on 
balancing the faculties of memory and imagination. This definition deviates from 
other understandings of temperance because its primary concern is consciousness 
instead of desire or action. Instead of a median between two extreme desires or 
actions, Romantic temperance calls for a balance between the imagined and the real 
where the imagination—what might be—and memory—what has been—feed and 
form the temperate self. In this chapter I will further my argument that this peculiarly 
Romantic kind of temperance was influential in the period by examining the way the 
Romantics conceptualized the relationship between the senses and the mind. First I 
argue that increased interest during the Romantic period in the senses, the nervous 
system, and the mind produced a concept of the mind as a system that needed to be 
managed. Next I argue that the Romantic preoccupation with the sublime and the 
beautiful as products of sensory experience produced the conditions for the aesthetic 
to help in this management of the mind. Finally, throughout my argument I show that 
management of the mind took the form of an examination of and concern with 
temperance in two ways, first, correcting the negative and mentally debilitating effects 
of indulging the senses and, second, the correction and prevention of mental 
derangements due to an imbalance between imagination and the real through the 
adoption of temperance.  
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THE ROMANTIC MIND 
During the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries advancements in 
science changed the way the Romantics thought about the relationship between the 
body and the mind. Prior to the Romantic period physicians followed a Galenic model 
in which the brain was mechanistic and dualistic. Galen, the Greek physician and 
philosopher,1 is responsible for the movement from the heart to the brain as the 
primary organ of the body,2 but his sense of how the nervous system worked in 
conjunction with the brain was outwardly mechanistic. Literary critic and theorist 
George Rousseau3 explains that Galen imagined the nervous system as a system of 
hollow tubes that carried “animal spirits” (“‘Originated Neurology’: Nerves, Spirits 
and Fibers, 1969-2004” 1) throughout the body, controlling movement and sensation. 
The role of the brain in his system is limited: it is the “animal spirits” separate from 
but residing in the brain that affect the body. His system also divides faculties into 
localized centers, locating what he calls “functions of the soul” in different organs of 
                                                
1 Galen was a Greek philosopher, physician, and surgeon who lived between 131 C.E. 
and 201 C.E. Galen’s theories on the circulatory system of the body influenced 
medicine until they were contested in 1628. Galen was the first western physician to 
posit that the brain controls the body.  
2 Alan Richardson argues that it was not until the Romantic period that the brain 
became the organ of thought. Galen’s theory suggests otherwise, but that appearance 
is misleading. Although Galen named the brain as the primary seat of reason, he also 
attributed the functions of the brain to the portion of the soul that resided inside of it. 
Like physicians before him, Galen believed that the soul was the source of reason.  
3 George Rousseau’s Nervous Acts is a collection of essays first published between 
1969 and 1993 but not collected until 2004. It is simultaneously the beginning of 
neuro-Romanticism and its own example of the cognitive process as it moves over a 
period of thirty-five years from the early inception of cognitive science’s influence on 
Romantic literature to a reflection on the field as it stands in 2004. Rousseau traces the 
history of the nervous system and the imagination from the ancients to its height in the 
Romantic period. He moves between periods without insisting on complete continuity 
of ideas; instead showing that Romantic concepts of the mind and the imagination—
although unique—are rooted in earlier configurations. 
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the body: reason in the brain, passions in the heart, and appetite in the liver. Although 
Galen argued that the brain, heart, and liver contributed to the health of the overall 
body, his dualistic theory attributed the functions of thought, passion, and appetite to 
the soul. The soul was the active part of the system, reducing the role of the brain to a 
passive receiver.  
Although the nearly 1,600 years between Galen and the Romantics saw 
changes in the understanding of the nervous system, it was not until the late-eighteenth 
century that the causal relationship between the nerves and brain shifted to an inward 
model that credited the brain as the active processor of sensory data. In British 
Romanticism and the Science of the Mind (2001), Alan Richardson4 catalogues the 
points of general scientific advancement and agreement that influenced the Romantic 
concept of the brain. Richardson includes among these points of agreement, that the 
Romantic period “locat[ed] the mind in the brain” and considered the brain “a 
biological rather than mechanistic conception of physiological and mental 
functioning” (British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind 6). Unlike the Galenic 
model, the Romantic mind is anti-dualistic. In Galen’s theory the cognitive functions 
of the mind could be spread throughout the body because there is no biological 
component to them: the soul is responsible for active processes like feeling and 
thinking. The Romantic’s concept of the mind attributes the faculties of reason and 
imagination—and the experience of passion and desire—to the biological function of 
the brain. The movement of the mind to the brain and the change from a dualistic to an 
                                                
4 Romantic critic and theorist Alan Richard was the first to use the term Neuro-
Romanticism.  
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anti-dualistic model5 created the conditions for a greater sense of interiority. It also 
radically changed the relationship between sensory experience and the mind. Because 
sensory stimuli feed the mind by providing it with the material to produce feeling and 
thought, the degree to which the mind is fed is dependent on the amount of stimulation 
and individual sensibility.6 The Romantic preoccupation with the relationship between 
sensory stimuli and sensibility, then, is about how much “food” one can get from 
sensory stimuli.  
For Wordsworth superior minds require less stimulation to produce feeling and 
thought. In his 1802 “Preface to the Lyrical Ballads” he writes: 
For the human mind is capable of being excited without the application 
of gross and violent stimulants; and he must have a very faint 
perception of its beauty and dignity who does not know this, and who 
does not further know, that one being is elevated above another, in 
proportion as he possesses this capability. It has therefore appeared to 
me, that to endeavor to produce or enlarge this capability is one of the 
best services in which, at any period, a Writer can be engaged. 
(Wordsworth: The Major Works 599). 
In this passage Wordsworth justifies his choice to take common occurrences as his 
subject in Lyrical Ballads and to write about them in common language. Instead of 
provoking his reader’s feelings by narrating great events, Wordsworth’s project is to 
                                                
5 In the science of the mind dualism refers to the theory that mind and matter are 
ontologically separate categories. This theory is different than the duality I discuss in 
“Toward a Definition of Romantic Temperance.” That duality refers to self-
consciousness. 
6 By sensory stimuli I mean the excitation of the senses from outer forces and by 
sensibility I mean the mind’s capacity for response to sensory stimuli.  
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produce in his reader’s the capacity to feel strongly about common events. His project 
is reinvigoration; by increasing the capacity for the mind to be excited without 
uncommon provocation he trains his readers to be stimulated by common occurrences 
in the world around them. He connects the beauty and dignity of the mind to its 
sensibility when he says that minds that possess the capability to be excited without 
extreme stimuli are “elevated” above others. For the sensible mind every observation 
and interaction is a significant source of stimulation; the mind that finds stimulation in 
everyday events is constantly engaged in feeling and thinking. Just after this passage 
Wordsworth goes on to discuss the kinds of minds that are not constantly engaged 
because their senses have been dulled by too much stimuli. He writes: 
For a multitude of causes, unknown to former times, are now acting 
with a combined force to blunt the discriminating powers of the mind, 
and unfitting it for all voluntary exertion to reduce it to a state of almost 
savage torpor. The most effective of these causes are the great national 
events which are daily taking place, and the encreasing accumulation of 
men in cities, where the uniformity of the occupations produces a 
craving for extraordinary incident, which the rapid communication of 
intelligence hourly gratifies. To this tendency of life and manners the 
literature and theatrical exhibitions of the country have conformed 
themselves. The invaluable works of our elder writers, I had almost 
said the works of Shakespeare and Milton, are driven into neglect by 
frantic novels, sickly and stupid German Tragedies, and deluges of idle 
and extravagant stories in verse. (Wordsworth: The Major Works 599) 
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In this critique Wordsworth assigns a violent agency to particular aspects of his 
contemporary world that were “unknown to former times.” These changes include the 
ready availability of national news, most probably in the forms of newspapers; the 
increasing number of city-dwellers; the repetitiveness of menial work; and 
contemporary plays and literature. Wordsworth assigns agency to these elements of 
modern life by assigning them the power to act and affect an end; he says that they 
“are now acting with a combined force to blunt the discriminating powers of the 
mind.” His diction gives these elements of modern life an insidiousness, as if they 
were purposefully acting on the mind of men. The words “blunt” and “reduce” suggest 
that these “causes” are undermining and lessening the natural powers of the mind. 
“Savage torpor” appears to be an oxymoron: “savage” suggests extreme violence 
while “torpor” is inactivity. The combination of the two words together makes 
apparent the violence of inactivity on the mind. The “torpor” is savage because the 
faculties of the mind are active by nature. Inactivity is unnatural and violent to the 
mind. The combination of the two words also reminds readers of Wordsworth’s prior 
claim that “one being is elevated above another” in as much as he possesses the 
capacity to be stimulated by everyday encounters. Those whose minds have lost this 
ability and who have fallen into “torpor” are, for Wordsworth, savaged and savage.  
The elements of modern life to which Wordsworth assigns this ability to 
savage the mind are those that provide an overabundance of stimulation to the sense, 
whether real or fictional. He makes no distinction between the effects of news and 
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novel because for him they are both dulling the powers of the mind.7 Wordsworth calls 
contemporary novels “frantic,” German Tragedies “sickly” and “stupid,” and poetry 
“idle” and “extravagant.” While certainly not condemning all of his contemporaries, 
Wordsworth’s critique is far reaching. The language he uses mirrors his more general 
critique of all modern practices that encourage mental lassitude but adds an additional 
connotation of mental illness. During the Romantic period “frantic” exclusively meant 
insane or the properties associated with it, while “sickly” and “stupid” both referred to 
an unhealthful state of mind (Oxford English Dictionary). He uses the words “frantic,” 
“sickly,” and “stupid” as adjectives to describe the literature but the whole focus of the 
passage in the “Preface” describes the effects of contemporary culture on the mind: 
this suggests that in the case of these literary texts their corruption imparts corruption. 
Wordsworth’s critique of contemporary life and literature as detrimental to the 
mind due to excess stimulation, and his defense of his project as producing or 
enlarging sensibility, presents a concept of the mind as trainable. This concept of the 
mind is in keeping with scientific understanding of the relationship between the mind 
and the nervous system during the Romantic period. When the concept of the brain as 
a passive receiver changed to a concept of the brain as an active processor the nerves 
took up the space of the receiver. This new role for the nerves coincided with 
scientific discoveries that proved that the nerves worked in the body as a system. In 
                                                
7 One minor but important distinction he makes is that literature is following the 
tendency of lived experience instead of the other way around. He does not claim that 
novels, plays, and poetry have created a world where violent amounts of stimulation 
are require to engage the mind, as some critics of imaginative literature do. Instead he 
claims the opposite: the fault literature bears is that instead of keeping itself apart from 
the corrupting influence of the world it has followed the trend toward more and more 
extreme stimulation.  
 51 
“Originated Neurology” (2004), George S. Rousseau traces the conceptual origins of 
the nervous system and the way its design was perceived from antiquity to the 
Romantic period. Although not unified by any one specific argument, Rousseau takes 
the reader through the scientific advancements pertaining to the nerves and shows how 
the increasing recognition of the nerves as a system that connects the body and the 
mind also gave rise to a concept of the mind as a system. During the Romantic period, 
Rousseau claims, the nerves added plasticity to the mind that allowed for education 
and aesthetics to play a significant role in its shaping. Rousseau argues, “if nerves 
were not wholly adequate now, they could be educated to perform better . . . In this 
sense, they were more plastic than all other parts of the body, organs, solids, and fluids 
. . . plasticity was in their nature, . . . learning to be shaped by its experience rather 
than being hard-wired from birth with no possibility for alteration” (50).8 As the 
receivers and communicators of sensory stimulation, the nerves had to be sensitive 
without being overly sensitive. How and how much the nerves were excited by 
sensory stimuli determined the input the brain would use to produce feeling and 
thought. If the nerves were not adequately sensitive they could be trained into more 
keen sensitivity, and if they were too sensitive they could be trained to be less so. This 
concept of nervous plasticity is what makes Wordsworth’s poetic project possible. It is 
also what makes the imagination such an important mental faculty. It is the 
                                                
8 The “emotional brain” Rousseau references here is the hypothalamus. The 
hypothalamus is now considered the gate of emotion because it controls emotional 
response by sending impulses to the brain that determine how the brain experiences 
emotion. For more information see Joseph LeDoux’s “The Emotional Brain, Fear, and 
the Amygdala” in Cellular and Molecular Neurobiology, Vol. 23, Nos. 4/5 Oct. 2003. 
LeDoux provides an excellent historical review of early-twentieth century research on 
the emotional functions of the brain.  
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imagination that falls into a state of “torpor” (1802 “Preface to the Lyrical Ballads” 
Wordsworth: The Major Works 599) when bombarded with more and more 
stimulation, and it is the imagination that is re-trained by Wordsworth’s project of 
making the common poetic.  
TEMPERANCE AND THE ROMANTIC IMAGINATION 
In this section I will argue, first, that the Romantics conceptualized the 
imagination as a mental faculty influenced by and capable of influencing sensual 
experience and, second, that Burke’s theory of the sublime and the beautiful produced 
the conditions for the aesthetic to assist in the shaping of the mind. By arguing that the 
sublime and beautiful are the means through which the nerves are exercised and 
strengthened and that the source of the sublime must be removed enough not to 
present a real danger to the self, Burke’s theory creates the conditions for the aesthetic 
to serve in the healthful excitation and relaxation of the sense and resulting 
strengthening of the mind. 
In the second essay in his collection Nervous Acts: Essays on Literature, 
Culture and Sensibility, entitled “Science and the Discovery of the Imagination,” 
(1969) Rousseau constructs an intellectual history of the imagination. He argues that 
man “discovered” (86) his imagination in the late seventeenth century. Rousseau 
claims that the Romantics are the first to aggregate to the imagination the power to 
affect the body and that the Romantics believed that a diseased imagination could 
infect the whole of the mind.9 His first point, that in the Romantic period the 
                                                
9 There is one major point on which Rousseau and I differ. Rousseau claims that the 
Romantics romanticize the idea of the diseased brain, “endow[ing] [it] with an aura of 
glory” (101) and although I agree that Romantic poetry and prose explores the 
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imagination was conceived of as strong enough to influence our sensual experience is 
evidenced in Wordsworth’s “Goody Blake and Harry Gill.” In the poem Goody Blake, 
an old and very poor woman, collects sticks for firewood from a hedge belonging to 
Harry Gill. Harry Gill begrudges her the sticks and lies in wait until he catches her 
taking them. He grasps her with the intent to take vengeance and she cries, “‘God! 
who art never out of hearing, / Oh may he never more be warm!’” (Wordsworth: The 
Major Works 99-100). But it is not God in the poem who hears her; Harry hears her 
curse and it impresses on him so much that he immediately lets her go. The poetic 
voice tells us, “You Harry heard what she had said, / And icy-cold he turned away” 
(Wordsworth: The Major Works 102-3). Harry Gill is affected by Goody Blake’s curse 
when he hears it because it forces him to face his own cold-heartedness. For the rest of 
his life he experiences that cold-heartedness as literal cold. It takes hold of his 
imagination and is transferred to his sensual experience.  
In British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind (2001) Alan Richardson 
argues that Wordsworth’s work is marked by this strong connection between the body 
and mind (71). Richardson claims that Wordsworth “acknowledges throughout the 
role played by the body and its organs in the formation and continual reformation of 
an active subject of perception” (73). Richardson’s argument is that Wordsworth, 
more than any of the other Romantic poets, grounds feeling and thought in the 
                                                
functioning of the diseased brain including melancholy and mania I do not think the 
Romantics glorified the diseased brain, or at least not uniformly. Certainly Romantic 
authors differ in the degree to which they glorify madness. At times there are 
differences in the treatment of madness within the poetry of one author. Much of the 
literature I will discuss later in this chapter is concerned with illustrating the diseased 
brain to show the dissolution that results from allowing oneself to indulge the passions 
but not all Romantic poetry dealing with madness can support that claim.  
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sensational experiences of the body. Because feeling and thought are grounded in 
sensual experience the formation of a subject hinges on sensibility. During the 
Romantic period there was a proliferation of theories hypothesizing which pursuits or 
sensations could increase sensibility, including theories of the sublime and beautiful.  
The Romantic preoccupation with the sublime and the beautiful as products of 
sensory experience produced the conditions for the aesthetic to assist in the shaping of 
the mind. In The Neural Sublime (2010),10 Alan Richardson argues that the Romantic 
sublime is, in fact, the Romantic sublimes. Richardson’s argument is both modest and 
revolutionary: he claims that Romantic theories of the sublime compete and coexist 
instead of supplanting each other. It is modest because it does not attempt to refute the 
long-standing critical tradition of interpreting key moments of Romantic poetry as in 
dialogue with Kant’s sublime. On the other hand, it is revolutionary because it 
                                                
10 Richardson’s The Neural Sublime takes up the issue of sensation in the experience 
of the sublime. He argues against reading differing theories of the sublime as part of a 
narrative that culminates in Kant’s theory. He goes on to say that thinking of the 
sublime as competing theories instead of as a linear narrative allows for an embodied 
sublime separate from Kant’s theory that so completely severs body and mind. 
Because the Kantian sublime hinges on the moment when reason triumphs over bodily 
experience, Richardson argues, it prioritizes reason over imagination. Richard 
theorizes that an embodied sublime—he calls it the neural sublime—was more 
common to the Romantic period. The neural sublime is the triumph of passion over 
reason instead of reason over the senses. Richardson’s neural sublime draws its tenets 
predominantly from Edmund Burke, who is also invested in examining how feeling is 
elicited or moderated. The neural sublime is strongly related to Richardson’s argument 
in British Romanticism and the Science of the Mind that the nerves are plastic. In The 
Neural Sublime he argues that the “sublime functions like the rush of an aerobic 
workout, toning the nerves and buffing up the sensory organs” (27). Although he 
never articulates the connection specifically, in his second book on neurology and the 
Romantics, Richardson shows that aesthetic experience trains the nerves, an argument 
that is essential to my own that the Romantic preoccupation with the sublime and the 
beautiful as products of sensory experience produced the conditions for the aesthetic 
to play a large role in the management of the mind. 
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challenges the long-held assumption that key moments of the sublime in Romantic 
poetry are in dialogue with Kant’s sublime. Burke’s sublime in particular is important 
to Richardson’s critical readings of the Romantic period because Burke’s sublime does 
not insist on transcendence. In Burke’s sublime, Richardson argues, there is no 
rapture; as a result of the “stretching and subsequent relaxation” of the nerves, the 
Burkean sublime roots the mind in the body (The Neural Sublime 26). If the 
phenomena of the sublime are the ultimate expressions of the mind/body connection it 
allows Richardson—and, he argues, the Romantics—to claim them as a testament to 
the mind’s ability to conceptualize feeling instead of as a triumph of reason over 
feeling.  
 In A Philosophical Enquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), Burke 
claims that just as the body cannot remain healthy in a constant state of lassitude, so 
too the nerves must be exercised (164). Burke compares the nerves to muscles; he 
theorizes that just like physical labor is necessary to maintain a strong body even when 
painful or unpleasant, so too is the exercise of the nerves essential to maintaining a 
strong mind. The nerves are exercised through the experience of pain and terror 
induced, for Burke, by stimulation that exceeds the perceptive bounds of the senses. 
But Burke’s sublime is the exercise of the nerves in pain and terror only in as much as 
the pain is not “noxious,” “violent,” or of a “present destruction of the person” (165). 
For any sensual experience to truly be sublime it must be removed enough from the 
one who experiences it that there is no real bodily danger. Because of this necessary 
remove, art becomes a perfect vehicle for the sublime. Burke’s sublime is 
overwhelming without being injurious; it solidifies the connection between the body 
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and mind by stretching the mind’s capacity to safely experience the passions. 
However, the same passions that instigate the sublime’s stretching of the mind also 
present real and immediate risk. If the neural sublime does not allow for a disconnect 
between the passions and the mind, there is nothing to stop the passions from 
adversely affecting the imaginative faculty. Burke’s sublime is a careful balance—
enough stimuli to stretch the nerves and keep them from a state of lassitude without 
overstretching the nerves and causing damage to the mind. One might argue that the 
passions associated with the sublime are not those that are likely to damage the 
imagination, but the primary passions Burke lists are exactly those passions that the 
physicians of the period most often cite as the cause of mental derangement: shock 
and fear.11 And, in fact, complete relaxation will hurt the nerves as well. Burke writes, 
“in this languid inaction state, the nerves are more liable to the most horrid 
convulsions, than when they are sufficiently braced and strengthened  . . .. 
Melancholy, dejection, despair, and often self-murder, is the consequence of the 
gloomy view we take of things in this relaxed state of body” (164). In the case of the 
sublime and beautiful in poetry, the poet who wishes to exercise the nerves of their 
reader must beware of the dual problems of too much and not enough stimulation. To 
further complicate the matter, the stretching of the nerves also serves as a kind of 
conditioning and, like with any muscle, working the nerves makes them stronger. This 
strengthening is the kind of fortification and strengthening Pinel and Haslam insist 
must be part of education if the mind is to be prepared to experience the passions that 
accompany the vicissitudes of life. If the poet is to strengthen the mind of the reader 
                                                
11 The third most commonly reported cause, anger, has no place in the sublime that I 
have found. 
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they would need to shuttle between the sublime and the beautiful, exciting and 
relaxing the nerves through the application of balanced forces of passion and pulling 
the mind toward a middle, temperate space where passion can safely be experienced 
without the risk of damaging the imagination.  
MADNESS AND FEELING IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
The Romantic concern for balancing reason with imagination is most visible in 
the medical texts dealing with insanity. At the end of the eighteenth and beginning of 
the nineteenth centuries there is a proliferation of books about insanity written and 
published. Foucault, of course, traces some of this proliferation in our most famous 
account of the rising concern with mental health, Madness and Civilization: A History 
of Insanity in the Age of Reason (1964). Foucault’s text moves from the Middle Ages 
to Modernity with its main focus on the changing motivations for confinement 
beginning with leprosy. Foucault argues that hospitals were left empty when leprosy 
declined and that these hospitals were filled over time, first as work houses for the 
poor and then as asylums for those who were identified as suffering from mental 
disorders. His narrative of confinement speaks of marginality—the movement of those 
who cannot function within an increasingly narrow definition of “normal.”12 My work 
                                                
12 It is important to note, however, that in his creation of a seemingly seamless 
narrative Foucault sometimes attributes to once period what belongs to another. He 
cites Pinel in a section where his discussion seems to be about the seventeenth century 
although Pinel did not publish until 1794. In the very same paragraph he identifies 
Pinel with the nineteenth century as well (Foucault 38-39). Some of the discrepancy in 
Foucault’s timeline might be because he is less interested in any one period and more 
interested in a narrative across periods.  
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with these medical texts will center on how they theorize madness as an embodied 
experience and the result of the effects of sensory stimulation on the mind.13 
 It is during the Romantic period that doctors stop thinking of madness as a 
result of an imbalance in the body connected to the humors or as a physical defect in 
the brain like a lesion or ulcer. In “A Treatise on Insanity: In Which are Contained the 
Principles of a New and More Practical Nosology of Maniacal Disorders Than Has 
Yet Been Offered to the Public” (1806), Philippe Pinel, a prominent physician who 
pioneered the humane treatment for madness, theorizes that “derangement of the 
understanding is generally considered an effect of an organic lesion of the brain, 
consequently as incurable; a supposition that is, in a great number of instances, 
contrary to anatomical fact” (3). Although Pinel says that his peers typically attribute 
madness to biological causes, many of his contemporaries were actually in agreement 
that biological causes were not the most common reason for mental derangement. 
Autopsies performed to study the brain were not uncommon in asylums, although the 
procedure would not be standardized for a number of years, and most of the doctors I 
discuss in this chapter who performed them became convinced that biological causes 
for madness were unlikely due to the lack of defect in the postmortem brains they 
examined.14 The movement from biological causes to non-biological causes changed 
                                                
13 It is important to understand that during the Romantic period there was no 
separation between psychology and medicine. Doctors who worked in asylums were 
just as concerned with examining and theorizing the brain as doctors who worked in 
hospitals and colleges.  
14 The one exception is Charles Bell (Idea of a New Anatomy of the Brain, 1811). His 
dissension from the general agreement may be a result of his lack of experience with 
the insane. Bell was a surgeon and worked primarily at hospitals and universities, 
including the Royal Hospital Haslar. He was never a surgeon at any of the facilities 
where patients with mental disorders were treated and may not have been involved in 
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the way Pinel and his contemporaries conceived of prevention and of cures. As Pinel 
observes, if madness is the result of a defect in the brain it is most likely hereditary 
and probably incurable.15 In his work he reviews some of the various physical cures 
administered to patients in an attempt to repair biological madness, including 
primarily anti-inflammatory geared bloodletting and bathing. Pinel condemns these 
kinds of “cures” as barbaric and ineffective.16 If the problem is not in the body then 
derangement cannot be treated through the body. Pinel’s refutation of biological 
causes for mental derangement opens up the possibility for a cure that would target the 
mind instead of the body.17  
The shift from biological cause to emotional surplus changes madness from a 
disease of the body to a disease of the mind.18 The most common cause attributed to 
this new sensual madness by those that studied it was too much feeling—or passion—
                                                
a large enough number of autopsies on the insane. Although there was no division 
between researchers and patient care physicians they certainly had differing levels of 
experience with autopsy.   
15 Most cases of biological damage that Pinel and others found during autopsy could 
clearly be linked to an injury. 
16 Pinel objects to physical cures most of which were anti-inflammatory. He writes, “it 
is on the other hand to be lamented that regular physicians have indulged in a blind 
routine of inefficient treatment” (Pinel 4).  
17 In Madness and Civilization Foucault dates this shift from impossible to cure to 
curable a bit earlier. He writes, “in the literature of the early seventeenth century 
[madness] occupies, by preference a median place . . . displaced in the economy of 
narrative and dramatic structures, it authorizes the manifestation of truth and the return 
of reason” (32).  
18 The majority of medical texts on madness published during the Romantic period 
include a categorization of the various species of madness such as melancholy, mania, 
and derangement. Although almost all the varieties of madness have distinct 
manifestations they are attributed to similar causes—an overabundance of feeling, 
indulgence of the passions, or both. Because my argument and interest lies in the 
causes attributed to the state of mind and not the classification system of species, I will 
refer to “madness” throughout this chapter as a general for mental disorder. This 
choice is not without precedent in the period, the majority of the texts I will discuss 
also use madness as an overall designation for any species of mental disorder.  
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of almost any variety. They considered the passions as dangerous in as much as they 
have the potential to swamp the brain with sensory impressions. As an active 
processor instead of a passive receiver, the brain was responsible for interpreting 
sensory data and forming thoughts and ideas using those impressions.19 Like with any 
processor, too much sensory data to interpret could cause a system failure. In “An 
Essay on Diseases Incidental to Literary and Sedentary Persons with Proper Rules for 
Preventing Their Fatal Consequences and Instructions for Their Cure” (1769), S.A. 
Tissot imagines the brain as a machine. Tissot claims that too much “violent labor” of 
the mind wears at the parts of it and causes it to become “callous,” lessening the 
capacity for “forming ideas” (34). Tissot does not revert back to the brain as a 
mechanical receiver—the brain is engaged in the labor of thinking, but like all organs 
of the body it is subject to fatigue. Overstimulation in the form of too much sensory 
excitation can result in brain exhaustion. In Tissot’s theory the brain and sense stimuli 
depend on each other and work together, but he warns that like a machine the brain 
can become worn if overworked (38).  
                                                
19 Charles Bell theorized the relationship between the brain and the senses. Bell 
indicates that it is by divine design that the external excitement is necessary to “rouse 
our faculties” but that once roused the mind can exercise the organs in the service of 
memory and imagination (13). Bell claims that the mind relies on the senses for 
stimulation because if it could excite thoughts and ideas independent from the external 
world it would be autonomous and man would not have to interact with nature or with 
each other, making him singular opposed to part of a whole. His theory of the mind 
has a strong relationship to the fall of mankind. He claims that it is essential for man to 
experience passion and reason as a result of his bodily interaction with good and evil 
in order to become intelligent and be accountable for his own actions (16). One of the 
most interesting things about Bell’s theory, I think, is that it brings divine influence 
into brain science just at the moment it seems to be left. But instead of the soul 
connecting the body to the divine, as it had before, biological design connects the 
body to the divine.  
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The machine-brain is not the same as the receiver-brain. In Tissot’s conception 
of the brain as a machine it is actively engaged in processing sensual experience and 
producing feeling and thought informed by that experience. A problem only occurs 
when sensual experience is greater than what the mind can process. The collapse of 
the brain-machine he fears is like the danger of collapse from the sublime when it is 
not tempered by shuttling between it and the beautiful.20 
Brain exhaustion from an overload of sensory stimulation brings sensibility to 
the forefront of scientific study. In “A Treatise on Insanity,” Philippe Pinel theorizes 
                                                
20 Few of the remaining texts from Wordsworth’s personal library, now preserved at 
Dove Cottage, contain his written notes. Wordsworth’s copy of Paradise Lost is a 
notable exception. Bishop C. Hunt published a transcript of Wordsworth’s annotations 
in the 1969 Bulletin of the New York Public Library. Wordsworth wrote commentary 
on thirteen passages, as Hunt has observed the distribution of his commentary was as 
follows: Wordsworth commented on two passages in Book III, one in Book VI, two in 
Book VII, one in IX, one in X, five in XI, and one in XII. Of these corrective 
comments several identify inconsistencies in plot or narrative logic—Hunt argues his 
comments are indicative of Wordsworth’s close reading of Milton. The rest of the 
written comments are also corrective but they take up issues of style. I was fortunate 
enough to make my own transcription from Wordsworth’s original markings. In one 
particularly important comment Wordsworth writes, “This part of the picture might 
have been improved by a simple introduction of some of the most interesting rural 
images of an extensive prospect viewed at daybreak such as Hamlets cottages & 
woods with reaches of a river, all lifting themselves here & there thro the morning 
vapour. The three last verses are inimitably picturesque. It has been said of poets as 
their highest praise that they exhausted worlds and then imagined new, that existence 
saw them spurn her bounded reign &c. But how much of the most valuable part of the 
poet’s province how much of the real excellence of Imagination consists in the 
capacity of exploring the world really existing & thence selecting objects beautiful or 
great as the occasion may require. Who is there that does not peruse this description of 
so familiar an appearance with far more pleasure than the preceeding [sic] account of 
the sea of Jasper or liquid pearl, the palace gate embellished with diamond and with 
gold, or the golden stairs which were occasionally let down from heaven.” In every 
case of stylistic correction Wordsworth argues for the sublime passages of Paradise 
Lost to be softened by descriptions of the beautiful.  
 62 
that “paroxysms of madness are generally no more than irascible21 emotions prolonged 
beyond their ordinary limits; and the true character of such paroxysms depends, 
perhaps more frequently upon various influence of the passions, than upon any 
derangement of the ideas, or upon any whimsical singularities of the judging faculty” 
(19). In Pinel’s definition of madness emotions prolonged past the mind’s ability to 
cope with them replaces corrupted reason as the most likely cause of mental 
derangement.22 Pinel’s view was not uncommon in the period. For example in The 
Borderers, Wordworth attributes Rivers’ derangement to overindulgence. Wordsworth 
writes, “having indulged a habit, dangerous in a man who has fallen, in dallying with 
moral calculations, he becomes an empiric—and a daring and unfeeling empiric” (The 
Borderers 65). Rivers does not live by any moral philosophy; he uses reason to justify 
his bad behavior. In fact, Wordsworth articulates the purpose of his play as “shew[ing] 
the dangerous use which may be made of reason” (67). In Rivers we see that reason 
alone is detrimental because it can be used to equivocate as easily as it can be used to 
determine what is ethical. What is most important is the relationship between passion 
and the imagination that shapes our own realities. It is the combination of imagination 
and reason that would stop Rivers from justifying his behavior. If the imagination 
becomes corrupt through overindulgence then reason can be used to justify any course 
of action within that scope of the mental derangement.  
                                                
21 It is unlikely that Pinel is referencing Plato’s division of the soul. Plato designated 
the irascible soul as the part that housed appetites and passions. By 1806, when this 
work was published, the tripartite soul had fallen out of favor as I showed earlier in 
my review of the movement from Galen who also divided the soul into three parts. 
The Oxford English Dictionary’s definition of irascible as “arising from anger or hot-
tempered passion” is the most likely definition for this period.  
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In an article titled “A Treatise on Diseases of the Nervous System. Part the 
First: Comprising Convulsive and Maniacal Affections” (1822) in The Medico-
chirurgical Review, A.C. Prichard writes, “our author avers that he knows of no 
disease of the nervous system in which the reasoning or the intellectual faculty is 
perverted . . . It is a common remark that lunatics reason correctly from false 
premises” (124). Prichard explains that many patients still reason adequately within 
their delusions and, in fact, many of their inappropriate behaviors are appropriate 
when considered inside of their delusions. Madness is produced, he argues, not by the 
reasoning faculty but by a deranged imagination that provides the reasoning faculty 
with a false set of parameters with which to operate.  
It should not be surprising that causes for madness in the Romantic period 
would be attributed to emotion with more frequency than to reason. It is in keeping 
with the movement away from Enlightenment philosophy that marked the period on 
the whole. Still, even if not surprising, the ramifications of this shift are significant. If 
emotion and not reason is the contributing factor in cases of madness it becomes 
possible to prevent and cure madness by learning to moderate emotion and by 
controlling sensory stimulation.  
In Observations on Insanity: With Practical Remarks on the Disease, and an 
Account of the Morbid Appearances on Dissection (1798) John Haslam, physician and 
apothecary to Bethlehem Hospital, claims that in the majority of his case studies 
madness results from excess emotion. Haslam begins almost every one of his case 
studies with a review of the causes of the patient’s condition. In the overwhelming 
majority of the case studies he begins with the claim that the patient’s mental 
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derangement has been brought about by too much of some emotion—most commonly 
but not limited to shock, grief, anger, or desire. The narratives in these accounts 
suggest that the reason the patient has gone mad is because his or her feelings became 
unmanageable.23 Joanne Baillie also attributes madness to extreme shock or fear, 
saying that, “instances of intellect being destroyed” by the experience of those kinds 
of extreme passions are “more numerous” than any other cause (Plays on the Passions 
72). Pinel argues that “the known tendency to mental derangement at those periods of 
life which are most exposed to the influence of strong passions agrees with the 
uniform experience of hospital observations and practice” (113). Pinel creates a 
catalogue of confined individuals that shows that confinement is more likely between 
the ages of twenty and forty than at other time of life. He determines that this increase 
in confinement is because between the ages of twenty and forty people are more likely 
to experience strong passions that could become unmanageable. Although Haslam 
typically uses the word “emotion” and Pinel more often relies on “passion,” both men 
                                                
23 It is important to consider the theory that prolonged emotions triggers madness in 
conversations with Foucault’s work on the rise of the asylum. Foucault indicates that 
the confinement of those deemed mad marks the moment when “unreason” became a 
social problem akin to poverty, illness, and inability to integrate into society (64). On 
one hand I agree that confinement on the basis of madness was certainly motivated at 
least in part by a narrowing of social spaces for those who could not or would not 
conform to the ever more dominant concept of normality. On the other hand I think it 
is essential to think about the differences between Foucualt’s “unreason” and the 
untenable emotion that it was believed caused madness during the Romantic period. 
Pinel often attributes mental derangement to the violence of the French Revolution 
especially as it affected those who were neither very rich nor very poor. In these 
accounts it seems less like confinement is the result of the narrowing “normal” and 
more like it is the result of larger social dissolution. In other words, madness is not a 
product of a faulty faculty but the product of acute sensibility in a cruel world. In other 
cases the responsibility lies with the patient for purposefully seeking out sensory 
stimulation and refusing to curb their passions. 
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attribute them to the same experiences such as loss, disappointment in love, desire, 
and other various forms of excitement.  
For Haslam and Pinel, feelings became unmanageable for one of two reasons: 
either because of too much sensory stimulation as I discussed above, or because of too 
much sensibility. In other words, in addition to an excess of feeling, overly acute 
sensibility is also responsible for mental derangement. Haslam and Pinel both indicate 
that mental derangement is due not just to the degree of the stimuli but also the 
sensibility of the patient. Pinel argues that “the feelings of individuals endowed with 
acute sensibility may experience so violent a shock that all the functions of the mind 
are in danger of being suspended in their exercises or totally abolished” (166). The 
intensity of the sensation and the sensibility of the patient are both contributing factors 
to mental derangement; the health of the mind is dependent on a balance in the system. 
This is one of the dangers of locating sensory experience in the brain instead of in the 
“outward organs” such as the hands and fingers (Bell 11). It means that what we 
experience through the outward organs affects the brain by way of the nerves. In other 
words, external excitement lives in the mind and is responsible for providing the 
material with which thought is formed (Bell 11). Pinel’s description emphasizes this 
delicate balance between the functions of the mind and sensibility. Only through 
sensory excitation can the functions of the mind be stimulated; however, overload the 
mind and all functions may cease.  
If the brain is overloading with stimulation and its functions are affected, the 
most likely faculty to become deranged is the imagination. I have shown above that 
reason is not the faculty in danger because it can remain functional even when a 
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patient is suffering from madness. Pinel writes, “of all the powers of the human mind 
that of the imagination appears to be the most subject to injury” (Pinel 73) and 
Prichard quotes physician Richard Mead (1673-1754) as saying that the “disease 
[madness] consists entirely in the strength of the imagination” (277). Even those in 
disagreement with the idea that madness was the product of a deranged imagination 
concede that professions and pursuits that put strain on the imagination are more likely 
to produce madness than those that do not, including Haslam who argues that the 
derangement does not exist entirely in the imagination but does so only partially. Pinel 
and Tissot are the most vocal about the dangers of imaginative pursuits. Pinel argues, 
“it is well known that certain professions conduce more than others to insanity, which 
are chiefly those in which the imagination is unceasingly or ardently engaged and not 
moderated in its excitement by exertion of those functions of understanding which are 
more susceptible of satiety and fatigue” (Pinel 113-4). Here Pinel says that if an 
imaginative pursuit also calls on “functions of understanding” that tire or become 
satisfied, then the likelihood of insanity is reduced. Engaging a secondary function of 
understanding is important because, Pinel argues, the imagination never gets tired and 
is never satisfied. Consequently, left to its own devices the imagination will continue 
in excitement until it becomes deranged.24 In The Borderers Wordsworth offers a 
metaphor in Rivers’ character study that helps us think about the relationship between 
passion and imagination. He writes, “but when our malignant passions operate, the 
original causes which called them forth are soon supplanted, yet when we account for 
the effect we forget the immediate impulse and the whole is attributed to the force 
                                                
24 Pinel says of one patient, “his imagination was greatly heated” (69). Again this puts 
us in mind of a machine that overheats as it is used beyond its limit.  
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from which the first motion was received. The vessel keeps sailing on, and we 
attribute her progress in the voyage to the ropes which first towed her out of harbor” 
(68). The ropes that tow our imagination are the passions—the sensory stimulation 
that provides us the raw material to make meaning of the world. Once the passions are 
operative, Wordsworth argues, whatever originally instigated them ceases to control 
them as they begin to work on our minds.  
The pursuits that engage the imagination, judging from Pinel’s case studies, 
include the arts and the sciences of invention. Tissot’s interest is in the former. In his 
treatise “On Diseases Incidental to Literary and Sedentary Persons” he relates the 
story of two men made ill by engaging in imaginative scholarly pursuits. He says, 
“Malbranche was seized with dreadful palpitations in reading Descartes’ Man; and 
there is still living at Paris a professor of rhetoric who fainted away whilst he was 
perusing some of the sublime passages of Homer” (Tissot 20). Tissot warns repeatedly 
of the dangers of allowing the imagination to be excited without rest. His examples 
suggest that with improper and irresponsible care the imaginative power—a voracious 
and dominating power for Tissot—can become monstrous and destructive to the other 
faculties.  
The emphasis on taming the imagination does not reduce its significance in the 
period, if anything it increases it. The imagination is so strong and is such an 
important faculty that it can infect the mind with delusions so real they can fool 
reason. Even if reason continues to function as it should, if the imagination is 
deranged reason cannot fix it. Making imagination, when excited by unchecked 
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passion, the cause of madness makes it the most powerful and dangerous of the mental 
faculties.  
Although reason cannot bring a deranged imagination back in check, 
temperance can because temperance addresses and moderates the passions that excite 
the imagination. In Nosologie Methodique (1771) physician and botanist Francois 
Boissier de Sauvages warns, “the distraction of our minds is the result of our blind 
surrender to our desires, our incapacity to control or moderate our passions” (12). 
Wordsworth expresses a similar sentiment in his character study of Rivers in The 
Borderers. Wordsworth writes that Rivers’ appetite “from being exhausted becomes 
unnatural” (Wordsworth 65). The continued satiation of his appetite causes it to grow 
beyond the bounds of reason. Like de Sauvages, in Rivers Wordsworth shows the 
possible danger in unmediated gratification. If the cause of uncontrollable appetite is 
surrender to passion, an excess, the cure is learning to moderate passion and bring 
imagination under a control that will allow it to function robustly without damaging 
the rest of the faculties. Pinel is an advocate for treating insanity by moderating the 
passions. He may have derived his ideas from works on classical temperance; although 
we have no indication of his reading practices outside of those in his own field he 
mentions in his treatise, he does allude to the “ancients.” Pinel shares a story about a 
friend whose passion for glory drove him to madness. He recounts how his experience 
with his friend “enhanced [his] admiration of the judicious precepts of the ancients, 
and made [him] regret that [he] had it not then in [his] power to put them in practice” 
(Pinel 52). Pinel also alludes to “the doctrine in ethics of balancing the passions of 
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men by others of equal or superior force,” a description that calls to mind Aristotle’s 
theory of temperance as the median between two equal forces (229).  
 Both Pinel and Haslam recommend temperance as a way to manage the mind 
and cure madness. Haslam points out that we are so ruled by habit that even after 
madness has taken hold many patients continue in the day-to-day habits they had prior 
to their derangement. Haslam says he had hoped that simply bringing the patients into 
a system of regularity would alleviate their mental disorders but found that in the case 
of habit, thought does not precede action and so any effort to produce ordered thought 
through ordered action was ineffective. Instead of bringing patients into a system of 
regularity in their actions, Haslam recommends “superinducing different habits of 
thinking” (130). To superinduce different habits of thinking is to displace the current 
habits of thought with new ones. Haslam shifts his focus from regulating or managing 
action to managing thought as the best way to bring the mental faculties back into 
balance and cure mental derangement. Pinel agrees, mourning the inefficient 
treatments used by doctors in the past: “it is . . . to be lamented that regular physicians 
have indulged in a blind routine of inefficient treatment, and have allowed themselves 
. . . to be diverted from the more important management of the mind” (Pinel 4-5). 
Pinel uses some of the same descriptors for the physicians as he and others have used 
to describe patients. Here the physicians have indulged and are blind and diverted 
because they continue to attempt cures that address the body instead of the mind. 
Treating the body alone cannot cure madness caused by too much feeling because 
feeling is in the mind. Pinel uses the language of temperance, “management of the 
mind,” to describe the preferred treatment. Later Pinel advocates for treating madness 
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at the level of habits of thought when he says, “it is not to be wondered at that proper 
attention to mental and corporeal regimen seldom fails to effect a cure” (Pinel 159). 
Pinel advocates both a corporeal and a mental regimen to cure madness. I will discuss 
the corporeal regimen more below, but the mental regimen suggests the kind of 
superinducing Haslam discusses. A regimen is simultaneously a set of practices and an 
act of governance. As a set of precisely repeated practices it creates habit, as an act of 
governance it brings the mind and body into control. It is this dual effect that is 
intrinsic to temperance, temperance being both the development of habit over time 
through regulating thoughts and actions, and self-governance. Pinel’s “moral 
treatment,” a theory he pioneered, is a “moral regiment” for the treatment of insanity 
that attempts to affect both ends of temperance (5). Pinel advocated for environment 
control to remove the patient from excess stimulation.25  He talks specifically about 
quiet walks in nature and other daily activities that would reduce the sensory stimuli 
patients experience in order to control their emotions.26 Even when patients become 
violent Pinel suggests meeting that violence with unshakeable calm and patience in 
order to persuade the patient to adopt the same. By removing environmental stimuli, 
the “moral treatment” reduces the sensory stimulation available to the patient in order 
to calm the patient’s mind. 
                                                
25 Pinel and others who adopted the moral treatment still used strait jackets but they 
were often employed to decrease sensory input, not to restrain. Prior to the moral 
treatment, as Foucault tells us, patients were often chained and shackled for long 
periods of time without release.  
26 This is compared to the city of Paris where Pinel worked. Nature, of course, has 
plenty of sensory stimuli but Pinel considered nature to be within normal or “natural” 
limits and so more likely to encourage the patient to bring their own passions into 
normal parameters.  
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 The patient's environment is especially important in cases where mental 
derangement results from acute sensibility, not just because it is even more important 
to control the environment but also because the environment outside of the hospital is 
even more destructive to the patient. Pinel says that patients who suffer acute 
sensibility are more prone to relapse: “the acute sensibility which generally 
characterizes the temperaments of maniacs, and which renders them susceptible of the 
liveliest emotions both of pleasure and pain, renders them likewise liable to relapse. 
But this consideration ought to operate upon such as are subject to this complaint as an 
additional inducement to subdue their passions by the dictates of wisdom, and to 
fortify their minds by the precepts of enlightened morality” (Pinel 38). Because Pinel 
is writing in the aftermath of the French Revolution, life outside of the hospital would 
have been especially tumultuous. Those with acute sensibility, he suggests, would 
have a difficult time retaining any balance they gained while hospitalized. For these 
individuals it would be even more important to resist excitation. For this reason Pinel 
admonishes patients with more acute sensibility to control their passion and fortify 
their minds. To fortify is to make strong but it is also to shore up against attack and to 
“give oneself . . . endurance for some effort” (Oxford English Dictionary “Fortify”). 
Pinel’s admonishment suggests that those with more acute sensibility have an 
obligation to prepare their minds against what will be for them a hostile world full of a 
continuous flow of too much stimulation. The relationship between the two sentences 
is if/then: if acute sensibility makes one more likely to relapse into insanity, then 
controlling the passions will fortify the mind and prevent relapse.  
 72 
 Although acute sensibility makes a person more inclined to insanity because 
sensory stimulation excites the imagination and the imagination becomes deranged 
from the glut of stimuli, Pinel and Haslam both claim that acute sensibility does not 
make insanity inevitable. Both physicians blame insufficient education and 
indulgence—in youth especially—for the inability to control passions later in life. 
This critique does not seem to be limited to a particular class. Pinel provides examples 
from an array of social classes; madness can result in any case where there is 
insufficient education and indulgence. Pinel provides an example of an “only son of a 
weak and indulgent mother” who encouraged him in “the gratification of every caprice 
and passion” (151). Pinel goes on to say that this young man was already prone to “an 
untutored and violent temper” but that his education exacerbated his natural tendencies 
instead of teaching him to control his natural inclination to extreme passions, it shaped 
him into a vicious and uncontrolled man. Haslam does not provide a case study but he 
does say that “the greatest number of these moral causes may, perhaps, be traced to the 
errors of education; which often plant in the youthful mind those seeds of madness,”27 
and that “it should be as much the object of teachers of youth to subjugate the passions 
as to discipline the intellect . . . The tender mind should be prepared to expect the 
natural and certain effects of causes”28 (Haslam 101). When Haslam says “tender 
                                                
27 When Haslam says “moral cause” he means those causes that arise from the mind 
opposed to injury.  
28 The syntax of Haslam’s “effects of causes” may seem particularly strange. It is 
likely that Haslam is drawing on either Thomas Reid’s or John Locke’s theory of 
cause and effect. Hume’s more obscure relationship between cause and effect was a 
favorite with physician John Brown (1797)—a contemporary of Haslam’s—but 
Haslam seems to indicate here that cause and effect have a natural and, perhaps even, 
predictable relationship. Hume’s cause and effect theory suggests that we can only 
trace the relationship between cause and effect through experience which would mean 
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mind” he is referring to minds that are especially sensitive to sensory stimuli. 
Education becomes training to prepare these minds for the barrage of sense stimuli and 
the tumultuous emotions of life. If the mind is not prepared to control passions and 
anticipate the experience of them then, for Haslam and Pinel, education has failed to 
produce a mind that can survive in the world—or in other words, a temperate mind. 
FEELING AND MADNESS IN ROMANTIC POETRY  
In this last section I will examine instances of tender-mindedness in 
Wordsworth’s “The Ruined Cottage.” I will not argue that madness resulting from 
tender-mindedness is treated through temperance in the ways that the physicians I 
discussed recommend. Instead in this poem temperance operates at the level of the 
narrative as the poetic voice mediates the experiences for the reader. In Wordsworth’s 
Poetry: 1787-1814 (1964) Geoffrey Hartman writes that “The Ruined Cottage” “tends 
to become a story about the relation of teller to tale” (139). Hartman argues that 
Wordsworth conceives his “myth of nature,” at least in part, in “The Ruined Cottage,” 
and that at its core the poem is about the growth of the mind as it becomes 
independent of and then co-creator with nature. It is in this relationship that Hartman 
locates the tension in the poem, between nature and man as distinct centers. The poem 
also gets its tension from shuttling between the beautiful and the sublime; at its core 
this poem is about the pull of the twin powers toward excitation (read “madness”) and 
laxness (read “madness”).  
                                                
that it would be impossible to teach how to anticipate it. Although a minor point, the 
wording of Haslam’s argument suggests that effects can be anticipated by teaching 
their relationship to particular causes. It is possible to prepare oneself for feelings in 
relation to outcomes that have not yet occurred if one knows that the preceding event 
is likely.  
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 More often than not critics have taken “I see things around me [ ] / Things 
which you cannot see” (129-130) as the operative lines of “The Ruined Cottage.” I 
propose that we look instead to the balance between those lines and these later ones, 
“enough to sorrow have you given, / The purpose of wisdom asks no more” 
(Wordsworth: The Major Works 508-9). The narrative of “The Ruined Cottage” 
balances between the responsibility to feel compassion for Margaret and the 
responsibility to care for the self by enjoying the pleasures of nature even when it is a 
reminder of past pains. The balance works on three different levels with the three 
different poetic figures: Margaret, Armytage, and the Traveler. Margaret’s narrative is 
one of imbalance. The poem has come under fire more than once for its perceived 
insensitivity to Margaret’s plight. De Quincey famously said that the Peddler “would 
have done better to give Margaret some cash rather than mere sympathy” 
(Wordsworth: The Sense of History 322). But De Quincey’s response, regardless of 
how much it is in sympathy with modern sensibilities, circumvents the poem. In “The 
Ruined Cottage” Margaret’s suffering is only ostensibly the topic. The real focus of 
the poem is the Traveler’s reaction to Armytage’s narrative of Margaret’s suffering. 
Unlike Wordsworth’s other poems that deal directly with the suffering of the marginal 
poor like “The Last of the Flock” and “The Mad Mother,” “The Ruined Cottage” pulls 
the attention of the reader away from Margaret’s suffering to focus instead on the 
Traveler as he hears about Margaret’s suffering. 
To better understand the turn away from Margaret’s suffering to the Traveler I 
turn to Joanna Baillie’s introduction to Plays of the Passions (1798). Baillie’s 
introduction is a defense of the subject matter of her plays. Like Wordsworth she is 
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vulnerable to attack because her plays could read as capitalizing on the pains of 
hardship and vice for the purpose of entertainment. Baillie defends her choice, saying, 
“God almighty has implanted it [the fascination with the extreme passions of others] 
within us, as well as all our other propensities and passions, for wise and good 
purposes. It is our best and most powerful instructor. From it we are taught the 
propensities and decencies of ordinary life, and are prepared for distressing and 
difficult situations. In examining others we know ourselves” (74). Baillie claims that 
our interest in the suffering of others has little to do with schadenfreude. Instead, when 
we watch others experience pain or give way to their passions, we are in a position to 
reflect critically on ourselves. “Examine” demands more than passive enjoyment; it is 
cognitive work that Baillie asks of her readers. Like Burke, Baillie sees the passions as 
universal to the human condition—we all feel the same things, she argues, just to 
differing degrees. And because we feel the same things, seeing that passion become 
out of control in another will teach us to moderate it in ourselves.29  
Telling Margaret’s story—and more importantly, thinking about Margaret’s 
story—illustrates the consequences of allowing non-moderated passions to take hold 
                                                
29 Later in her introduction Baillie argues specifically that by seeing passion rage in 
another person we will learn the signs of danger in ourselves. She writes, “We cannot, 
it is true, amidst its wild uproar, listen to the voice of reason, and save ourselves from 
destruction; but we can foresee its coming, we can mark its rising signs, we can know 
the situation that will most expose us to its rage, and we can shelter our heads from the 
coming blast. To change a certain disposition of mind which makes us view objects in 
a particular light, and thereby, oftentimes, unknown to ourselves, influences our 
conduct and manners, is almost impossible; but in checking and subduing these 
visitations of the soul, whose causes and efforts we are aware of, every one may make 
considerable progress, if he proves not entirely successful. Above all, looking back to 
the first rise, and tracing the progress of passion, points out to us those stages in the 
approach of the enemy, when he might have been combated most successfully; and 
where the suffering him to pass may be considered as occasioning all the misery that 
ensues” (Plays of the Passions 94). 
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over the mind and infect the imagination. Through Margaret’s story the Traveler 
learns to be the master of his own passions. The Traveler does not allow the pain of 
Margaret’s story to overtake him.30 This does not mean that Margaret is a means to an 
end for the Traveler. His feeling for her is genuine and at times he is in danger of 
being overcome by it in the poem. But the Traveler resists collapsing into Margaret’s 
story and in so doing he learns to assert boundaries between self and other and self and 
experience.  
Throughout Armytage’s tale Margaret becomes more and more despondent 
until her imagination overcomes all other mental faculties as she entertains the fantasy 
that her husband is still coming home. Nature outside her cottage mimics the state of 
her mind because, like her mind, she allows it to fall into disrepair: as Margaret’s mind 
becomes disordered so too does her garden. She has ceased to take pleasure in nature 
and instead experiences only pain. In addition, she stops taking part in useful activities 
and withdraws from her life except as it pertains to her desire for her husband’s return. 
Margaret’s despair is so extreme she claims it had wrought a physical change in her—
something Wordsworth,31 Pinel, and Haslam all argue is possible.  
And so I waste my time: for I am changed; 
                                                
30 It is interesting to note that one of the reasons the insane must be confined away 
from society according to Pinel is because madness is catching. Direct, prolonged 
exposure to someone suffering from a deranged imagination can result in a kind of 
pandemic of the passions. Literature provides a way to learn from those who have 
allowed their passions to compromise their minds without the danger of infecting the 
reader. This put a new spin on Burke’s insistence that something cannot be sublime if 
it presents a real danger.  
31 Wordsworth makes this argument in the note about Goody Blake and Harry Gill in 
the Preface to Lyrical Ballads. He writes, “the power of the human imagination is 
sufficient to produce such changes even in our physical nature as might almost appear 
miraculous” (Wordsworth: The Major Works 612). 
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And to myself,” she said, “have done much wrong, 
And to this helpless infant. I have slept 
Weeping, and weeping I have walked; my tears 
Have flowed as if my body were not such 
As others are, and I could never die. (Wordsworth: The Major Works  
352-7) 
The wrong she has done to herself remains undefined but the rest of the passage 
suggests that it is in her surrender to her passions that she has erred. The change that 
has come over her body is in its capacity to experience grief but there is no 
corresponding fortitude in her mind. Her nerves have been stretched and stretched 
without any relaxation and she has suffered beyond what her mind can bear to process. 
By Burke’s definition Margaret’s experience is not sublime—the pain and terror she 
feels can and does damage her. However, the stretching of her nerves is the same kind 
of nervous stretching that occurs in the Burkean sublime; the difference is not in the 
quality of pain the nerves experience but in the degree of pain.  
As a character one degree removed from the narrative, however, Armytage’s 
experience does have the potential to be sublime. Margaret is contrasted with 
Armytage as his state of mind waxes and wanes throughout the story. At times he is 
despondent; he says, “But often on the cottage do I muse / As on a picture, till my 
wiser mind / Sinks, yielding to the foolishness of grief” (Wordsworth: The Major 
Works 117-119). Yet each time he is in danger of surrendering to his narrative-induced 
despair he resists and even chastises himself for the lapse.  
‘Tis now the hour of deepest noon. 
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At this still season of repose and peace, 
This hour when all things which are not at rest 
Are cheerful, while this multitude of flies 
Fills all the air with happy melody, 
Why should a tear be in an old man’s eye? 
Why should we thus with an untoward mind 
And in the weakness of humanity 
From natural wisdom turn out hearts away, 
From natural comfort shut our eyes and ears, 
And feeding on disquiet this disturb 
The calm of nature with our restless thoughts? (Wordsworth: The 
Major Works 187-98) 
Here Armytage pulls back from his narrative to temper his sad recollections with the 
beauty of nature. The last six lines are a question: why should we refuse the solace 
nature offers and pursue instead our feelings of sadness? In this moment of 
recollecting past sorrow there is a readily available source of present joy. I see no 
indication in these lines that Armytage is suggesting there is never time for sorrow, 
just that now is not the time. “Deepest noon,” he claims, is time for peace; that is not 
to say that there is no time for sorrow. An “untoward mind” means both an unprepared 
and unmanageable mind; if he surrenders to passion instead of moderating and 
managing it he shows his mind is unprepared for the stretching motion of the sublime. 
The “weakness of humanity” is the tendency to give in to passion even when the 
nerves require relaxation. 
 79 
 Even when Armytage continues with Margaret’s story he resists falling prey to 
his passions again. Instead he tells the story remembering how he once experienced 
despair at seeing Margaret in pain. When Armytage concludes his story he has found 
balance. The pain becomes a step removed from him, not doing violence to him at 
each new recollection as trauma would, but instead providing him with the pleasurable 
pain of the sublime—a pain that attests to the growth of the mind. 
 Finally, the Traveler is two steps removed from the narrative and so is the most 
likely to access Margaret’s story as sublime. We find, however, that he struggles in 
doing so. It is not until Armytage teaches him by twice calling him back to pleasure 
that the Traveler is able to experience Margaret’s story as other than uncontrolled 
passion. After Armytage pauses in his narrative the Traveler forgets it but only so long 
as Armytage distracts him. The moment the Traveler is alone in nature his mind 
returns to Margaret’s pain so much so that he begs for the rest of the story. The 
Traveler explains that his care for Margaret is not just because her story is tragic; it is 
in the way Armytage relates the narrative and “the things of which he spake / seemed 
present” (Wordsworth: The Major Works  211-12). Armytage’s narrative style—the 
way he makes the story real and then pulls back only to insist on pausing for 
pleasure—affects the excitation and relaxation of the nerves.  
This vacillation between pain and pleasure as Armytage tells Margaret’s story 
and then stops to insist on recognizing the beauty of nature has an effect similar to the 
thematic turns of “Tintern Abbey.” Hartman argues that “Tintern Abbey” has a 
“vacillating calculus of gain and loss, of hope and doubt” (27). He links the thematic 
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vacillations to the metrical structure,32 which he compares to a wave—lengthening and 
pulling back but never quite reaching a climax. I believe that a similar principle is at 
work in “The Ruined Cottage.” Margaret’s story builds but never reaches a climax and 
by denying a climax the Traveler—and the reader—are denied surrender to the 
passions the story incites.  
Armytage facilitates the experience of the dual powers of the sublime and 
beautiful by the design of his narrative. Remember that Haslam put forth the plan of  
“superinducing different habits of thinking” to prevent and cure madness; Armytage’s 
narrative does precisely that (130). It conducts the stretching of the nerves while 
simultaneously teaching how to fortify the mind by relaxing them in the enjoyment of 
pure pleasure. At the conclusion of the poem an “unworthy eye” is synonymous with 
an intemperate eye. The intemperate eye cannot perceive the dual forces of the 
beautiful and sublime that must vacillate in a healthy formation of the self: the tragedy 
of Margaret’s story and the beauty of nature left behind (Wordsworth: The Major 
Works 511).  
                                                
32 Wordsworth spoke about metrical structure as a way to control affective response in 
the “Preface to Lyrical Ballads”: “The end of Poetry is to produce excitement in 
coexistence with an overbalance of pleasure. Now, by the supposition, excitement is 
an unusual and irregular state of the mind; ideas and feelings do not in that state 
succeed each other in accustomed order. But if the words by which this excitement is 
produced are in themselves powerful, or the images and feelings have an undue 
proportion of pain connected with them, there is some danger that the excitement may 
be carried beyond its proper bounds. Now the co-presence of something regular, 
something to which the mind has been accustomed when in an unexcited or a less 
excited state, cannot but have great efficacy in tempering and restraining the passion 
by an intertexture of ordinary feeling” (Wordsworth: The Major Works 609). Although 
he goes on after this passage to specifically talk about metrics, I think his theory here 
is also deeply connected to his investment in common language—another regular, 
familiar element of his poetry that controls the reader’s passionate response.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
TEMPERANCE AND THE RE-TRAINING OF THE SENSES IN 
WORDSWORTH’S LYRICAL BALLADS 
 Theories of education proliferated in the Romantic period. In Literature, 
Education, and Romanticism: Reading as Social Practice 1780-1832 (1994) Alan 
Richardson claims that “in its wider sense of mental growth, education might be taken 
as defining the Romantic ethos” (6). Richardson defends his claim through an 
exhaustive survey of educational texts that were influential during the Romantic 
period and rigorous readings of their methodologies. Among these texts he includes 
John Locke’s Some Thoughts on Education (1693); Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Émile 
(1762); Mary Wollstonecraft’s Thoughts on the Education of Daughters (1787); 
Richard Lovell Edgeworth and Maria Edgeworth’s Practical Education (1798); 
Hannah More’s Strictures on the Modern System of Female Education (1799); 
Andrew Bell’s The Madras School, or Elements of Tuition (1808); and John 
Lancaster’s Improvements in Education (1808). Richardson’s research characterizes 
the Romantic period as engaged in a complex dialogue about education. The 
discussions took place at local and national levels and issues of class, gender, and 
religion influenced the theories. At times highly stratified, extremely coercive, and 
deeply religious, Romantic education was also revolutionary and liberationist. A new 
widespread availability of the printed word helped usher in an overall movement 
toward literacy for all classes. However, education was still very much designed to 
limit class mobility. Although educational theories aimed at the middle class like 
Locke’s, Rousseau’s, and the Edgeworth’s are predominantly secular Sunday Schools 
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took up the majority of the responsibility to educate the poor. These religious schools 
took the Bible as their primary text. Because of the involvement of religious groups in 
educational efforts there was often an overlap between education and indoctrination. 
This overlap allowed for more movement than we often recognize between religious 
values and educational ideals at the moment when education was becoming 
institutionalized for the first time in English history. Drawing on Richardson’s work in 
Literature, Education, and Romanticism 1780-1832 I will begin this chapter by 
discussing elements of Locke’s, Rousseau’s, and most especially the Edgeworth’s 
educational theories that pertain to the inculcation of moral and social values. I will 
then examine sermons on temperance to establish the religious significance of the term 
during the Romantic period. Finally I will conclude by reading Wordsworth’s 
educational theory and instances of temperance in his poetry and prose together with 
primary and secondary texts that address the English “Poor Laws.”  
EDUCATION IN THE ROMANTIC PERIOD 
 Although not Romantics, Locke’s and Rousseau’s writings on education 
influenced educational theories during the Romantic period. In Some Thoughts Locke 
lays out an educational theory that is at once permissive and coercive. Locke 
advocates for the teaching of reasoning skills over rote memorization of moralisms, 
play as an essential element of intellectual development, and fostering love instead of 
administering corporeal punishment. However, Locke’s theories are purposed toward 
practical application. He prefers teaching reasoning over rote memorization because 
reasoning skills—when based on specific moral principles chosen by the teacher—are 
more likely to foster habits than memorization; he advocates for genuine affection 
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between parent and child because it is more likely to cultivate lasting obedience. Long 
after the child has ceased to be motivated by fear of a parent, Locke argues, the child 
will be obedient out of love (Literature, Education, and Romanticism 1780-1832 48). 
Both Locke and Rousseau advocate for systems that eschew heavy-handed 
discipline for surveillance. In Some Thoughts on Education and Émile every aspect of 
the child’s development is watched over and engineered. Although both texts 
recommend free play as part of proper childhood development it is only ever within a 
tightly controlled environment. The Lockean and Rousseauian systems are intent on 
producing an autonomous (male) subject but only after every prescribed precept has 
been instilled in him through a tightly designed program of behavioral and cognitive 
control. The first-generation Romantics objected to Locke’s and Rousseau’s theories 
because in them contrived experiences supplant genuine experiences (Literature, 
Education, and Romanticism 51). Both systems of education require the teacher to 
contrive encounters for their pupils—who are made to believe the encounters are 
chance—in order to achieve specific didactic purposes. By designing the seemingly 
adventitious experiences of everyday life, all elements of a child’s formation are 
tightly controlled (Literature, Education, and Romanticism 50).  
Even though Locke’s and Rousseau’s methods were heavily critiqued during 
the Romantic period the control they advocated, Richardson argues, remained a 
feature of Romantic educational theory. The Edgeworth’s Practical Education 
dispensed with Locke and Rousseau’s method of contriving experiences but retained 
their tight environmental control. Where Locke and Rousseau take pains to make the 
educational environment appear natural, the Edgeworth’s instructions run more to the 
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arrangement of the nursery and the kinds of objects best fitted for play. However the 
Edgeworths are similar to Locke and Rousseau in their insistence that children be 
continuously monitored (Practical Education 13). The Edgeworth’s watchfulness 
takes two forms; they recommend constant vigilance against undesirable traits and 
monitoring the progress of desirable traits as they are instilled in the child through 
instruction. Monitoring the degree to which the child retains his lessons is essential for 
the Edgeworths because their system of education requires that only one principle is 
taught at a time (Practical Education 68). In the Edgeworth’s system the adoption of 
each principle is carefully monitored because the system is dependent on associations. 
Like Locke, the Edgeworths believe that the mind is a tabula rasa and that from 
infancy a child’s mind makes associations that will later form his thoughts. The 
Edgeworths argue: 
What the man of reason cannot do for himself after his associations are 
strongly formed, might have been easily accomplished in his early 
education. He might have been taught the same general principles, but 
with different habits. By early associating the pleasures of sympathy, 
and praise, and affection with all generous and benevolent actions, his 
parents might have joined these ideas so forcibly in his mind, that the 
one set of ideas should never recur without the other. Whenever the 
words benevolence or generosity were pronounced, the feelings of 
habitual pleasure would recur; and he would independently of reason, 
desire from association to be generous. (Practical Education 202) 
 85 
The kind of education the Edgeworths describe prioritizes habit formation over reason. 
Although the man of reason has been taught the principle it is not infixed in him. In 
Edgeworth’s system the principle is not learned it is instilled. The man educated by 
Edgeworth’s system is trained into associating the principle with pleasures so much so 
that they cannot be divided. This educational strategy takes positive reinforcement to a 
coercive level. By associating praise and affection with good deeds, the Edgeworths 
claim that a child can be trained to immediately and unreflectively associate pleasure 
with socially desirable actions. Through repetitive association the child would learn to 
react like Pavlov’s dog.1 By associating benevolence and generosity with pleasure at 
the level of conditioning, even the words themselves would generate pleasure. The 
association aims to remove critical thinking from ethical action. The relationship 
between association and action is interesting; here the action arises from a desire to 
prolong and produce pleasure. Because generosity is associated unreflectively with 
pleasure, acting generously is of immediate emotional benefit to the actant. The 
pleasure, however, is simultaneously distanced from the act of generosity. It is not the 
generosity that produces pleasure, it is the association between generosity and pleasure 
continuing to recur. Of course for the Edgeworth’s system to work the way they 
                                                
1 The Edgeworth’s educational philosophy and Pavlov’s experiment differ in that 
Pavlov began from an observation of unconditioned response. Dogs naturally salivate 
when presented with food for physiological reasons. The similarity between Pavlov’s 
dog and the Edgeworth’s child lies in the purposeful association of stimuli. Pavlov 
took a neutral stimulus—one unconnected with the unconditioned stimulus (food)—
and forced an association through repeatedly linking the neutral stimulus to the 
unconditioned stimulus. Eventually the dog learned to associate the neutral stimulus 
and the unconditioned stimulus until both neutral and unconditioned stimuli created 
the unconditioned response (salivation). In other words, Pavlov rang the bell when he 
fed his dog; after repeatedly associating the bell with the food, he found that the dog 
would salivate just from hearing the bell.  
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imagine it they would have to maintain absolute control over all of the child’s 
associations. 
 One of the Edgeworth’s primary methods to control associations, Richardson 
explains, is to control figurative language (Literature, Education, and Romanticism 
56). Although they recognize the impossibility of dispensing with figurative language 
altogether—most especially in representing thought and feeling—the Edgeworths 
advise maintaining as much control over linguistic associations as possible. They 
claim that those who “wish to argue accurately . . . when they are obliged to describe 
their feelings or thoughts by metaphoric expressions . . . will prefer the simplest . . . 
[words] with which the fewest extraneous associations are connected” (Practical 
Education 170). Because the Edgeworth’s educational theories are based on 
controlling associations figurative language is problematic. The value of language in 
the passage above is measured by its accuracy. Language is valuable in as much as it 
does the work of accurately communicating thought or feeling. Language loses its 
value as it becomes less precise because the speaker loses control over the associations 
the listener makes. If the parent or teacher does not have complete control over the 
associations the child makes, then they might engineer sub-rational habits 
unintentionally. For the Edgeworths the impreciseness of figurative language might 
mean the difference between a child who associates generosity with pleasure and one 
who associates generosity with something less motivating.  
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 Even though the Edgeworths have concerns with the ambiguity of figurative 
language they consider the arts important to childhood education.2 Their interest in 
literature resides in its ability to foster socially acceptable taste and a sympathetic 
imagination (Practical Education 181). To create a socially acceptable taste children 
must only be exposed to artistic and literary works that “those who have determined 
the national standard” consider best (172). Here the arts lay the groundwork for 
nationalism and social conformity. The Edgeworths proceed to advise parents and 
teachers to model the evaluation of the arts on the basis of their socially accepted 
value. They say that parents should ask who painted or wrote a print or poem prior to 
offering an opinion on its worth so that children learn by example to judge according 
to socially accepted values instead of their own taste (172).  
The Edgeworthian system accomplishes the other purpose of the arts, the 
cultivation of a “sympathetic imagination,” through the association of ideas (Practical 
Education 181). They provide two examples to illustrate their theory. In the first, a 
painter depicts two girls laughing so realistically that everyone who sees the painting 
feels its infectiousness and cannot help but laugh. The other example is from Plutarch; 
when Porcia and Brutus part Porcia is composed, but when she sees a painting of 
Hector and Andromache’s parting she begins to cry. Although they call the reactions 
in both the first and second examples sympathy, only the second example results from 
the “sympathetic imagination” (181). Bodily sympathy, for the Edgeworths, does not 
                                                
2 In a later volume entitled Readings on Poetry (1816) the Edgeworths address the best 
methods of teaching poetry to children. They expound on excerpts from a number of 
poems including selections from poems by Pope, Milton, and Gray. Their readings, 
dealing primarily with context and rhetorical devices, claim singular meanings for 
each selection.  
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involve the imagination; the first example is an uncultivated physical response. The 
viewer, according to the Edgeworths, does not laugh because they feel affinity with 
the girls in the painting; they laugh as one yawns upon seeing another yawn. In the 
second example, Porcia is moved because of the connection she imagines between 
Andromache and herself; she feels that they are united in their love and concern for 
their husbands.  
There is also an element of class to the Edgeworth’s division between bodily 
sympathy and sympathetic imagination.3 The Edgeworth’s bodily sympathy is 
universal—it is like an echo of emotion and requires no particular training. To have a 
sympathetic imagination one must be trained. The painting prompts an outpouring of 
sympathy because Porcia is familiar with Andromache’s story. She would likely feel 
nothing in response to the painting if she could not identify the painting as 
Andromache and Hector’s parting and did not know that Hector’s death was 
imminent. Porcia can associate her own fear and pain with that of Andromache 
because she has the cultural knowledge to draw upon. The imaginative work in this 
example of the “sympathetic imagination” occurs in Porcia’s using that knowledge to 
imagine a connection between Andromache and herself. By imagining herself as 
similar to Andromache Pocia expands her understanding and experience of her own 
emotions while simultaneously acknowledging the depth of someone else’s.  
                                                
3 The Edgeworths agree that the educated and uneducated may have the same capacity 
for imagination but argue that the uneducated have fewer associations upon which to 
call. Because they conceive of the imagination as different combinations of images 
and associations often drawn from literature and art, if one is not familiar with 
literature and art one has fewer possible imaginative combinations to draw from 
(Practical Education 183). 
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It would be irresponsible to characterize the Edgeworth’s sympathetic 
imagination as a predecessor to what Spivak calls “imagining the other.”4 The end of 
the sympathetic imagination is pleasure for the subject. The Edgeworths claim, “no 
happiness can be enjoyed in society without the social virtues . . . [and] on our 
sympathy with our fellow creatures depend many of our social virtues” (Practical 
Education 253-4). Sympathy is desirable because of its relationship to social virtues. 
As with the association between generosity and pleasure I discussed previously5 the 
end of virtue, for the Edgeworths, is pleasure. The sympathy is almost incidental. To 
be happy requires a certain level of peaceful coexistence and honest affection. The 
Edgeworth’s educational system trains the imagination to make sympathetic 
connections between self and other to affect this end. However, that the Edgeworths 
make a connection between imagination and social virtues is significant. Although 
their educational theories are heavily influenced by rationalist ideas, the imagination 
has an important place in fitting a child for inclusion in society. The Edgeworths take 
care to reiterate that imagination and sympathy must be governed by reason but 
imagination is still the faculty that connects self to other and creates the conditions for 
social felicity.  
                                                
4 In “Terror: A Speech After 9-11” Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak argues that we must 
be “trained into imagining the other” (3). Imagining the other suspends the 
construction of the other as an object that can be known in favor of listening to the 
other. In Spivak’s ethical imagining the other is as the self—complex, changeable, and 
fathomless.  
5 The Edgeworths claim that forging associations early on between benevolent actions 
and pleasure would solidify the connection between the two in the mind of the child so 
much so that later in life any mention of generosity would produce pleasure. By 
forging this association one could ensure a generous subject because the resulting 
pleasure would motivate them to generosity. 
 90 
While educational theories aimed at the middle class advocated training habits 
of mind in order to produce a rational, autonomous subject fit for inclusion in society, 
education designed for the poor aimed to produce a more moral, competent, and 
complacent workforce. In Religion and Respectability: Sunday Schools and Working 
Class Culture 1780-1850 (1976) Thomas Walter Laqueur argues that “most men had . 
. . [an] external, instrumental motive in supporting education; they hoped that it would 
make the lower orders more virtuous, more loyal, more firmly attached to the church, 
more moral, easier to control, and perhaps healthier and more productive as well” 
(130). Laqueur provides an excellent history of the rise of Sunday Schools during the 
late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. He contends that the debate about 
education took a turn during this time period; instead of arguing about whether or not 
to educate the poor the debate in the Romantic period turned to who should have 
control over their education and what they should be taught (Laqueur 128-9).6   
Sunday School curricula combined secular and religious studies including 
reading, writing and, sometimes, basic math (Literature, Education, and Romanticism 
66). Far from the school “displac[ing] the church . . . as the principal cite for 
regulating social relations of power and domination” (Richardson 39) for many of the 
working poor the school and the church became synonymous. Most Sunday Schools 
took the Bible as their primary text but many also utilized primers that included poetry 
and prose (Religion and Respectability113-16). The materials included in the primers 
                                                
6 Sunday Schools accomplished much of the work of educating the poor during the 
Romantic period and no widespread secular institutional system existed until the 
Elementary Education Act of 1870. Laqueur’s research shows that 200,000 students 
were formally enrolled in Sunday Schools in 1800, 450,000 in 1818, and 1,400,000 in 
1833. Instead of lessening over the Romantic period enrollments grew right up to the 
Education Act of 1870. 
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varied but, when included, the poetry was often associated directly or indirectly with 
religious topics; it was typical to include sections from Pilgrim’s Progress, Paradise 
Lost, and the Book of Martyrs (Religion and Respectability 206). These texts were 
used to support the social order by emphasizing the importance of hierarchical 
structures, the moral responsibility of each person in the hierarchy to fulfill their role, 
and the characterization of mortal life as transient and necessarily painful or difficult.  
England’s motivations for educating the poor were deeply rooted in the 
changes brought about by industrialization and the fears associated with the French 
Revolution. In The Statesman’s Manual (1832) Coleridge constructs an argument for 
the education of the poor based on what he claims were the mistakes that led to the 
French Revolution. Coleridge attributes the French Revolution to the convergence of 
three major factors: the education and power available to the rising industrial class, the 
insensibility and indulgence of the ruling class, and the irreligiosity of the then-
prevalent philosophies.  
Coleridge forges a connection between the three factors by linking them to 
scriptural prophecy. Immediately after condemning these three failings of French 
society Coleridge quotes at length from Isaiah, chapter forty-seven. In this chapter 
Isaiah prophecies the destruction of Babylon and Chaldae7 for reasons that match the 
accusations Coleridge has just lodged against France. By putting his accusations 
alongside Isaiah’s, Coleridge makes France a mirror for the Biblical Babylon. He 
follows the lengthy quotation by insinuating that England is in the same danger. His 
                                                
7 Chaldae was a part of southern Babylon. Although Isaiah specifies Babylon and 
Chaldae in chapter forty-seven the two terms are often used interchangeably.   
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insinuation is indirect; instead of extolling the faults of England8 as he did with 
France, he uses second person to include England with France and Babylon. Coleridge 
writes,  
There is a grace that would enable us to take up vipers, and the evil 
thing shall not hurt us: a spiritual alchemy which can transmute poisons 
into panacæa. We are counseled by our Lord himself to make unto 
ourselves friends of the mammon of Unrighteousness:9 and in this age 
of sharp contrasts and grotesque combinations it would be a wise 
method of sympathizing with the tone and spirit of the Times, if we 
elevated even our daily news-papers and political journals into 
comments on the Bible. (47-48) 
Although he begins the quoted passage with the claim that it is a condemnation of 
France, by switching to second person he includes England in Isaiah’s censure. The 
passage is rife with Biblical allusions. He alludes to Mark when he names snake 
handling and transmutation of poisons; these are the miracles promised to those who 
believe the testimony of the Apostles. Coleridge also references the parable of the 
unjust steward in Luke, chapter sixteen when he says “we” are counseled to make 
ourselves friends to the “mammon of Unrighteousness.” In this parable the steward 
                                                
8 The first and second of these factors were certainly concerns in England as well as in 
France. The increasing population of industrial towns and cities, availability and 
popularity of political tracts like Thomas Paine’s Rights of Man (1971), beginnings of 
labor unions, and public displays of discontent like the Bread Riots contributed to a 
potentially volatile environment.  
9 Coleridge is referencing the parable of the unjust steward in Luke, chapter sixteen. In 
this parable the steward wastes the riches of his master. The steward goes to the 
debtors who owe his master and collects partial payments of the debts they owe in 
hopes that when his master dismisses him the debtors will welcome him into their 
homes.   
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wastes the riches of his master. The steward goes to the debtors who owe his master 
and collects partial payments of the debts they owe in hopes that when his master 
dismisses him the debtors will welcome him into their homes. Taken together these 
two allusions provide a solution to the problem of social upheaval and moral 
degradation that Coleridge wrestles with in The Statesman’s Manual. First, Coleridge 
suggests, to escape the fate of France England must have faith because it is upon faith 
that miracle-enabling grace is contingent. Second, England must make friends where it 
would typically make enemies. In the parable the unjust servant is wise because he 
seeks out those who have reason to hate him—as a steward he would be the debt 
collector—and makes them his friends and allies. When he reduces their debts he 
makes them indebted to him for his kindness instead of to his master for money. 
Coleridge proffers faith as the answer to his second and third causes of the French 
Revolution (the insensibility and indulgence of the ruling class, and the irreligiosity of 
the then-prevalent philosophies). He applies the parable as the solution to his first 
cause (the education and power available to the rising industrial class). Instead of 
attempting to stop the poor from accessing the newspapers and political journals that 
could incite them to riot, Coleridge suggests turning those publications to friendly 
purposes by making them into Bible commentaries.  
 Coleridge argues that the type of literature the poor have access to is bad for 
the health of their minds and that it makes them “proud” (49). He employs a metaphor 
comparing aesthetic taste to sensual taste to articulate the relationship between reading 
and the health of the mind.  
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It would require the intrepid accuracy of a Colquhoun10 to venture at 
the precise number of the vast company only, whose heads and hearts 
are dieted at the two public ordinaries of Literature, and the circulating 
libraries and the periodical press. But what is the result? Does the 
inward man thrive on this regimen? Alas! if the average health of the 
consumer may be judged of by the articles of the largest consumption; 
if the secretions may be conjectured form the ingredients of the dishes 
that are found best suited to their palates; from all that I have seen, 
either of the banquet or the guests I shall utter my Profaccia with a 
desponding sigh. From a popular philosophy and a philosophic 
populace, Good Sense deliver us! (50-51). 
In this passage food takes the place of literature, the stomach takes the place of the 
mind, and secretions (waste) take the place of ideas and actions. The daily meals 
(ordinaries) of the poor have been circulating libraries and periodical presses—two 
sources that would not come with any regulation or interpretation to control or direct 
their reading. The metaphor suggests that this reading changes the mind the way food 
changes the body. Food contributes to determining the health of the body. It can 
change the shape and composition of the body and affect its performance. It certainly 
affects the secretions of the body. Like food, Coleridge suggests, literature shapes the 
mind and affects its production of thought, feeling, and, by extension, action.  
                                                
10 Coleridge may be referring here to Patrick Colquhoun’s 1806 “A Treatise on 
Indigence.” In his treatise Colquhoun argues that the poor are a necessary part of any 
economy. Coleridge argued against Colquhoun’s conclusions (McCloskey 24).  
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The metaphor allows Coleridge to bemoan what he calls the “reading public” 
while simultaneously emphasizing the importance of reading. Food is essential to life. 
To live one must eat even if the available food is less nourishing than one would 
prefer. Likewise the connection Coleridge makes between the literary diet and the 
literal diet of the poor allows Coleridge to imply that literature is essential to feed the 
mind. It also positions him to offer his solution to the problem of the reading public; 
instead of endeavoring to take away the knowledge the poor currently have access to 
Coleridge argues for more knowledge through a more thorough education.  
Coleridge argues that basic literacy is only a partial education because the real 
end of education is shaping the faculties of mind and the habits. He writes, “much less 
can [literacy] be held to constitute Education, which consists in educing the faculties, 
and forming the habits” (53). Coleridge’s use of “educing” suggests a different view 
of education. Instead of indoctrination or inculcation, “educing” suggests drawing out 
something already present in proto-form. Even though Coleridge claims that literature 
is essential to education it is not the purpose of education. The purpose of education is 
to expand the faculties of the mind—reason and imagination both.  
RELIGIOUS TEMPERANCE 
In “Sermons on the Following Subjects” (1799) Richard Graves11 similarly 
                                                
11 Reverend Richard Graves (1715-1804) was a minister, and a Fellow at All Souls 
College—although his Fellowship was revoked when he married, as was customary. 
He wrote prolifically and was the author of the novel The spiritual Quixote, 3 volumes 
(1773); many published sermons and essays including, The love of order: a poetical 
essay (1773); A letter from a father to his son at the university (1787); The reveries of 
solitude: consisting of essays in prose (1793); and the poems “On Calumny” (1776); 
“The Banks of the Wye” (1776); “A College Life” (1780); and “On Caprice” (1780). 
He is not to be confused with the clergyman Richard Graves (1763-1829), author of 
Graves on the Pentateuch.    
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yokes together aesthetic and sensual taste and their relationship to habit. He warns that 
the intemperate man is “under the tyranny of his sensual appetites; which he has so far 
indulged as to have lost all relish for every other enjoyment . . . his understanding is 
clouded, and his imagination extinguished . . . he has lost all taste for the common 
enjoyments and innocent amusements, of life” (117-118). Graves’ concern here is in 
the relationship between sensual enjoyment and sensibility. Sensibility decreases in 
inverse correlation to sensual enjoyment—or at least certain kinds of sensual 
enjoyment. The sensual appetites, for Graves, are the appetites of the flesh. He makes 
a distinction between dangerous sensual appetites and “common” and “innocent 
amusement.” The latter include familial affection, intellectual enjoyment, and the 
pleasures of the imagination. It is for these pleasures that the intemperate man has lost 
“relish.” The language of taste weighs heavy in Graves’ sermon. Taken together the 
words “appetite,” “relish,” and “taste” bring to mind taste as a sense. But these words 
accomplish double purpose; when combined with the faculties of understanding and 
imagination they also figure for aesthetic taste.12 The language Graves uses to discuss 
                                                
12 Wordsworth utilizes this same doubling of language in the 1802 “Preface” to 
Lyrical Ballads when he critiques the use of traditional poetic expressions. 
Wordsworth critiques poets for “think[ing] that they are conferring honour upon 
themselves and their art, in proportion as they separate themselves from the 
sympathies of men, and indulg[ing] in arbitrary and capricious habits of expression, in 
order to furnish food for fickle tastes, and fickle appetites, of their own creation” 
(Wordsworth: The Major Works 597). Like Graves, Wordsworth uses the language of 
sensual and aesthetic taste. Inflated poetic language is an indulgence; it is “food” for 
fickle tastes and appetites. Through the connection between these two types of taste 
Wordsworth also accuses the poet of complicity in the degradation of those appetites; 
he claims that the poets create the appetites that they satisfy. Later in the “Preface” 
Wordsworth discusses the ills of the “degrading thirst after outrageous stimulation” 
(599) that he says is becoming common due to the increasing availability of daily 
news and the faster pace of city life.   
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the aesthetic aspect of intemperance—“clouded” understanding and “extinguished” 
imagination—suggest obfuscation. To understand is to see clearly and imagination is 
often linked to light (A Defense of Poetry 673). It is the connection between these two 
kinds of taste—sensual and aesthetic—that characterizes temperance.  
Because sensitivity of the mind is the hallmark of temperance, and sensitivity 
and stimuli are in direct proportion, the kind and amount of stimuli one enjoys is a 
moral concern. In “A Compleat Treatise of Moral and Intellectual Virtues ” (1722) 
John Hartcliffe specifically warns against the effects of intemperance on the senses in 
the two acts of consumption he deems most dangerous: feasting and reading romances. 
There is no distinction in Hartcliffe’s writing between the feeding of the body and the 
feeding of the mind. Consuming too much food or food that is too rich will result in 
illnesses of the body, including a de-sensitivity of taste that makes simple fare 
unpalatable. Likewise, too much emotional stimulation or stimuli that are too turbulent 
result in illnesses of the mind, including warped reason and a hardened heart or 
lessened ability to feel. Hartcliffe writes:  
There hath, for some hundred years, passed a sort of writing, which we 
call Romances,  . . . which books are the greatest fomenters of Folly, 
Lust, and Idleness, that have appeared upon the stage of Human 
Madness . . . . For this reason, some moralists have resolved, that 
young persons must not be suffered to look into lascivious books, and 
some priced of poetry; because, tho' they are fittest to learn virtue, by 
precepts of morality, yet they are most apt, by the arts made use of in 
these discourses, to be drawn into vice, being set forth in the most 
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charming postures, and in the most taking colors. (124) 
Hartcliffe is concerned that the disproportionate excitement of Romance will, 
as Graves puts it, lessen “relish” for more common pleasures. He claims that 
Romances incite “folly, lust, and idleness,” presumably as a result of this gap between 
Romance and reality. Readers become accustomed to the adventure and danger in 
Romances, making common experience less appealing and increasing the reader’s 
desire to seek out more violent stimuli. Hartcliffe admits that although he is arguing 
against reading Romance because of its possible detrimental affect, it is possible for 
Romance to promote morality as well. For Hartcliffe, if Romances were read as moral 
lessons they could ultimately teach virtue; but because depictions of vice are by their 
very nature seductive, he believes that the depictions of vice in Romance will seduce 
readers and keep them from recognizing the moral lesson. Like Graves, Hartcliffe 
yokes together sensual and aesthetic taste—in this case intemperance in aesthetic taste 
leads to intemperance in sensual taste. The fantastical nature of Romance leads to an 
over abundance of sense stimuli which results in an increased desire for even more 
stimuli.13  
                                                
13 Warnings against the affect of too much stimuli on the imagination abound in the 
eighteenth century. In addition to the sermons quoted above, Nathaniel Wanley, Vicar 
of Trinity Parish, discusses it in The Wonders of the Little World (1774). The Wonders 
is an index of stories illustrating the dangers of various kinds of intemperance, 
including the corruption of the imagination to a degree that it becomes a danger to the 
health of the body. In Theological, Philosophical, and Moral Essays, Reverend 
Edward Barry (1790) advocates for temperance on the basis of its ability to “place the 
mind, for the most part, in a calm and reasonable posture and renders it of course, less 
liable to the boisterous attack of the passions” (198). And in “The Ensign of Peace” a 
whole section is given over to a description of how one might die from an over-excited 
mind. 
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Conversely, in these sermons temperance increases the acuteness of the senses, 
steadies the mind, preserves the body, and increases enjoyment from common 
experiences. According to Hartcliffe, temperance “enables and prepares us for all 
moral good . . . [being] that which preserves our Wits entire, and all whatsoever fits us 
for prudent or regular actions” (115). Hartcliffe’s description of temperance is a 
prerequisite for moral action as well as moral enjoyments. That temperance enables 
and prepares suggests a cycle of past and present production. Temperance enables 
“us” for moral good in the present but only after preparing “us” for it in the past. 
Considering Hartcliffe’s earlier emphasis in this sermon on the relationship between 
intemperance and a lack of enjoyment in everyday pleasures, here “regular actions” 
are actions that take place regularly and actions that are themselves moderate. In 
“Theological, Philosophical, and Moral Essays” (1795), Reverend Edward Barry 
argues that temperance “stir[s] up the mind to industrious and commendable pursuits” 
(198). Intemperance stirs the passions; temperance stirs the mind. Both Hartcliffe and 
Barry emphasize the relationship between temperance and action. Like a kind of 
mental conditioning, temperance keeps the mind in shape.14 
The concerns Graves, Hartcliffe, and Barry articulate in their sermons about 
intemperance are drawn from Biblical conceptualizations of the affects of sin on the 
heart and mind of man. Both the Old and New Testaments repeatedly warn against the 
hardening of the heart and mind due to intemperance. Ephesians chapter 4, verse 19 
                                                
14 This description of the mind as “fit” or “unfit” is reminiscent of Burke’s theory of 
the role of the nerves in the experience of the sublime and beautiful. Burke compares 
the nerves to muscles; he theorizes that just like physical labor is necessary to 
maintain a strong body even when painful or unpleasant, so too is the exercise of the 
nerves essential to maintaining a strong mind.  
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says that the Gentiles “being past feeling have given themselves over unto 
lasciviousness” (King James Bible). In this moment Paul is counseling the Ephesians 
on how to be worthy disciples. He connects keen sensibility with good discipleship. 
The figurative language that frames encounters with the divine shapes the relationship 
between sensibility and discipleship. In the Old and New Testaments the voice of God 
is often described as “small,” “still,” and and as a “whisper.” For example, the 
description of the encounter between God and Elijah at Horeb is described as follows: 
“And, behold, the Lord passed by, and a great and strong wind rent the mountains, and 
brake in pieces the rocks before the Lord; but the Lord was not in the wind: and after 
the wind an earthquake; but the Lord was not in the earthquake: And after the 
earthquake a fire; but the Lord was not in the fire: and after the fire a still small voice” 
(King James Bible 1 Kings 19.11-12). The progression of violent stimuli to subtle 
stimuli is a test of Elijah’s devotion and worthiness. Elijah proves his worthiness by 
being attuned to the “still small voice” of God instead of being distracted or 
overwhelmed by the display of power. In Ephesians Paul contrasts disciples of Christ 
with the Gentiles based on this mental and emotional sensitivity. The Gentiles are 
alienated from God because of the “vanity of their mind[s]” and “blindness of their 
heart[s]” (King James Bible Ephesians 4.17,18). Religious concepts of intemperance 
affect the mind and the heart—thought and feeling—making the subject unfit to hear 
the voice of God or feel the subtle stirrings of his love. The relationship between 
intemperance and insensibility is cyclical. At first intemperance causes insensibility 
but once the cycle has begun, as with the Gentiles, intemperance becomes the by-
product of the failure of feeling as well.  
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WORDSWORTHIAN TEMPERANCE 
In the 1802 “Preface” to Lyrical Ballads Wordsworth identifies increasing the 
sensitivity of the mind as the purpose of his poetry. He writes, 
For the human mind is capable of being excited without the application 
of gross and violent stimulants; and he must have a very faint 
perception of its beauty and dignity who does not know this, and who 
does not further know, that one being is elevated above another, in 
proportion as he possesses this capability. It has therefore appeared to 
me, that to endeavor to produce or enlarge this capability is one of the 
best services in which, at any period, a Writer can be engaged. 
(Wordsworth: The Major Works 599) 
Wordsworth claims a role for literature that is educative and moral. The work is 
educational because it can “produce or enlarge” the capability of the mind to be 
stimulated without recourse to extreme, excessive, or profuse stimuli. It answers the 
ends of education as defined by Coleridge. Coleridge claims that the end of true 
education is in “educing the faculties, and forming the habits” (The Statesman’s 
Manual 53). Coleridge argues that literacy is only part of this educational work to 
form the mind. Wordsworth claims the ability to increase sensibility as the province of 
literature. Wordsworth argues that this work is necessary because changes in living 
conditions are endangering the sensitivity of the mind. He argues, “a multitude of 
causes, unknown to former times, are now acting with a combined force to blunt the 
discriminating powers of the mind, and unfitting it for all voluntary exertion to reduce 
it to a state of torpor” (Wordsworth: The Major Works 599). Wordsworth’s concern 
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echoes Richard Graves’ sermon on temperance where he cautioned that the 
intemperate man’s “understanding is clouded, and his imagination extinguished . . . he 
has lost all taste for the common enjoyments and innocent amusements, of life" 
(“Sermons on the Following Subjects” 117-18). Graves and Wordsworth are similarly 
concerned with the effect saturating the senses has on one’s ability to feel subtler 
stimuli. But there are also some important differences in the ways that Graves and 
Wordsworth think about the problem of sensibility. Graves is primarily concerned 
with bodily pleasures while Wordsworth applies the same theory—that too much 
stimulation results in a dulled ability to feel stimulation—to pleasures of the mind. In 
addition, Graves’ solution is to moderate sensual pleasure while Wordsworth argues 
for an overabundance of certain kinds of pleasures. Wordsworth says of poetry, “The 
end of poetry is to produce excitement in a co-existence with an over-balance of 
pleasure (Wordsworth: The Major Works 609). It is not in pleasure Wordsworth 
locates the problem but in pleasure driven by a craving for sensationalism. 
 Poetry should excite the mind and incite pleasure but it does so through inducing a 
state where “ideas and feelings do not . . . succeed each other in accustomed order” 
(Wordsworth: The Major Works 609). Like the Edgeworth’s theory of education, 
Wordsworth’s poetry creates associations between stimuli, thought, and feeling. In 
Wordsworth’s theory poetry has the capacity to re-train the mind to feel deeply in 
response to subtle, everyday stimuli by associating that stimuli with pleasure. 
Wordsworth expressed repeated concerns that formal education of his period 
addressed only the “mechanical” part of human nature to the neglect of feeling. In 
Literature, Education, and Romanticism Alan Richardson claims that for Wordsworth 
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“the function of poetry . . . is not didactic yet is fundamentally pedagogic” (262). 
Richardson explains, “didatctic poetry could not, in fact, perform the educative 
function which Wordsworth wished his own writing to exemplify . . . rather than 
conveying or embodying one sort of doctrine or another, poetry rightly performs its 
work of “educing” through the very process of its reception, bringing the reader’s 
imagination into responsive activity and thus stimulating, fostering, and refining it” 
(263). This claim comes in the epilogue to Richardson’s book, so Richardson does not 
explore how Wordsworth’s poetry attempts to accomplish this goal. My aim in the 
remainder of this chapter is to continue the conversation Richardson began by 
examining Wordsworth’s educational theory in his poetry and prose.  
Wordsworth said of his own education that it was “wanting in power to 
connect together the heart and the intellect, so as to produce that intelligent feeling or 
moral power, by which heaven is first gained and then enjoyed” (The Letters of 
William and Dorothy Wordsworth 1821-1828 312). Here Wordsworth articulates the 
strong relationship between thought and emotion that he prioritizes in his poetry. 
Education, for Wordsworth, has a moral element; he calls the product of thought and 
feeling “intelligent feeling or moral power.” Wordsworth yokes attainment and 
enjoyment together and makes “moral power” the condition for both. The 
relationships between thought and feeling, and attainment and enjoyment that he 
constructs are mutually dependent. Without the connection between thought and 
feeling one does not meet the conditions for or have the capacity to enjoy salvation.15 
                                                
15 Whether Wordsworth is speaking of heaven literally or figuratively is unclear. By 
using the term he capitalizes on the connotations of salvation.  
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 Wordsworth’s critique of education and his emphasis on the necessary 
connection between thought and feeling is further explored in his 1808 letter to the 
Reverend Wrangham, in which Wordsworth critiques the Reverend’s recommendation 
of exclusively religious books for the education of the poor: “you like all other 
clergymen, may confine yourself too exclusively to that concern which you justly 
deem the most important, but which by being exclusively considered can never be 
thoroughly understood” (The Letters of William and Dorothy Wordsworth 1806-1811 
246). Although Wordsworth agrees that religious education is crucial, he also argues 
that an exclusively religious education is insufficient. Because salvation requires a 
connection between thinking and feeling, any education that addresses them 
separately, or one to the exclusion of the other, will fail in its purpose. An effective 
education must re-train the mind to react with thought and feeling until the two 
become inextricably linked. Only then will one have the “moral power” necessary to 
attain and enjoy heaven.  
Morality is a complicated idea in Wordsworth’s poetry. For Wordsworth what 
is “moral” is produced by and produces feeling. For this reason, no one theory of 
justice can govern action; what constitutes correct action is likely to change with every 
new permutation of feeling. In Wordsworth Ethics (2012), Adam Potkay observes that 
“ethics, for Wordsworth, is about concrete relations, not about abstract theories” (31-
2). Potkay argues that it is the unknowability of the other that spurs ethical responsibly 
in Wordsworth’s poetry and while I agree that these encounters are often sites of 
ethical generation, it is important to note that most encounters in Lyrical Ballads result 
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in non-action.16 Instead of spurring the reader to do, these poems incite the reader to 
feel.17  
That’s not to say that Lyrical Ballads imposes self over other by fabricating 
unity through over-identification, but that through the use of subtle stimuli the poems 
re-train the reader to respond to the other with feelings of compassion. For example, in 
“The Last of the Flock,” “The Female Vagrant,” and “The Mad Mother” the poetic 
voice gives over the narrative to the marginal figure. In all three poems the poetic 
voice speaks briefly and only to bring the marginal figure to the attention of the reader 
or to ask for the cause of the suffering the poetic voice witnesses. None of the poems 
offer any moralizing conclusion or reflection to direct the feelings of the reader. The 
pains of the marginal subject are the focus in these poems without extrapolation upon 
what should be learned by and through reading about them. 
Although pedagogic in the sense that they train the reader, the poems resist 
didacticism. On the whole, Lyrical Ballads, as Richardson asserts, attempts to instill 
morality without moralizing, train without constricting the imagination, and teach 
without utilizing didacticism. Wordsworth articulates his resistance to moralizing and 
didacticism in the fragment Essay on Morals (1798) when he says, “I think 
publications in which we formally and systematically lay down rules for the actions of 
Men cannot be too long delayed. I shall scarcely express myself too strongly when I 
                                                
16 In fact, Wordsworth has often been criticized by scholars for the lack of action-
oriented response to the tragedy in his poetry.  
17 This is not unusual; almost all literature is in the business of provoking feeling. 
What differs in Lyrical Ballads is that the reader is asked to feel about people and 
situations that would elicit little or no emotion in real life whereas much literature uses 
extreme situations of danger, joy, and passion to stir the reader.  
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say that I consider such books as Mr. Godwyn’s, Mr. Paley’s & those of the whole 
tribe of authors of that class as impotent in all their intended good purpose; to which I 
wish I could add that they were equally impotent to all the bad ones” (The Prose 
Works of William Wordsworth 103). It is not the purpose of Mr. Godwyn’s and Mr. 
Paley’s books that Wordsworth objects to, it is the method. Wordsworth contends that 
systematically “lay[ing] down” rules of conduct is an ineffective method of teaching a 
reader. But he goes beyond saying that it is ineffective, he also claims that it is 
damaging. The passage that follows the quote above illuminates some of his reasons 
for this claim: 
Now I know of no book or system of moral philosophy written with 
sufficient power to melt into our affections, to incorporate itself with 
the blood and vital juices of our mind, and thence to have any influence 
worth our notice in forming those habits of which I am speaking. 
Perhaps by the plan which these authors pursue this effect is rendered 
unattainable. Can it be imagined by any man who has deeply examined 
his own heart that an old habit will be foregone, or a new one formed, 
by a series of propositions, which presenting no image to the mind can 
convey no feeling which has any connection with the supposed 
archetype or fountain of the proposition existing in human life? These 
moralists attempt to strip the mind of all its old clothing when their 
object ought to be to furnish it with new. All this is the consequence of 
an undue value set upon that faculty which we call reason . . . these 
bold and naked reasonings are impotent over our habits, they cannot 
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form them; from the same cause they are equally powerless in 
regulating our judgments concerning the value of men and things. They 
contain no picture of human life; they describe nothing. (103)  
Mr. Godwyn’s and Mr. Paley’s methods suggest that change is accomplished through 
reasoning—a process of recognition and instruction that simply explains what is 
wrong and tells what is right. However, Wordsworth prioritizes imagination over 
reason because habit is sub-rational. Recognizing that change is desirable is not the 
same as changing. To change a habit you must replace it with a new habit, one that 
becomes as deeply ingrained as the last—a concept he expresses through the use of the 
words “melt” and “incorporate.” In order to form new habits, Wordsworth argues that 
they need to be formed sub-rationally as well, or at least in the language of sub-
rationality. For Wordsworth, new habits are formed when the mind is provided with 
new associations through images tied to real life. These images elicit feeling and 
become incorporated into the thought/feeling cycle. Images, pictures, and descriptions 
are important to Wordsworth’s concept of how habits are formed—a process whereby 
these images that become associated with the reader’s feelings are the forces that 
shape the reader. Although sub-rational, Wordsworth’s concept of habit-formation 
allows for self-analysis and intent. One cannot reason oneself into change but one can 
imagine oneself into it. His argument takes up the same position as Hartcliffe’s 
warning against Romances for a very different end. If imaginative literature is a 
danger because it can so pervasively influence feeling, then it is the most appropriate 
kind of literature to re-train the senses and assist in the formation of a temperate 
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reader. Likewise, if instructive literature is no danger because it does not inspire 
emotion, it is completely unfitted to the work of re-formation.18 
Wordsworth’s theory of habit formation reverses the typical roles of teaching 
and training. J. Jennifer Jones comments on the tension between teaching and training 
in her discussion of Kant’s Lectures on Pedagogy in the introduction to “Romantic 
Training: Education and the Sublime” (2010), a collection in the Praxis Series of 
Romantic Circles. Jones writes:  
The most notable site of struggle in this text occurs around the concept 
of training. Kant defines training as the precondition of the more 
complex work of instruction. Training is defined as “the discipline that 
merely prevents errors” and the latter as guidance in the “exercise of 
that which one has learned” (446). Put another way, “Training is . . . 
merely negative . . . the action by means of which man's tendency to 
savagery is taken away. Instruction . . . is the positive part of 
education” (438; my emphasis). Likewise, training is associated with 
the disciplinary and mechanical, whereas instruction is associated with 
imagination and freedom” (6).  
Jones goes on to complicate this relationship between training and teaching—or 
instruction—through a nuanced reading of Lectures on Pedagogy that shows that even 
                                                
18 Wordsworth goes on in Essay on Morals to say, “can it be imagined by any man 
who has deeply examined his own heart that an old habit will be foregone, or a new 
one formed, by a series of propositions, which presenting no image to the mind can 
convey no feeling which has any connection with the supposed archetype or fountain 
of the proposition existing in human life?” (103). His emphasis here on the importance 
of image to the mind reinforces the important role of poetry in the re-formation of the 
mind.  
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though Kant values instruction over training, both are necessary to realize the full 
potential of humanity. Unlike Kant, Wordsworth prioritizes training as the higher of 
the two methodologies and the one that allows for more freedom and imagination. 
Mechanization is a complicated concept in Wordsworth’s writing. Whereas we think 
of the mechanical as that which is without thought and often even life, for Wordsworth 
the mechanical is the immediate and, therefore, sometimes most full of life. For 
example, the heart pumps blood mechanically, repetitively and without thought, but 
the mechanization of the heart is the ultimate sign of life; if the heart ceased to be 
mechanized, if thought was required to support its motion the body would die. 
Similarly with most mechanical functions of the body, unmechanize them and life 
ceases. The immediacy of habit, its mechanization, is a sign of life. Wordsworth’s oft-
quoted “spontaneous overflow of powerful feeling”19 is itself a mechanical response, 
one that is made possible by training. Only through thinking “long and deeply” does it 
become possible to experience the immediate, mechanical reaction of emotion in a 
way that would produce valuable poetry. In other words, anyone can feel, but only 
those who have trained themselves through reflection that connects thought and 
feeling to common, daily life can feel the valuable, powerful, and immediate emotion 
that is necessary for the composition of “good” poetry. 
Jones then turns to discuss Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “Terror: A Speech 
After 9-11” (2010) for its Romantic-era based theory of pedagogy. I would similarly 
like to address Spivak’s “Terror: A Speech After 9-11” and the way Spivak thinks 
                                                
19 “For all good poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings: but though 
this be true, Poems to which any value can be attached, were never produced . . . but 
by a man, who being possessed of more than usual organic sensibility, had also 
thought long and deeply” (598). 
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closely and carefully about training as an ethical mode of education. Spivak argues 
that we must be, “trained into imagining the other” (3). She says that it is only through 
this imagination, an exercise that suspends the construction of the other as an object 
that can be known in favor of listening to the other. Suspension of knowledge means 
also suspension of judgment. In Spivak’s ethical imagining the other is as the self—
complex, changeable, and fathomless. Imagining the other maintains Kant’s second 
formulation of the categorical imperative (that humanity is an end in itself and not to 
be treated as a means to an end) while dismissing entirely the first formulation of the 
categorical imperative (that all humanity be ruled by the same principles of reason). 
Spivak’s ethical imagining of the other requires that it not be undertaken to establish 
judgment or acquittal, and not as a means to the end of judgment or knowledge. In 
other words, really imagining the other cannot obtain the end of knowing or judging 
the other. For Spivak, the ethical is the interruption of the epistemological—of 
knowing. Spivak’s ethical imagination is a trained skill. She qualifies her use of the 
word “training” with the phrase “the exercise of the educative power” (4).  It is 
education, particularly an education in the Humanities and even more particularly in 
reading, that provides the conditions of possibility for the eruption of the ethical.  
TEMPERANCE IN LYRICAL BALLADS 
 Temperance in Lyrical Ballads is deeply concerned with the ethical imagining 
of the other, most especially the poor and disenfranchised. Wordsworth’s depiction of 
the poor was heavily influenced by the political and social changes in the legal and 
moral understanding of obligations owed to the poor in England. Due to enclosure, 
industrialization, and England’s almost continuous state of war the Romantic period 
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saw a rise in concern about poverty. During the Romantic period the “Poor Relief Act” 
of 1601, instituted by Elizabeth I, governed relief practices. The “Poor Relief Act” 
was a parish-based system that included both in-door and out-door relief.20 The “Poor 
Law Amendment Act” of 1834 sought to do away with out-door relief and to unify the 
care for the poor into a national system. Although the “Poor Law Amendment Act” 
was instituted after Lyrical Ballads was published the theory by which it was shaped 
was written and circulated during the time Wordsworth was writing Lyrical Ballads.  
Jeremy Bentham’s 1797 taxonomy “Cases Calling for Relief” included in The 
Annals of Agriculture and Other Useful Arts, and Thomas Malthus’ 1798 “An Essay 
on the Principle of Population” both called for a shift in the way the poor of England 
were treated and perceived. Both of these works supported the movement from a 
parish-based system of relief to a nationally organized and instituted system while also 
arguing against personal sympathy for the poor. Local attempts to assist the poor were 
cast as counter productive because they did not result in a decreasing population of 
those in need.  
Malthus claims that the natural consequences of poverty including disease and 
starvation are necessary to cull the population and alleviate the burden of poverty on 
the larger society. Attempts to alleviate these natural consequences make poverty 
bearable and in so doing not only sustain the number living off of charity but also 
threaten to increase it by making begging more appealing than work. Malthus argues 
that to make poverty unappealing and motivate the poor to sustain themselves natural 
consequences must not be mediated by local assistance and that any assistance 
                                                
20 Meaning that the system included workhouses for those found guilty of crimes and 
parish-provided assistance that did not require residence at a workhouse.  
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provided through national organization must make poverty even more painful. He 
suggests doing so through the organization of poor houses that would provide the only 
available relief to the poor and that would be made miserable in every possible way.  
Tim Fulford’s “Apocalyptic Economics and Prophetic Politics: Radical and 
Romantic Responses to Malthus and Burke” (2001) examines the ways Malthus used 
Burkean rhetoric of the apocalyptic sublime to align concepts of the English poor with 
the French Revolutionaries. Fulford beautifully shows how the rhetoric of the 
apocalyptic sublime is adapted by Burke from Milton’s Paradise Lost through his 
appropriation of the images of Sin and Death, and then by Malthus who casts the poor 
as radical, lawless, and threatening. Fulford then discusses the Romantic resistance to 
Malthus’ rhetoric. Hazlitt, Coleridge, and Southey spoke out against Malthus’ attack 
on the poor and, Fulford argues, so too did Wordsworth. 
Fulford argues that the second edition of Lyrical Ballads indirectly contends 
with “An Essay on the Principle of Population.” As Fulford observes, one of the 
prevailing accusations against Romantic poetry is that it uses the imagination, and I 
would add nature and the pastoral, as a means of retreat from the political, but as a 
response to Malthus’ essay, Lyrical Ballads is highly political. It intervenes, through 
the medium of poetry, in a discussion taking place through political discourse. This 
intervention through poetry claims a place for poetry and the poet in political 
discourse. In addition, the significance of Wordsworth “common language” pastoral 
poetry, when taken together with Malthus’ adoption of the rhetoric of the apocalyptic 
sublime is even more striking because it attempts to empower the rural poor by 
claiming a place in the discussion for their language. Lyrical Ballads combats the 
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stigmatization of the poor by altering the participants and the terms of the discussion 
but without taking up a defense of the poor on the ground of whether or not they are 
deserving of assistance or compassion.  
 Wordsworth’s resistance to the deserving/non-deserving binary sets him apart 
from many of his contemporaries who argued that appropriate sympathy for the poor 
was dependent on whether or not they were culpable for their situation. Determining 
such culpability was a major effort during the Romantic period. One such effort was 
Bentham’s taxonomy “Cases Calling for Relief” that I mention above. Bentham’s 
taxonomy included a thorough list of pauper categories intended to help in 
inventorying the poor. It included demographic data such as martial status and age as 
well as types of handicaps both physical and mental. The insert requested Annals 
readers complete the tables provided for those receiving in-door and out-door relief 
(marked in different color ink to differentiate between them). Bentham’s “Cases 
Calling for Relief” was a census of the poor that attempted to map the causes of 
poverty not for the purpose of alleviation but for the purpose of comprehending and 
managing them. It was ultimately unsuccessful because he received too few completed 
inserts but his theories were still instrumental in the “Poor Law Amendment Act” of 
1834 (Boehnen 288).  
 Bentham’s main contribution was his doctrine of utilitarianism that advocated 
two principles essential to the “Poor Law Amendment Act”: first, that man is 
motivated only through and by pain and pleasure; and second, that what is moral is 
that which produces the most happiness for the most people. Bentham’s commitment 
to the first principle caused him, like Malthus, to advocate for the widespread 
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establishment of workhouses with purposefully deplorable conditions. His 
commitment to the second principle explains his zeal for the division of the deserving 
from the undeserving poor. Only by dividing out those who do not deserve happiness 
and are the causes of stress on society could one know how to best maximize the 
happiness of society.  
 Representations of poverty in Lyrical Ballads resist the kind of classification 
that Bentham advocated. Instead of demographics and binaries, “The Last of the 
Flock,” “The Female Vagrant,” “Simon Lee,” and “The Thorn” insist on narratives 
that offer opportunities for sympathy without making decisions on issues of 
culpability. These poems engage the reader in an imaginative work to “educe” the 
faculties of the mind and increase sensibility when faced with the everyday pains of 
the poor and marginalized.  
In “The ‘Preface’ to Lyrical Ballads: Poetics, Poor Laws, and the Bold 
Experiments of 1797-1802” (1997), Scott Boehnen articulates the ways that 
Wordsworth’s refusal of culpability as a consideration in poverty relief is a political 
statement. Boehnen supports his argument with contemporary reviews and responses 
to Lyrical Ballads that show readers were engaged with the poems at the level of a 
politics of poverty relief (291). That readers engaged with Wordsworth’s poetry as 
political complicates New Historicist formations of Lyrical Ballads as participating in 
an occlusion of politics through a turn to the pastoral. Instead, the pastoral becomes 
the site of political conflict because part of the argument was whether or not parish-
based (rural) methods of poverty relief were socially beneficial. Boehnen further 
argues that Lyrical Ballads attempts to displace Bentham’s pleasure/pain binary by 
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substituting an array of complex feeling including sympathy. He calls Wordsworth’s 
poetic theory a “poetics of sympathy” and contends that it attempts to provide 
motivation for readers to change their habits in regard to the relief of the rural poor by 
sidestepping issues of culpability (306).   
Wordsworth attempts to increase reader’s sensibility to the marginal poor in 
several ways. One of these ways is to create the feeling that the reader has an 
encounter with the marginal poor by implicating the reader in the narrative. 
Wordsworth implicates the reader in the narrative through the use of two techniques. 
In “The Thorn” Wordsworth uses address and tense to shift the relationship between 
reader and text until the reader becomes part of the text. In “The Mad Mother,” “The 
Last of the Flock,” and “The Female Vagrant,” the poetic voice begins as an observer 
relating an experience with the marginal figure but then slips into the background of 
the narrative. Slipping into the background of the narrative allows the marginal figure 
to appear to tell his or her own story, giving the reader the impression of an 
unmediated encounter.  
The first five stanzas of “The Thorn” are addressed directly to the reader. By 
way of subtle tense changes the poem revises the reader’s position in relation to the 
scene. The poem moves from a second person address in conditional simple tense (you 
would) to a second person present simple tense (you are). The second person 
conditional simple tense creates a sense of intimacy as the poetic voice imagines the 
reader into the poem as a potential co-observer. In the first two stanzas the poetic 
voice tells the reader what he or she would say if he or she were present to view the 
scene. Second person conditional present tense allows the poetic voice to direct the 
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reader’s interpretation of the poem’s primary symbol—the thorn—by narrating the 
reader’s imagined reactions.  
But the second person conditional simple tense also creates distance by 
rendering the sentence structure a reminder of absence. The distance serves to temper 
what would otherwise be too painful an image. The thorn is “old,” “grey,” “knotted,” 
“forlorn,” and “wretched” (1, 4, 8, 9). The moss that clings to the thorn is imbued with 
malevolence; the moss “creep[s]” to “clasp” the thorn so close that the poetic voice 
claims if the reader were there he or she would be positive that the moss meant to 
“drag it to the ground” and “bury it . . . forever” (20, 22). The dual effect of second 
person conditional simple tense allows the poetic voice to direct reader interpretation 
while maintaining a distance from the image that renders it less painful or suffocating.  
However, in the third stanza of “The Thorn,” the poetic voice switches the 
conditional simple tense for second person simple present tense and collapses the 
distance. The change in tense coincides with a drawing away from the primary 
symbol; while the first two stanzas describe the thorn, in the third stanzas the poetic 
voice and reader look together at the beautiful area surrounding the thorn. Suddenly 
the reader goes from potential co-observer to observer. The poetic voice narrates the 
experience of the reader as if in real time thus increasing the impact of the “beauteous” 
heap of moss that is at once “vermillion,” “olive-green and scarlet-bright,” “green, red, 
and pearly white” (44, 46, 48) and drawing the reader deeper into the narrative 
through an overabundance of pleasure.  
Like “The Thorn,” “The Mad Mother,” “The Last of the Flock,” and “The 
Female Vagrant,” take the form of an observation. These poems are all told from the 
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perspective of a poetic voice who observes the scene. Often these observers are 
without characterization themselves and serve as vehicles for the stories of the 
marginal poor. In “The Mad Mother,” “The Last of the Flock,” and “The Female 
Vagrant,” the poetic voice slips into the background almost immediately and 
sometimes repeatedly, leaving the reader to focus on their own imaginative encounter 
with the marginal figure. In “The Last of the Flock” the poetic voice speaks in the first 
sixteen lines of the one hundred-line poem and his lines serve only to introduce us to 
the shepherd who dominates the remainder of the poem. In “The Female Vagrant” the 
poetic voice speaks even less, only one line in two hundred and seventy and that line is 
in parentheses, “(The Woman thus her artless story told)” (2). The poetic voice in 
“The Mad Mother” is present in the first stanza to give a description of the Mother 
who then speaks directly for the rest of the poem. In each of these cases the poetic 
voice serves as an introduction to the marginal figure. Although the marginal figure 
begins as an observed object, in each case the figure quickly become the active subject 
in the poem.   
Although it is impossible to have an unmediated encounter with the marginal 
poor in any of these poems, the withdrawal of the poetic voice as a mediating 
influence gives the impression of an unmediated encounter. In “The Last of the Flock” 
and “The Mad Mother” the impression of an unmediated encounter is accomplished 
through the use of direct quotation from the marginal figure. Because the poem is 
mostly in the form of direct quotation it suggests to the reader that he or she is able to 
access the “real” or “true” encounter without it being interpreted by the poetic voice. 
While these encounters simulate “true” encounters they do not offer “Truth.” Instead 
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they offer the story as told by the marginal figure, validating their language and 
experience in the process.  
Another way Wordsworth attempts to increase the sensibility of his readers to 
the common pains of the marginal poor is to displace judgment while emphasizing 
unknowability. In “The Thorn” the reader cannot know if Martha Ray killed her child 
or not. The poetic voice presents the reader with a series of possibilities gleaned from 
the community but each one is presented as nothing more than gossip. All the poetic 
voice knows for certain is that Stephen Hill promised to marry Martha Ray and 
married another woman instead, and Martha Ray was pregnant at one time. The poetic 
voice emphasizes that we cannot know what happened to the baby or why Martha Ray 
continues to go sit by the thorn and cry. The poetic voice tells the reader, “I cannot 
tell; I wish I could / For the true reason no one knows” (89-90). Although the poetic 
voice “longs to know,” knowing is out of reach. Not only can the poetic voice not 
access the truth of Martha Ray’s past, he also cannot access her feelings in relation to 
their shared environment. The poetic voice asks “But what’s the thorn? and what’s the 
pond? / And what’s the hill of moss to her?” (210-11). Those landmarks have received 
the most vivid and imaginative attention in poem but neither the poetic voice nor the 
reader can know what she sees in them or what their significance is to her. The poetic 
voice can only imagine, and the imagination of the poetic voice is contrasted with 
those who provide the vicious gossip he reports and who insist she should be “to 
public justice brought” (233).  
Even the poetic voice’s imagination is contrasted with those who imagine 
Martha Ray’s guilt. The poetic voice’s primary concern is not whether Martha Ray is 
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guilty of killing her child but why she is so miserable. While true that one could 
certainly contribute to the other, those who want to arrest her believe they know the 
reason for her misery is her guilt. The poetic voice refuses imagining based on a pre-
formed conclusion. The poem elicits the reader’s imagination by posing questions that 
prioritize Martha Ray’s feelings over the salacious aspects of her story.  
Wordsworth employs a similar strategy in “Simon Lee, The Old Huntsman,” 
but he makes the responsibility of the reader to imagine the marginal figure more 
overt. The subtitle of the poem is “With an Incident in which he was Concerned” but 
Wordsworth delays relating any particular incident until the last two stanzas of the 
poem. Instead, each prior stanza is the introduction of a possible incident that is left 
unexplained. We are told that Simon Lee has “upon his back, No doubt, a burthen 
weighty” but not what the burden is; we are told “he has but one eye left,” but not the 
story of how he lost the other; and we are told that “Few months of life has he in store, 
/ As he to you will tell” but we are not told why nor are we permitted to hear Simon 
Lee’s own assertion (5-6, 15, 65-6). Each aborted story draws the reader’s interest 
without recourse to salacious details or harrowing anxiety by delaying the relating of 
the promised “incident” of the subtitle. Instead each story resists schadenfreude and 
appeals to sympathy by creating increased interest in the common experience of a 
particular marginal figure. After eight stanzas of aborted stories, the poetic voice 
interjects with an address to the reader, saying: 
 My gentle reader, I perceive 
How patiently you’ve waited, 
And I'm afraid that you expect 
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Some tale will be related. 
 
O reader! had you in your mind 
Such stores as silent thought can bring, 
O gentle reader! you would find 
A tale in every thing. 
What more I have to say is short, 
I hope you'll kindly take it; 
It is no tale; but should you think, 
Perhaps a tale you'll make it. (69-80) 
The reader expects a tale for an understandable reason: one was promised in the 
subtitle. Regardless of how legitimately the reader might expect a tale, the poetic voice 
insists otherwise. Instead of being provided with a tale the reader is asked to consider 
the role he has played in the narrative—a passive role of patient waiting—and the 
active capacity of his own mind to create a tale of its own. If the reader finds no tale 
present in his own mind, “silent thought” is recommended to generate one. In essence, 
the poetic voice has furnished the reader with several beginnings and asked the reader 
to imagine the multiplicity of narrative possibilities. The address to the reader here 
switches the subject of the poem from the “truth” about Simon Lee to the workings of 
the reader's own mind by asking the reader to consider his mind, how it has or has not 
worked and how it might work. It also bolsters the imagination by furnishing the 
reader with open-ended narratives. 
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However, that is not the only thing the poetic voice asks of the reader. In the 
last three stanzas of the poem the poetic voice does, finally, relate an incident. In these 
last stanzas the poetic voice explains that he happened upon Simon Lee while Simon 
Lee was attempting to chop the root of a rotted tree. The poetic voice takes the ax and 
accomplishes the task for the old woodsman. The final lesson is in Simon Lee's 
reaction. 
The tears into his eyes were brought, 
And thanks and praises seemed to run 
So fast out of his heart, I thought 
They never would have done. 
—I've heard of hearts unkind, kind deeds 
With coldness still returning. 
Alas! the gratitude of men 
Has oftner left me mourning. (97-104) 
The relation of this incident does not undermine the interpretive opportunity offered 
by the previous resistance to completing the tale. Instead it requires further 
imaginative work. In addition to asking the reader to analyze the workings of his own 
mind by imagining the endings to the aborted stories in prior stanzas, the poetic voice 
asks the reader to turn his attention to himself in relation to Simon Lee by considering 
the poetic voice, his actions and his feelings. To make sense of the poem the reader 
must ask why gratitude would cause the poetic voice to mourn and to interpret these 
feelings into a kind of moral lesson that implicates the larger world instead of Simon 
Lee: there is so little good done in the world that common acts of decency cause a 
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disproportionate amount of gratitude in the recipient. The play on words in the subtitle 
becomes apparent only when the reader engages in this complex analysis. The “he” of 
the subtitle (“With an Incident in which he was Concerned”) could be either Simon 
Lee or the poetic voice, Simon Lee because he is “concerned” meaning involved and 
the poetic voice because he is “concerned” meaning dismayed. The work the reader is 
asked to do prompts not only consideration of the text but also consideration of and 
concern for the world outside the text, the reader himself, and his own thoughts in 
relation to both text and world with an emphasis on the responsibilities of Christian 
charity.  
It is at the intersection of Christian charity and the ethical imagination where 
we find temperance. As a habit of delaying judgment to provide a space for an 
eruption of feeling, temperance governs both practices. These poems take as their 
primary object teaching the reader this habit of imagining and feeling. By implicating 
the reader in the narrative, attempting to reduce the distance between the marginal 
poor and the reader, and emphasizing unknowability, the poems create the conditions 
for a more ethical response to the marginal poor. In this project Wordsworth was 
deeply influenced by the politics and religious and educational rhetoric of his time. 
But he also deviates from other educational theories by thinking about the ways that 
the mind can be re-formed (and reformed) once associations have already become 
solidified. For Wordsworth, the most effective tool in re-forming the mind is poetry 
because it can engage the imagination of the reader in a way that forges new 
associations and builds new habits.  
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AFTERWORD 
In 2009 a team of Stanford researchers published a report in Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences on the cognitive capabilities of information technology 
multitaskers. They found that those who regularly engage in “over-saturation” of 
media” have difficulty filtering memories, distractions from their environment, and 
distractions from their own minds. The researchers came to the conclusion that 
“people who are regularly bombarded with several streams of electronic information 
do not pay attention, control their memory or switch form one job to another as well as 
those who prefer to complete one task at a time” (Nass et al.). They could not 
determine if there was a genetic component to the tendency toward technology 
multitasking; however, they left open the possibility that those who engage in more 
than one media stream at a time are actively training their brains to be incapable of 
activities that require more sustained attention.  
In 2012 the Pew Research Center conducted a survey that showed a 
widespread belief among educators that students’ use of digital technology has 
reduced their ability to engage in more sustained cognitive activities. Although the 
study is subjective and provides no hard data, it is a good measure of the overall 
impressions that govern the choices teachers make in the classroom. Many teachers 
who participated in the study commented that they felt pressure to cater their 
curriculum and teaching style to their students’ lowered attention spans. Dr. Dimitri 
Christakis, Director of the Center for Child Health, Behavior and Development at 
Seattle Children’s Hospital, commented on the study, saying that “students saturated 
by entertainment media [are] experiencing a ‘supernatural’ stimulation that teachers 
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might have to keep up with or simulate” because excessive exposure to technology 
“makes reality by comparison uninteresting” (“Technology Changing How Students 
Learn, Teachers Say”).1  
It seems like researchers and teachers agree that students’ use of technology is 
problematic but there seems to be little agreement on what to do about the problem. 
Some, like Dr. Christakis, believe that education must evolve in order to meet 
students’ increased need for stimulation. Many institutions of higher education are 
paying close attention to the “NMC (New Media Consortium) Horizon Report” for its 
predictions of which technologies will change higher education in the next one to five 
years. The report consistently advocates for more faculty training on technology in the 
classroom and more flexibility for students’ use of technology inside and outside of 
the classroom.  
Others contend that more technology is not a viable solution to the problem of 
too much technology. Studies in “Generation Y and Learning” in the Ashridge Journal 
argues that students need to spend more time on single-focus learning. This year’s 
“The Leap: Vision for Learning” report (2015) from the Association of American 
Colleges and Universities found that because “the ground has shifted for Americans in 
virtually every important sphere of life [and] . . .the world is being dramatically 
reshaped by scientific and technological innovations” (6) the three most important 
skills for students to learn at college are those typically laid claim to by the 
Humanities: “inquiryand analysis,” “criticalandcreativethinking,” and “writtenand
                                                
1 Dr. Christakis studies the effects of technology stimulation on mice. 
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oralcommunication” (7). Still others claim an even more essential role for the 
Humanities. For Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak the Humanities are nothing less than the 
best training ground for ethical engagement through the practices of imagination.  
While the capacity of the Humanities to do something about what is being 
portrayed as a crisis of thought and imagination seems to be generally acknowledged,2 
the amount of money invested in the Humanities at the college level reflects a 
different story. While the government provides 70 to 75% of the funding for the 
sciences, it only provide 20 to 30% of the funding for the Humanities (The Heart of 
the Matter 40).  
I raise the argument surrounding the purpose, value, and support of the 
Humanities to gesture toward what I hope will be the future of my work. To say the 
Humanities are under attack is, perhaps, hyperbole, but to say that they suffer from 
neglect is not. My hope is that by examining the claims we have made for the 
Humanities in the past we might avoid the mistake of slipping into a nostalgia—one 
that claims people used to be able to think, concentrate, read—that only ever positions 
the Humanities as no longer relevant however much we wish they were. Examining 
the historical why and what of claims made on behalf of the Humanities will, I hope, 
help us to better imagine and defend their future. 
                                                
2 A flurry of publications in 2013 (“The Heart of the Matter,” “Ready to Innovate: Are 
Educators and Executives Aligned on the Creative Readiness of the U.S. Workforce?,” 
“It Takes More Than a Major: Employer Priorities for College Learning  
and Student Success,” and “STEAM: The Integration of the Arts and Sciences,” 
among others) shared general consensus that the Humanities excelled in preparing 
student for ethical and innovative thinking. “The Heart of the Matter,” for example, 
describes the Humanities as “a source of national memory and civic vigor, cultural 
understanding and communication, individual fulfillment and the ideals we hold in 
common” (9). 
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